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ABSTRACT
Progress on women's equality in Japan is found to be constrained by state
intervention in the women's movement. This intervention takes the form of
regulations that limit the independence of women's group, as well as resources
that aid and influence their activities. The result is a relationship between
women and the state that is more cooperative than conflictual. For this reason,
social change is necessarily slow, as it is achieved through constant consultation
and compromise.
These findings were reached through an examination of women's organizations,
women's centers, and women's policy in Japan. Data collected on 889 women's
organizations shows a vibrant and diverse women's movement. But Japanese
government policies make it difficult for grassroots civic groups to gain legal
recognition and develop beyond part-time voluntary associations into full-time
professional organizations. At the same time, the Japanese government actively
intervenes to aid women's organizations by providing various resources, such as
direct funding, government offices for women's policy, and public women's
centers. Data collected on 623 women's centers and analysis of various women's
programs show how the provision of these resources allow the government to
influence the women's movement. In this way, cooperation between the state
and women's movement is institutionalized, minimizing social conflict and
slowing social change.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard J. Samuels
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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Chapter One
Introduction
In Japan's northernmost prefecture of Hokkaido, the two-and-a-half mile
long Nozuka tunnel connects the counties of Hitaka and Tokachi along national
highway 236. For the ground-breaking ceremony in August of 1990, the mayors
of surrounding towns, heads of prefectural counties, and representatives from
the national government were all invited, except for one. Nagai Nobu was the
first woman to head a prefectural county in Hokkaido, a post she had just taken a
few months earlier. Even though Nagai headed the county of Hitaka where the
tunnel would be located, she was not invited to the ground-breaking ceremony
because of the belief that the presence of a woman would cause the mountain
goddess to become jealous and incite accidents during construction. A male
county official was invited in her place. But Nagai herself seemed unfazed. "I
have not heard who will attend. I suppose the person who gets invited should
be the person who attends," she was quoted as saying in the Hokkaido Shiimbunii, 5
August 1990.
Was this an isolated incident, reflecting the regional eccentricities of the
less developed north? Apparently not. Five years later and a thousand miles
south of Hokkaido in the city of Kagoshima, a seven member labor standards
committee was to conduct a safety inspection of a tunnel under construction.
The one female member of this committee was asked not to attend, again, for fear
of causing accidents. Her reaction was also rather mild. According to the
Minami Nihon Shimbuin, 30 November 1995, she responded, "I was glad that times
have changed so that I, as a woman, could become a (committee) member. This
outcome is a little disappointing."
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These stories epitomize the contradictions of gender inequality in Japan.
In a wealthy, technologically advanced country of super highways and tunnels,
superstitious beliefs about women receive official recognition. While women
have made significant gains, serving as county officials or advisory committee
members, there is quiet acceptance of the discrimination they face. How are
patriarchal ideas maintained in such a modern country? Where is the outrage,
organization, and mobilization of women against sex discrimination? These are
the questions that led to this study of the women's movement in Japan, and the
search for a political explanation for the persistence of gender inequality in
Japan.
Japan's rise from the rubble and ashes of military defeat to become the
second largest economy in the world has been hailed as nothing short of a
miracle. Rapid economic growth and democratic institution building has
transformed Japanese society in the postwar period. Yet, in the midst of massive,
social, political, economic, and cultural change, gender inequality persists at
remarkably high levels throughout Japanese society, in employment, education,
and politics. This is not to say that the status of women in Japan has not
undergone significant change, but rather the measurable gains in women's
equality with men are strikingly small in proportion to the magnitude of change
throughout the rest of Japanese society. And, compared with other countries,
Japan consistently ranks at or near the bottom of the industrialized world on
standard measures of gender equality.
The paradox of Japan's social, economic, and political progress against the
persistence of gender inequality raises the question of why gender inequality in
Japan remains so pronounced in the face of economic, demographic, and
international indicators pointing in the direction of equality. This broad, general
question has been studied from a variety of perspectives, with each discipline
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formulating its own research question. For example, anthropologists ask how
gender roles are prescribed by Japanese culture, while economists ask how labor
market conditions contribute to gender inequality. From a political science
perspective, the question is about power, specifically the power of Japanese
women to lobby and influence the state on behalf of women's interests.
Therefore, this dissertation asks, why have Japanese women failed to use their
political power as citizens of a democracy to affect social change towards gender
equality?
This question is broken down into a series of questions. First, are women
in Japan organized as a political movement? Second, if so, are there institutional
obstacles to their participation in the policy making process? Third, perhaps
women are organized and have political access, but do not define their political
interests in terms of equality with men. After examining these most basic
political science questions, I have found a very vibrant and active women's
movement in Japan that seeks equality and enjoys access to the policy making
process. But what has slowed and controlled the pace and direction of social
change on women's issues in Japan is a close relationship between the state and
women's organizations maintained through state intervention in civil society.
This intervention takes the form of regulations on interest groups, resources
offered by the government, and institutions of policy making, all of which ensure
a fundamentally cooperative relationship between women and the state.
Women's movements in all democracies struggle with the tension
between access and autonomy in cultivating their relationship with the state.
While access to government officials and political parties is crucial to achieving
legislative goals, too much cooperation and compromise can lead to co-optation.
On the other hand, autonomy from the state provides independence and
legitimacy, but often at the expense of efficacy. Striking the right balance
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between access and autonomy is a universal challenge for women's movements
worldwide.
This dissertation argues that, in the case of Japan, the scale tips heavily on
the side of access over autonomy for a large segment of the women's movement.
While the number of small, independent women's groups in Japan has grown
significantly in recent years, their influence in the policy making arena pales in
comparison to long-established, resource-rich, national women's organizations
with close ties to the government. These select groups enjoy access to state
officials and resources, in a relationship with the state that is characterized as
more cooperative than conflictual. This is not to say that Japanese women's
groups always support government positions and policies. But the level of
compromise, consultation, and cooperation between women's organizations and
the state has meant that the process of social change towards a more gender
equal society in Japan has been exceedingly nmeasured and slow.
The close relationship between mainstream women's organizations and
the state did not develop overnight or by accident. Historians have documented
state intervention in women's social movements in Japan since the Meiji period
(1868 - 1912), through World War II, and to the present (Sievers 1983; Bernstein
1991; Garon 1997). Following up on this body of historical work, this dissertation
examines the relationship between the women's movement and the state in
contemporary Japan. Specifically, the relationship is studied in the context of
regulations, resources, and policy-making. Each context offers a separate widow
through which to view interactions between the state and women's
organizations. First, as all states regulate interest group activity to varying
degrees, women's organizations and the laws that govern their activities in Japan
will be examined. Second, this study looks at government supported women's
centers as a unique institutional link between the women's movement and the
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state. Finally, the process of making women's policy will be examined to
provide a dynamic view of how women's organizations interact with state policy
making institutions.
Through the analysis of women's groups, women's centers, and women's
policy, this dissertation offers a political explanation for gender inequality in
Japan. Although there is a large, interdisciplinary literature on the status of
Japanese women, there are surprisingly few works that explicitly address
political processes and institutions.' At the same time, there is growing body of
comparative work on women's politics and policies across industrialized
democracies (Ruggie 1984; Katzenstein and Mueller 1987; Lovenduski and Norris
1993; Sainsbury 1996). But Japan is conspicuously missing from these studies.
The lack of politics in the Japanese studies literature on women, and the omission
of Japan from comparative women's politics indicate that a political explanation
is needed to provide a missing piece to the puzzle of gender inequality in Japan.
A Puzzling Case of Gender Inequality
Questions about the status of Japanese women arise because Japan
represents an exceptional case of gender inequality. While no society has perfect
equality between the sexes, there is much variation in levels of equality across
countries. Therefore, the underlying goal of this project is not to explain the
existence of inequality, but rather to identify factors that make some women
more or less equal than others. Japan provides an excellent case study to
examine this variation because women in Japan are measurably the "least equal"
in the industrialized world, as comparative data will show. This high degree of
' Pharr 1980 and LeBlanc 1999 are notable exceptions.
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inequality is puzzling in light of theories that posit a relationship between
economic development, political mobilization, and gender equality.
Economic Theory: Women and Development
Theories about women and economic development hold that there exists a
curvilinear relationship between women's status and economic development
(Boserup 1970; Gallin, Aronoff, and Ferguson 1989). Modernization Theory,
which was prominent in the 1960s, first suggested a linear relationship between
economic development and equality between the sexes. But empirical studies
beginning in the 1970s showed that the process of industrialization leads to an
initial decline in the status of women, before peaking in advanced stages of
economic development. The explanation for this trend is that in simple, agrarian
societies, men and women work side by side, doing equally back breaking work,
though their tasks tend to differ. But during the early stages of industrialization,
there is a distinct separation between home and work, as men typically work for
wages in factories, while women perform unpaid domestic work. It is during
this stage of development that women's economic autonomy declines.
Nevertheless, as the economy matures from manufacturing to services, changes
in the supply and demand of female labor bring women back into the paid labor
force alongside men. Thus, after an initial decline, the status of women is held to
be highest during the most advanced stages of economic development.
In some respects, the Japanese case supports this general theory. Key
economic and demographic indicators show that Japan's level of economic
development is comparable to the most technologically advanced, industrialized
countries in the west. Like their western counterparts, Japan is a large, wealthy
country with a service based economy (Table 1.1).
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Table 1.1 Demographic Profile of Selected Countries
Population Per capita Percentage of Labor Force in
(in millions) GDP ($) Agriculture Industry Services
2000 2000 1990-1992
Scandinavia
Denmark 5.3 27,627 6 26 66
Norway 4.5 29,918 6 24 70
Sweden 8.8 24,277 3 28 69
G-7
Canada 30.8 27,840 5 23 72
France 59.0 24,223 6 29 70
Germany 82.0 25,103 3 39 58
Italy 57.5 23,626 9 32 59
United Kingdom 59.4 23,509 2 28 70
United States 283.2 34,142 3 25 72
Japan 127.1 26,755 7 34 59
Asian "Tigers"
Hong Kong 6.9 25,153 1 35 64
South Korea 46.7 17,380 17 36 47
Singapore 4.0 23,356 -- 35 65
Other Asia
China 1,275.1 3,976 73 14 13
Indonesia 212.1 3,043 56 14 30
Malaysia 22.2 9,068 26 28 46
Philippines 75.7 3,971 45 16 39
Thailand 62.8 6,402 67 11 22
Vietnam 78.1 1,996 68 8 24
Sources: United Nations Development Programme 1995, 2002.
Japanese people enjoy a high standard of living compared with the rest of
the world. Japan has the longest female life expectancy of any country, and a
very low rate of infant mortality. Mass communications is widespread, as nearly
every household has access to television and newspapers (Table 1.2).
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Table 1.2 Selected Measures of Development
Scandinavia
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
G-7
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
United Kingdorr
United States
Japan
Asian "Tigers"
Hong Kong
South Korea
Singapore
Average Infant
Life Mortality Televisions
Expectancy (per 1,000 births) (per 100 people)
2000 2000 1992
76 4 54
79 4 42
80 3 47
I
6
4
4
6
6
7
4
79
79
78
79
78
77
81
80
75
78
n/a
5
4
64
41
56
42
44
82
61
28
21
38
Other Asia
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
Vietnam
71
66
73
70
70
68
32
35
8
30
25
30
3
6
15
5
11
4
n/a
2
12
5
7
1
Sources: United Nations Development Programme 1995, 2002.
As theory predicts, economic development has had a significant impact on
the status of women, as evidenced by demographic trends. Like women in other
wealtby industrialized countries, women in Japan are living long lives, having
few children, receiving near universal primary and secondary education, and
participating in the labor force in large numbers (Table 1.3).
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Daily
Newspapers
(copies per
100 people)
1992
33
61
51
22
21
3
11
38
24
58
82
41
34
Table 1.3 Selected Measures of Female Development
Female Workforce
Female Life Fertility Female School Participation Rate
Expectancy Rate Enrollment Rate* (Age 15 and above)
2000 2000 1992 - 1997 2000
Scandinavia
Denmark 79 1.7 112 62
Norway 82 1.8 106 59
Sweden 82 1.5 126 63
G-7
Canada 82 1.6 103 60
France 82 1.7 108 49
Germany 81 1.3 102 48
Italy 82 1.2 96 38
United Kingdom 80 1.7 131 53
United States 80 2.0 99 59
Japan 84 1.4 103 51
Asian "Tigers"
Hong Kong 82 1.2 84 51
South Korea 79 1.5 99 53
Singapore 80 1.6 81 50
Other Asia
China 73 1.8 95 73
Indonesia 68 2.6 79 55
Malaysia 75 3.3 84 48
Philippines 71 3.6 n/a 50
Thailand 73 2.1 n/a 73
Vietnam 71 2.5 n/a 74
Sources: United Nations Development Programme 2002, United Nations 2000.
*In some casec, the ratio exceeds 100 percent because the combined primary and secondary
enrollment ratio is defined as total first and second level enrollment of girls, regardless of age,
divided by the population of girls of the age group which corresponds to these two levels of
education.
These tables highlight the relationship between economic development
and demographic change in the female population. As wealthy industrialized
countries have moved away from agriculture and manufacturing towards a
service based economy, the shift in the economic base has had two important
consequences affecting the demand for female labor. First, as people from the
countryside pour into urban areas, the rural reserve pool of labor dries up.
Women represent an additional reservoir of untapped labor for employers to
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turn to. Second, jobs in the service sector tend to involve less physical labor than
jobs in manufacturing or agriculture. Physical differences that excluded women
from many jobs become less relevant in the new knowledge intensive labor
market. The decline of "blue-collar" factory jobs has been accompanied by the
rise in "pink-collar" clerical jobs that require interpersonal communication,
flexibility, and attention to detail, skills thought to be consistent with women's
traditional roles as caregivers and nurturers.
On the supply side, economic development has brought about changes
that have allowed women to meet the new demand for their labor. As Table 1.3
shows, women in wealthy, industrialized countries tend to live longer, have
fewer children, and attain higher levels of education than women in developing
countries. As the service sector expands, women have the time and skills
necessary to take advantage of new opportunities in the job market.
These changes in the supply and demand of female labor appear to be
fairly consistent throughout the industrialized world. A reasonable expectation
is that these economic and demographic trends would lead to growing equality
between the sexes, as women begin to go to school and work alongside men. In
general, this movement towards women's equality is seen throughout the world.
But, even among the wealthiest countries, there is significant variation in levels
of gender equality across different measures. The one strikingly consistent
finding is that Japan ranks at the bottom of the industrialized world on all basic
measures (Table 1.4).
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Table 1.4
Measures of Gender Equality
Administrators Female Enrollment Percentage of
Female Wages and Managers in Higher Education Women in
(as %7 male)a (%o women) (as % male)b Parliaments
1990-1999 1985-1997 1992-1997 2002
Scandinavia
Denmark 84 20 134 38.0
Norway 88 31 140 36.4
Sweden 91 59 142 42.7
G-7
Canada 63 43 130 20.6
France 79 10 125 12.3
Germany 74 19 96 31.7
Italy 83 54 128 9.8
United Kingdom 74 33 122 17.9
United States 75 44 116 14.0
Japan 58 9 85 7.3
Asian "Tigers"
Hong Kong 64 18 n/a n/a
South Korea 55 4 63 5.9
Singapore 59 36 84 11.8
Other Asia
China 59 12 57 21.8
Indonesia n/a 17 53 8.0
Malaysia 63 16 n/a 10.4
Philippines 74 35 128 17.8
Thailand 68 21 118 9.2
Vietnam 91 n/a 79 27.3
Sources: United Nations 2000, International Labor Office various years, United Nations
Development Programme 2001, 2002; Interparliamentary Union 2002.
a Ratio of female wages to male wages in manufacturing.
b Includes tertiary school age defined as 18 to 23 years. Values reported as female ratio as a
percentage of male ratio.
c Percentage of women in the lower or single House as of August 2002.
On these standard measures of gender equality, Japan stands out as a
highly unequal society. Among the industrialized democracies belonging to the
Group of Seven (G-7), Japan has the largest wage gap between women and men,
the lowest proportion of female managers, the largest gap between female and
male enrollment in higher education, and the smallest share of parliamentary
16
seats held by women. In terms of equal wages, the most common measure of
gender inequality, Japan does even worse than most of its Asian neighbors with
less developed economies. Such a high degree of gender inequality in Japan runs
counter to women's gains in health, education, and employment in the postwar
period. These same demographic trends have led to uniformly higher levels of
equality for women in the rest of the industrialized world, while Japan lags far
behind. For these reasons, Japan represents an outlier case that merits close
examination.
Political Theory: Development and Mobilization
At the very least, the Japanese case indicates that economic development
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for gender equality. Changes in
supply and demand of female labor alone do not guarantee gains for women's
equality. The history of women's movements world-wide reveals that equality
does not just happen. It must be fought for through political organization,
mobilization, and struggle. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the Japanese
case in light of theories that highlight the political mechanisms by which
economic development leads to growing equality between the sexes.
Inglehart (1990) posits that as countries grow richer, citizens begin to
adopt "post-materialist" values that go beyond economic issues such as
employment, inflation, or economic growth, to include less immediate, more
altruistic concerns, such as the environment, social welfare, or civil rights. There
is evidence that Japan underwent such a change in values following its period of
high speed economic growth. Richardson and Flanagan (1984) document a shift
in policy priorities in Japan beginning in the early 1970s when the government
dramatically increased spending on social security and welfare programs,
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adopted a series of stringent anti-pollution laws, and expanded outlays on public
works. It was also during this time, in 1975, that the United Nations inaugurated
its Decade for Women, prompting Japan to join the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The requirements
of this convention placed international pressure on Japan to adopt policies to
promote equal treatment between the sexes by the end of the women's decade.
But the resulting Equal Employment Opportunity Law, passed just in time to
meet the 1985 deadline, was notable for its failure to ban sex discrimination in
key areas of employment.2
Another theory that helps clarify the relationship between economic
development and equality is Gurr's theory of relative deprivation (Gurr 1970).
Gurr points out that popular protest arises when perceptions of actual
circumstances do not meet expectations. The absolute level of oppression is less
important than the relative deprivation people feel when they compare
themselves with others. This theory may be used to explain the timing of second
wave women's movements in the United States and West Europe in the 1970s.
As these economies moved from manufacturing to services, many women began
to enter the labor force, taking advantage of their increasing levels of education,
decreasing number of children to care for, and advances in labor saving
technology for housework. Working alongside men, women experienced rising
expectations about their rights and opportunities, resulting in broad based
political mobilization and government action. The proliferation of mass media
2 The EEOL of 1985 prohibits sex discrimination in training, education, benefits,
retirement and dismissal. But in the areas of recruitment, job assignment, and
promotion, employers are "obliged to endeavor" (doryokiu gima) not to
discriminate against women. This obligation to endeavor carries no legal effect
of enforcement. It was not until 1997 that the Diet passed two bills to amend the
EEOL to prohibit sex discrimination in all hiring, promotion and retirement. The
law took effect in April of 1999.
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and global communications further fueled rising expectations as women could
compare their situation with women in other countries. Japan has undergone
similar demographic changes that accompany economic development, and
Japanese women are well aware of their relative deprivation given Japan's
advanced system of mass communications and the national movement of
"internationalization," or "kokusaika." And yet for women in Japan, the rising
expectations that economic development tends to produce has not resulted in
mass political protest or rebellion.
Finally, a third theory suggests another intervening variable to specify the
relationship between economic development and equality. Resource
mobilization theory focuses on the organizational obstacles to forming and
maintaining successful political movements (McCarthy 1973). To overcome the
obstacles of large start-up costs and collective action problems, resources such as
money, time, skills, leadership, networks, and alliances are critical for forming
and maintaining broad based political organizations. For example, Freeman
(1975) shows how women in the United States were able to draw upon extensive
communication networks that were formed among college women during the
student New Left movement in the 1960-. Similarly, Evans (1979) points to
leadership and organizational skills that women learned through the civil rights
movement which later proved to be a valuable resource for the women's
movement. Because resources such as money, time, skills, and communication
networks are more likely to be available to affluent women, it is not surprising
that successful women's movements have been formed and maintained in the
wealthy capitalist democracies. Nevertheless, for women in Japan, the
availability of resources alone has not had a significant effect on improving
gender equality relative to other countries.
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All of these variables -- advanced economic development, sweeping
demographic change, post-materialist values, relative deprivation, and resource
mobilization -- point in the direction of equality for women in Japan. Yet,
despite these forces for change, Japan lags significantly behind other
industrialized countries in which these same variables helped raise the status of
women relative to men. How do we account for Japan's deviation from the rest
of the industrialized world? A rich, interdisciplinary literature on women in
Japan provides valuable pieces to this puzzle.
Literature Review
Cultural Explanations
Perhaps the explanation for gender inequality in Japan which most
immediately comes to mind is culture. Comparing Japan with other
industrialized societies always raises the issue of East versus West, as Japan is
the only non-western country among the world's richest nations. Any casual
observer who visits Japan will soon notice distinct gender differentiation in social
position and roles, and even in patterns of speech, behavior, and mannerisms.
Journalistic descriptions of women in Japan tend to focus on Japanese
culture to account for the second class status of women in Japan, citing numerous
examples of blatantly sexist but socially acceptable behavior on the part of both
men and women (Taylor 1983, Condon 1985). Much attention has been given to
distinct differences in language spoken by women versus men. Denigrating
words and Chinese characters related to women reflect their subordinate
position in society. And the manner of speech which is less direct and more
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polite for women than men explicitly shows how gender differentiation
permeates everyday life (Cherry 1989, Endo 1995).
Scholarly treatment of culture examines the status of women in Japanese
society throughout history and in various contemporary settings. Historical
studies point to religious and philosophical traditions, such as Confucianism,
that penetrated institutions of power and influenced official policies towards
women (Ackroyd 1959; Lebra, Paulson, and Powers 1976; Pharr 1977).
Anthropological studies offer intricate views of culturally prescribed gender
roles in the Japanese workplace (Kondo 1990, Roberts 1994), rural communities
(Smith and Wiswell 1982; Lebra 1984), and urban middle class (Imamura 1987).
Taken together these cultural analyses of gender relations in Japan form
textured layers of Geertz's thick description which inform this study on the
politics of gender inequality in Japan. Nevertheless, culture is a dynamic, ever-
changing force. And the challenge for women's movements has been to change
cultural definitions of women's roles. Therefore, rather than treat culture as an
independent variable to explain gender inequality in Japan, my approach views
culture as a dependent variable, or the phenomenon to be explained. All
countries have their own culturally prescribed gender roles. But in similarly
situated countries, women are breaking out of these roles more effectively than
women in Japan. What are the forces behind such cultural change?
Unfortunately, cultural explanations do not lend themselves to understanding
the economic imperatives or political movements that can actually change ideas,
attitudes, and practices towards women long embedded in a given culture.
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Economic Explanations
Human capital. To explain inequality, whether it be based on sex, race, or
class, Liberal, Neo-classical schools of thought offer explanations based on
human capital theory (Becker 1964, Mincer 1974). Focusing on the supply-side
of labor, outcomes for individuals in the labor market are held to differ according
to the investments they make in their marketable skills and knowledge.
Regression analysis to predict wages, based on levels of education, training,
experience and other variables, is the model of choice of human capital theorists.
This model has been applied to explain wage disparities between men and
women in Japan with mixed results (Hashimoto 1979, Yashiro 1980, Kawashima
1983, Osawa 1984, Hill 1992).
Human Capital theory is both intuitively and normatively appealing.
Unlike cultural explanations, it generates testable hypotheses and relatively
elegant statistical models. Also, measurable differences in education and
training are less value-laden than observations about culture. The underlying
assumption of Human Capital theory is that individuals have free choice, and
therefore a certain amount of control, over their status in the labor market or
society at large. This view is implicit in the defense of Japanese employers who
argue that women choose their own low employment status by not investing in
their length of service to the company, and instead choosing to quit work upon
marriage or childbirth.
But the most damaging criticism of human capital theory is that it tends to
assume an equal playing field where individuals compete freely based solely on
their skills and effort. This assumption fails to recognize that individual choices
take place within the context of available opportunities. If the labor market itself
does not provide equal opportunities to Japanese men and women, it may be
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rational for women to choose early retirement from a dead-end job and seek
fulfillment in the domestic sphere. Therefore, we must also account for the
playing field itself by examining the structure of the labor market, as well as
social and political institutions that constrain the choices available to individual
women.
Institutions. Three major works by western scholars examine the social and
economic institutions that tilt the playing field against working women in Japan.
American Sociologist Mary Brinton (1993) explains the role of Japanese women
in the postwar Japanese economy in terms of the institutions of education, family
and employment. She argues that women have had a dual-role in Japan's
postwar economic miracle. They contribute directly by providing cheap, flexible
labor, and indirectly by investing heavily in the human capital development of
their husbands and sons, helping to make Japanese men among the most
productive workers in the world. Brinton shows how this role was largely
determined by particular institutional arrangements that were deliberately
created to meet specific social and economic needs in the postwar period.
The Japanese employment system, which rewards continuous service to
the same company, developed as the result of the severe shortage of skilled
workers, along with a surplus of unskilled workers following World War LI.
Employers instituted the practice of lifetime employment and seniority wage
increases to ensure a return on their investments in training. Brinton argues that,
because women's years of work tend to be shorter than that of men, they were
not viewed as a wise investment, and thereby became marginalized as part-time
or temporary workers who could be laid off during economic downturns.
Brinton goes on to argue that Japanese institutions of education also
contribute to the marginalization of women. The Japanese education system is
highly competitive and extremely expensive. In the immediate postwar period,
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the Japanese government chose to let the private sector meet the booming
demand for higher education. The resulting high cost of college education has
necessitated shrewd investment decisions by parents in their children's
education. Particularly in Japan, where students are tracked from a very young
age, decisions about human capital investments fall heavily on parents. A high
proportion of Japanese parents expect to be supported by their children in their
old age. Therefore, they have a direct interest in their children's future earnings.
These institutions of employment and education create incentives and
constraints which shape the human capital investment decisions of individuals,
particularly as parents. Given limited household resources along with an
employment system that favors men over women, Brinton argues that it is
rational for parents to invest more heavily in the human capital development of
their sons than their daughters. In this way, the institutions of work, school, and
family constrain the choices available to individual women.
British economist Alice Lam (1992) also offers an institutional explanation
for the low status of female workers in Japan. Drawing upon internal labor
market theory, Lam attributes sex discrimination in the Japanese labor market to
the rules, procedures, and customs that govern hiring and promotion practices at
large Japanese firms. According to the theory of internal labor markets, firm-
specific training has become increasingly important, particularly in
technologically driven industries. In order to ensure maximum return on their
investment in training, employers create incentives for their most skilled workers
to stay with the same firm, for example through seniority based wage increases
and promotions. This "primary" sector is distinguished from the "secondary"
sector of the labor market in which wages are lower and jobs less secure than in
the primary sector. The result is a dual labor market (Doeringer 1971).
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Lam argues that Japan represents an extreme case of internal labor
markets, in which length of service is highly valued and rewarded within firms.
Because women tend to leave the labor market to raise children, employers view
them as a risky investment, and therefore discriminate against them. Lam's
analysis, based on a case study of Seibu Department store before and after the
passage of Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law in 1985, incorporates
theories of gender into the theoretical framework of internal labor markets. She
argues that sex discrimination is not simply an efficient strategy for employers to
maximize returns on investments. Her case study shows how certain "gendered
assumptions," or sexist attitudes play an important role in the employment
practices of Japanese managers. Lam concludes that Japanese employers
consciously exploit gender differentiation in society to support employment
stratification in the workplace and to ensure a cheap, flexible pool of labor.
Lam's analysis combines structure with culture, revealing a mutually reinforcing
relationship.
Another British economist, Mary Saso (1990) examines why so many
Japanese women are found in the secondary labour market, which includes
employment in small firms, family enterprises, temporary, and part-time work.
Her analysis emphasizes the additional responsibilities of housework and child
rearing that weigh heavily on working women in all countries, but especially in
Japan where surveys on time use show that men do practically no housework at
all. This division of labour in the home helps explain the segregation of men,
who form the core of primary internal labor markets, and women who are
disproportionately found in the secondary labor market. The closed system of
promoting from within firms shuts out women who wish to return to work after
taking leave to raise children. The long, inflexible hours that companies demand
from full-time regular employees are overwhelming for women who must work
25
an additional shift at home. The distinct duality between the rigidity and
stability of internal labor markets versus the flexibility and instability of the
secondary labor markets leave women with little choice. Household
responsibilities, social pressures and economic imperatives push women towards
secondary labor markets which are characterized by low wages and job
insecurity. Nevertheless, Saso observes a gradual shift in Japanese employment
practices away from internal labor markets to a more open, fluid, and flexible
system in which women's choices between career and family will be less stark.
All of these works highlight key variables that help explain the high
degree of gender inequality in Japan. Brinton emphasizes the role of institutions
in constraining parental decisions. Lam points to employers' need for cheap
flexible, female labor. Saso views the division of the labor in the home as the
source of job segregation at work. Although they differ in approach and
emphasis, what all three works have in common is that they trace the roots of
gender inequality in Japan to economic imperatives.
Undoubtedly economics plays a key role in structuring gender relations in
any society. And, as these works show, Japanese employers in particular have a
vested interest in maintaining the secondary status of women in the labor
market. Nevertheless, an exclusive focus on Japanese employment practices fails
to recognize the countervailing force of politics against markets. Labor markets
in industrialized democracies are not open fields on which employers are
allowed to run rampant over workers. The state steps in as referee to ensure fair
play by enforcing rules and regulations. Particularly in the area of women's
employment, governments of industrialized countries have played an active role
in promoting equal rights for women, often over the objections of employers.
The economic explanation suggests that the labor market in Japan is an uneven
playing field tilted in favor of Japanese employers at the expense of working
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women. But where is the state as referee? Why have women themselves been
unable to successfully challenge discriminatory practices and unfair play? A
political explanation is needed to answer these questions.
Towards a Political Explanation
Sweeping social change in the area of equal rights, whether for women,
ethnic minorities, or disadvantaged social classes, occurs through political
struggle. Economic and demographic forces may determine the timing of
change, and culture may shape the nature and direction of change, but the
collective action of individuals organized and mobilized to challenge the status
quo is always an essential part of the story. Particularly in the context of
advanced industrial societies, examining the political activity of women is crucial
to understanding differences in status across countries. All of the advanced
capitalist economies are democracies in which citizens, women and men alike,
are guaranteed a voice in government. But women's rights in these countries did
not simply emerge as a result of changing demographics or increased wealth.
Democratic rights were fought for and continue to be fought for by women
themselves. To put it simply, politics matter.
There has been surprisingly little focus on politics as an explanation for
the remarkably high degree of gender inequality in Japan. The literature on
women and politics in Japan include Pharr's groundbreaking work on the social
psychological processes behind the politicization of individual Japanese women
(1980), and LeBlanc's ethnographic study of the political activities of Japanese
housewives (1999). Aside from these two scholarly works, the literature consists
mainly of generaL, descriptive overviews of women in Japan, which also cover
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political participation (Iwao 1990; Gelb and Palley 1994; Fujimura-Fanselow and
Kameda 1995; Morley 1999).
The Japanese language literature on women and politics is extensive,
including many political biographies (Oku 1988; Moriyama 1990; Ichikawa
1992), collected historical documents (Ichikawa 1977; Chino 1996b; Suzuki 1996-
97), and general accounts of women's political activities (Kubota 1995; Sakurai
and Hayakawa 1998). However, there is little scholarly research done on gender
within political science in Japan, with notable exceptions (Aoki 1991; Mikanagi
1999). A 1992 National Women's Education Center survey indicates a lack of
support for women's studies within the field of political science in Japan (NWEC
1994b). The survey of 268 universities and junior colleges, showed that of the 512
women's studies courses reported, only one was offered in political science or
economics, compared with 42 in history, and 37 in sociology. Also, Mikanagi
reports that of the registered members of the Japan Political Science Association,
less than 5 percent are women, compared with the 32 percent female
membership of the American Political Science Association (1999: 20-21).
This dearth of political science research on the status of women in Japan is
regrettable, as the field offers useful theories for explaining gender inequality in
terms of political power. From a political science perspective, the central
research question is what has prohibited women in Japan from effectively
exercising their political power to challenge their unequal status? Political
science offers a set of hypothesis to address this question.
Dilemmas of Collective Action
The most basic proposition is that there is no women's movement in
Japan. There are logical reasons to believe that a group as large and diverse as
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women in Japan would have great difficulty organizing around a common cause.
Theories of collective action point out the inherent obstacles to organizing such
groups (Olson 1965). For example, a small cadre of committed women may push
for equal rights which would ultimately benefit all women, regardless of
whether or not they participated in the effort. Overcoming this "free rider"
problem is a fundamental challenge faced by all organizations that attempt to
bring together diffuse interests. Because the existence of a women's movement
in Japan cannot be taken for granted, this dissertation will assess the extent to
which women are politically organized in Japan.
Institutional Obstacles
A second hypothesis is that a women's movement does exist, but its access
to the policy making process is constrained by Japan's political institutions. In
one of the few comparative studies of women's political movements, Katzenstein
and Mueller (1987) provide the framework for an institutional approach to
understanding gender inequality in Japan. They begin with the notion that
women across Europe and the United States have a common transformative
agenda that challenges existing power relations between the sexes. Although
they start with basically similar goals, feminist activists in each country operate
through varying political structures and institutional arrangements, which lead
to different outcomes for women across countries.
Japan was not included in Katzenstein and Mueller's comparative study.
Nevertheless, the literature on protest politics in Japan identifies institutional and
cultural barriers that work against broad based social movements. The general
picture that emerges from this literature is of a ubiquitous unelected bureaucracy
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at the center of the policy making process, leaving relatively narrow channels of
access for ordinary citizens to voice their grievances. There is also a tendency for
case by case, informal, personal mediation of conflict, as opposed to formal,
legal, solutions based on general principles that may be broadly applied, and a
preference for material compensation, concessions or "side payments" to
individual protesters rather than symbolic, universal rulings. (Krauss, Rohlen,
and Steinhoff 1984; Upham 1987; Pharr 1990).
The institutional prominence of an insulated bureaucracy and the cultural
preference for flexible, case by case solutions over formal legal means represent
formidable barriers to the lobbying efforts of a broad based women's movement.
This well documented pattern of response to status based claims suggests that
the Japanese system of conflict management may work to diffuse and
delegitimize women's demands for equality. In other words, the problem is not
the lack of a women's movement, but lack of access to political institutions and
the policy making process.
Unique Preferences
A third hypothesis takes issue with institutional approach, in which
interests for the same groups in different countries are necessarily held constant
in order to test the effects of different institutional arrangements on policy
outcomes. Such an approach fails to account for the possibility that women in
Japan may define their interests differently from women in other countries.
Rather than lacking organization or access, it may be that Japanese women
simply do not want equality with men.
In a study of the consumer movement in Japan, Vogel (1999) presents a
cautionary tale, warning against the assumption of interests derived from
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economic theory. He draws the distinction between interests (taken from theory)
and preferences (discovered through field research). Vogel's research finds that
the interests of Japanese consumers, assumed to be lower prices, do not match
their actual preferences, which emphasize quality, safety, and support for small
business and farmers. The assumption of interests has led to the mistaken
conclusion that Japanese consumers are politically weak when, in fact, Vogel
shows that consumer groups (notably the Japan Housewives Association,
Shufiren) have been remarkably successful at pushing for regulations on product
safety, quality, and labeling.
Similarly in the case of women, interests derived from theory would
suggest that women's economic interests lie with equal wages and equal
opportunity. But many Japanese women openly question the value equality with
Japanese men who are famous for spending long hours at work and devoting
their lives to their companies, often at the expense of family life (Iwao 1993).
They point to the special contribution women make in their roles as wives and
mothers (Hasegawa 1984, Brinton 1993). This ambivalence towards equality is
further evidenced by opinion surveys showing that a majority of Japanese
women agree with the statement "The husband should be the breadwinner, and
the wife should stay at home" (Tokyo Metropolitan Government 1994). Given
these theoretical and empirical considerations, this dissertation will examine how
Japanese women themselves define their political interests.
Civil Society
A final hypothesis is derived from a relatively new literature on civil
society and social capital. Ever since Robert Putnam lamented that Americans
are increasingly bowling alone, scholars have turned their attention to the role of
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civic associations, such as bowling leagues or Parent Teacher Associations, in the
functioning of democratic governments and industrialized economies. Countries
in which grassroots organizations thrive are thought to be rich in social capital
and trust, which contribute to a healthy democracy.
In 1998, Japan adopted a new law aimed at bolstering civil society. But
non-profit organizations criticized the government for failing to provide tax
benefits, such as income tax deductions for charitable donations. The civil
society literature posits that such rules of civic engagement impact the ability of
groups to carry out their goals. Therefore, it is possible that women's political
efficacy is being hampered by the laws and institutions that govern civil society
in general, and women's civic associations in particular.
Study Design
This set of hypotheses will be explored within three areas of analysis--
women's organizations, women's centers, and women's policy making. These
areas were chosen for analysis because they provide a broad spectrum and
represent key facets of women's politics in Japan. An examination of women's
organizations and how they are regulated shows how Japan deals with universal
issues of regulating interest group activity. A focus on women's centers brings to
light an institution that is unique to Japan, as both a resource for women's
groups and a portal for state involvement in the women's movement. Finally, a
look at how women's organizations participate in the policy making process
provides a dynamic view of how women exercise their political rights in Japan.
The dissertation is structured according to these three areas of analysis.
Chapter Two begins with a broad overview of women's organizations in Japan.
Using information from published directories and the extensive pamphlet and
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newsletter collection at the National Women's Education Center, I have
constructed a database of women's groups to determine the extent and content of
women's organization in Japan. This database is used to examine the
propositions that there is no women's movement in Japan, and that Japanese
women do not want equality. Women's preferences are further explored -
through a review of opinion survey data. This chapter will also examine the
regulatory environment in which women's groups operate to determine if
Japanese policies regulating interest group activity represent institutional
barriers to an effective women's movement.
Chapter Three focuses exclusively on women's centers in Japan. There are
literally hundreds of women's centers throughout Japan. Their basic purpose is
to provide meeting space and resources for women's groups. While similar
institutions may exist in other countries, Japan is exceptional in its large number
of designated women's centers, and the amount of government support
provided to build and manage these centers. This institutional anomaly presents
its own puzzle as to why such centers for women thrive in a country considered
a laggard on gender equality. While the centers provide valuable resources to
women's groups, they also serve as points of access for government officials to
influence the women's movement. A comparison of the activities of women's
organizations with programs offered at women's centers shows a significant
difference between the interests of women's organizations and the agenda set by
women's centers.
Chapter Four examines how women's policy is made in Japan, paying
particular attention to points of access where women's organizations can exert
their influence. The large role of the bureaucracy has been well established in the
area of economic policy making, and the same holds true for women's policy. In
recent years, the government has established divisions within various Ministries
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to develop policies on gender equality. This effort is overseen by the office for
Gender Equality within the Prime Minister's Office. As with government
sponsored women's centers, the creation of gender equality divisions with the
Japanese bureaucracy suggests a high degree of state support for the women's
movement. But again, these offices are not neutral black boxes that translate
women's demands into policy. They are state institutions with their own
interests, and they act as gatekeepers for letting certain women's interests into
the policy making process while keeping others out.
Finally, Chapter Five provides a summary and conclusion. After
examining the proposed hypotheses through the universal, unique, and dynamic
lenses of women's organizations, women's centers, and women's policy making,
this dissertation reaches the following conclusions:
On the question of whether or not a women's movement exists in Japan,
the answer is a resounding yes. Although their movement may not look and act
like women's movements in other advanced industrialized democracies, women
in Japan are active and organized around a wide variety of issues at the local,
regional, and national levels. The magnitude and diversity of women's
organization in Japan clearly indicates that Japanese women have overcome the
dilemmas of collective action.
But do they have access to the policy making process? The answer is a
qualified yes. Since the 1970s, the government has established various women's
policy offices within the national bureaucracy and has put pressure on
prefectural and local governments to follow suit. These offices represent
institutionalized points of access for women's organizations to participate in the
policy making process. But, in practice, this access is not equal, as a single peak
association representing mainstream national women's organizations has gained
a privileged position through its close ties with the government. The
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institutional hypothesis posits a lack of access due to the closed nature of policy
making within the unelected bureaucracy. But it is not a lack of access that has
prevented progress on women's issues. It is rather too much access which allows
the government to influence the women's movement as much as the women's
movement influences government.
While Japanese women may have organization and access, the question
remains--Do Japanese women want equality? Although there is much survey
data showing women's ambivalence towards equality with men, these surveys
viewed over time indicate significant changes in women's attitudes in the
direction of equality. Moreover, an analysis of the types of women's groups in
Japan reveals that a large segment of the women's movement is organized
specifically around women's issues and equality, as opposed to homemaking or
flower arranging.
Finally, the civil society hypothesis is correct in predicting the importance
of regulations in shaping the women's movement. But the case of women in
Japan reveals that state involvement goes well beyond laws and regulations.
While the state does not support women's groups by granting them tax-exempts
status, the state does provide valuable resources to women, particularly in the
form of hundreds of public women's centers throughout Japan. These centers
encourage women's civic participation by providing meeting space and
programmed activities. But they also allow the government an active role in civil
society, which could not be achieved by simply offering tax breaks. Women's
centers are just one of many types of centers supported by the state to serve
various segments of civil society. These include consumer centers, elderly
welfare centers, youth centers and many more. In this way, women's centers
reveal a pattern of state intervention in which support for civic associations takes
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the form of resources that allow the state a degree of involvement and influence
over civil society.
This Japanese approach to civil society has created a close relationship
between women's organizations and state, based on regulations governing
women's groups, state-supported women's centers, and women's policy offices
at various levels of government. These institutionalized links between women
and state aid the women's movement by providing official recognition,
resources, and access. But these channels are a two-way street. While they allow
women to access the government, they also allow the government to access the
women's movement. This mutual access has meant that the relationship
between women and the state in Japan has been less combative and conflictual
than cooperative and collaborative. For this reason, social change is necessarily
slow, as it is achieved through constant consultation and compromise. Access
and recognition also come at the price of autonomy and independence. Groups
that operate outside these institutionalized channels may maintain their
autonomy, but their interests have little chance of making it onto the political
agenda. In this way, state intervention in the women's movement has slowed
and limited progress towards achieving gender equality in Japan.
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Chapter Two
Women's Organizations in Japan
Popular images of Japanese women tend to include the neatly uniformed
office lady cheerfully serving tea to her co-workers, or the industrious Japanese
housewife, meticulously taking care of the home while closely supervising her
children's education. They usually do not include the Pink Helmet Brigade
surrounding government offices, chanting slogans to demand access to
contraceptive pills, or the Housewives Association taking to the streets in their
aprons with rice paddles raised in protest of rising consumer prices. Because the
stereotype of the quiet, subservient Japanese woman is so ubiquitous, the
complex and diverse reality of women's social activism in Japan tends to go
unnoticed. While second wave feminism of the 1970s has received scholarly and
popular attention in west Europe and the United States, the iuiman ribu
(women's lib) movement that emerged in Japan around the same time was
largely ridiculed in the media as a poor imitation of women's activism abroad.
These popular perceptions combined with Japan's poor international standing on
measures of gender equality raise the questions, is there a women's movement
in Japan? If so, what does it look like? And what has hampered its
effectiveness?
This chapter addresses these questions by providing an overview and
analysis of women's organizations in Japan. Using data collected from a large
sample of women's groups, I will assess the extent to which women are
organized in Japan. These data also reveal the types of issues that mobilize
women to form groups. Based on this information combined with opinion
survey data, I will explore the goals and preferences of organized women's
groups. Finally, I will examine the laws that govern women's organizations and
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interest groups generally to determine how Japan's regulatory environment
constrains the ability to organize and mobilize an effective women's movement.
Is There a Women's Movement in Japan?
Although the question appears to be straightforward, it is not at all clear
how one would determine whether or not a women's movement exists in Japan.
Typically, it is assumed or asserted to exist and described in general terms,
noting visible or successful campaigns organized by Japanese women, or
pointing to individual, self-proclaimed feminist activists (lwao 1993, Buckley
1994, Tanaka 1995). But social movements are rare and remarkable. And there
are general theoretical considerations as well as specific historical and cultural
patterns that render the emergence of a broad based women's movement in
Japan to be unlikely.
Olson's classic theory of collective action first challenged the notion that
organized groups form naturally or spontaneously based on the shared interests
of individuals (1964). He questions the incentives to join groups, particularly for
broad based interest groups, such as women. In this case, a small number of
committed women may devote much of their time and resources to further the
interests of women, so that all women benefit regardless of individual
participation in the effort. Olson calls this the "free rider" problem. The diffuse
nature of benefits to large groups means that organizations must overcome the
free rider problem by providing selective benefits, such as newsletters or group
discounts, only to group members. Because of the inherent difficulties of
organizing broad based groups, we cannot simply assume that a women's
movement exists in Japan.
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While Olson's theory may be applied universally, empirical studies on
protest in Japan reveal obstacles to social movements specific to Japan.
According to this literature, the Japanese government's response to broad based
protest systematically weakens the ability of protesters to sustain an effective
social movement. Pharr (1990) documents how Japanese authorities engage in
the "privatization of conflict," to keep protest outside of formal public venues,
such as the courts, where universal rulings may be made and applied to future
conflict. Instead, grievances are handled on a case by case basis, and authorities
offer "preemptive concessions," to contain and diffuse protest before it can
develop into a symbolic, broad based movement. Upham (1987) highlights the
role of Japan's powerful and insular bureaucracy in this system of conflict
management, which he calls "Bureaucratic Informalism." The approach is
"bureaucratic" in that it allows Japan's elite bureaucracy to maintain control over
the processes of social conflict and change by maximizing bureaucratic discretion
and limiting judicial review. It is "informal" in that the bureaucracy prefers
informal consultation and compromise over strict enforcement of rulings spelled
out in the law. Finally, Steinhoff (1989) describes how grassroots protest
movements in Japan are taken over by political parties to form a national protest
cartel. She describes how, from the end of World War II to the 1970s, the
Socialist and Communist parties attempted to corner the protest market, as they
competed for support from labor unions, students, the Burakumin minority, and
women. Since the 1970s, some groups have become so closely aligned with
political pates that their protest activities have become institutionalized and
ritualized. Farmers and shopkeepers tied to the conservative Liberal Democratic
Party stage large rallies, while labor unions supporting the Socialist and
Communist parties launch an annual spring offensive. Although these activities
are mostly symbolic, Steinhoff argues that such ritual protest has gained social
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legitimacy. As for groups without party ties, such as environmentalists and
feminists, they fall outside the realm of institutionalized and ritualized protest
and therefore tend to be marginalized and alienated. The overall picture that
emerges from these works on protest movements in Japan shows the great
difficulties involved in organizing and sustaining an effective women's
movement. These obstacles stemming from Japan's particular approach to social
protest combined with the universal dilemmas of collective action make it
necessary to question the assumption that a women's movement in Japan exists
at all.
The most obvious way to determine the existence of a women's
movement is to examine the level of organization and mobilization among
women in Japan. Although there are no comprehensive figures on the total
number of women's organizations in Japan, published directories along with the
pamphlet and newsletter collection of the National Women's Education Center
provide a broad view of the scope and breadth of women's organizations in
Japan. The main directories of women's organizations in Japan include the Fusae
Ichikawa Memorial Association's Directory of National Women's Organizations,
published yearly and listing over one hundred national women's groups; Jojo
kikaku's Women 's Handy Notebook, published periodically and listing over three
hundred local women's groups, businesses, and centers; and the Yokohama's
Women's Forum's Women's Networking, published in 1991 and listing over six
hundred women's groups.
In addition to these sources, the National Women's Education Center
houses an extensive collection of materials from women's organizations
throughout Japan. Their collection contains over 1,400 alphabetized files,
carrying informational brochures, newsletters, flyers, and various other
materials put out by women's organizations. Although NWEC does not actively
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solicit these materials, women's groups using the center often distribute
information about their organizations, while other groups send materials to
NWEC to publicize their activities. According to Mori Michi of the NWEC
Information Center, the library staff and volunteers began to sort, file, and
catalog these materials beginning in 1987 (Mori 2000). They continue to maintain
and develop this collection, filing all materials they receive related to women's
organizations.
Although NWEC meticulously collects this valuable information on
women's organizations, no one has attempted to systematically analyze the data
contained in their extensive pamphlet collection. Therefore, I reviewed the
contents of all 1,434 files, and recorded data on 534 organizations. Not all files
produced useful data, as many contained information on one-time women's
events, women's centers, or businesses. I then supplemented my database with
the women's organizations listed in three published directories--the Fusae
Ichikawa Memorial Association's Directory of National Women's Organizations from
1998, Jojo kikaku's Women 's Handy Notebook from 1998, and Shiba's Directory of
Various Types of National Organizations from 1999.1 Altogether, I compiled
information on 889 women's organizations representing all regions of Japan
(Table 2.1). A simple accounting based on the NWEC pamphlet collection along
with the published directories yields a surprisingly large number of women's
groups from a country perceived to have a weak, if any, women's movement.
' The Yokohama Forum's Women 's Networking was not included in my database
because it has not been updated since it was first published in 1991, and its
contents have already been analyzed by Khor 1999. 1 use Khor's findings as a
basis of comparison for my own database.
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Table 2.1
Regional Distribution of Women's Organizations Sample
Region Number of Percentage of Percentage of
Groups Sample Population
Hokkaido 22 2.5 4.5
Tohoku 39 4.4 7.8
Kanto 364 41.3 31.7
Chubu 83 9.4 17.1
Kinki 147 16.7 17.9
Chugoku 27 3.1 6.1
Shikoku 23 2.6 3.3
Kyushu 35 4 10.6
Okinawa 7 0.8 1
National Groups 135 15.3
Unknown 7 0.8
Total 882 100 100
Source: Population data from Yano Tsuneta Kinenkai (Tsuneta Yano Memorial
Association). 2000. Nihon Kokusei Zue (The state of Japan pictorial data book.
Not only is there a large number of women's groups active throughout
Japan, but many of these groups are highly organized and politically
sophisticated, especially at the national level. Leading up to the United Nations
designation of 1975 as International Women's Year, forty-one national women's
organizations and labor unions came together at the International Women's
Year Conference of Japan to form a coalition called the Liaison Group for the
Implementation of Resolutions from the International Women's Year
Conference of Japan (IWYLG). This coalition has grown to include fifty-two
national women's groups with a combined membership of twenty-six million
women or one-fifth the total population of Japan. The Liaison Group is active in
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the international arena with its fundraising efforts on behalf of the United
National Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), as well as in domestic
politics as its holds hearings on women's policy issues and meets regularly with
representatives from government ministries.
The large number of women's groups and their demonstrated ability to
form national and international coalitions shows that, despite universal dilemmas
of collective action and the particular obstacles to social protest in Japan, women
have managed to come together to form broad-based organizations around
common goals and interests. Therefore, the question of whether or not a
women's movement exists in Japan can be answered empirically with a
resounding yes. The question then becomes why has the women's movement
failed to achieve gains in gender equality commensurate to Japan's economic
development and comparable to women in other industrialized democracies.
Do Japanese Women Want Equality?
An alternative explanation for gender inequality in Japan is that the
women's movement has not embraced equality as its primary goal. While there
is evidence of widespread organization and mobilization among Japanese
women, a women's movement is not necessarily a feminist movement. Women
worldwide have long debated the substantive and strategic merits of demanding
full equality with men against seeking recognition of the special contribution
women make to society through their traditional roles as wives and mothers.
Although the controversy over whether or not equality truly serves the interests
of women is not unique to Japan, the ambivalence towards equality between the
sexes is particularly apparent in both public debates and opinion survey data.
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Public Debates Over Equality
The issue of equality versus protection became the topic of widespread
discussion leading up the passage of Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity
Law in 1985. Much of the debate centered around female worker protections
contained in the 1947 Labor Standards Law. These include restrictions on
overtime and holiday work, prohibition of late night work and dangerous work,
and guarantees for maternity and monthly menstrual leave. The justification for
providing worker protections especially for women was to ensure that outside
employment would not interfere with women's household duties. Nevertheless,
many working women agreed with management's position that a legal
guarantee of equal rights entails equal responsibilities, even if this means
working a double shift at work and then at home. Other women sided with
labor, arguing that such protections should not only be maintained for women,
but extended to men to create a more humane work environment for everyone.
The landmark equal employment legislation that passed in 1985 was a
compromise between these two positions. Women were given a limited
guarantee of equality in employment, in which sex discrimination was legally
prohibited in training, benefits, retirement, and dismissal, but not in recruitment,
hiring, job assignment, or promotion. Similarly, a compromise was reached on
female worker protections, so that protections were eliminated for women in
managerial positions but effectively maintained for ninety percent of the female
workforce.
This debate over equality versus protection was by no means limited to
the public policy arena, as prominent scholars also contributed to the discussion.
In a leading intellectual magazine, C/mo Koron, Hasegawa Michiko, a professor of
philosophy, sharply criticizes Japan's signing of the UN Convention on the
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. She argues that the
provisions contained in the convention are patently ethnocentric, reflecting
western values which threaten the integrity of Japanese culture. She states that
calls for equal employment legislation miss the point that women at home are
actually working. Rather than privileging paid employment and demanding
equality for women in the workplace, Hasegawa advocates the revaluation of
housework on par with paid employment (Hasegawa 1984). In a similar vein,
sociologist Mary Brinton (1993) argues that the indirect contribution women
made to Japan's postwar economic miracle was the care and nurturing they
provided for the human capital development of working men.
The goal of equality is most notably challenged in Iwao Sumiko's popular
book on Japanese women. Iwao, a professor of psychology, is considered a
leading expert on women's issues and is frequently a member of government
advisory boards that consider policies relevant to women. In her book, she
argues that women in Japan are more interested in their actual quality of life
than the abstract principle of equality. Because Japanese men are notorious
workaholics, she believe that equality with men would actually worsen the
quality of life for women who value time with their families. She writes, "...in
contrast to the central position it holds in the American women's movement,
equality is not an issue in the forefront of the inconspicuous revolution going on
among Japanese women." (Iwao 1993, 16).
Popular Opinion
The goal of equality for Japanese women is further placed in doubt by
opinion survey data polling women's views on various issues related to gender
equality. In 1992 the Women's Affairs Section of the Tokyo Metropolitan
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Government conducted an international comparative survey on women's
attitudes about sex discrimination, family life, employment, and civic
participation. In nationwide surveys of eight countries, at least 1,000 women,
aged 20 or older, were randomly selected and interviewed directly in their native
language. Although the survey does not include a question that asks women for
their views on equality, it reveals much about their attitudes towards gender
equality nonetheless. It is likely that if Japanese women were asked directly if
they want equality with men, they would overwhelmingly respond yes. But
questions from this cross national survey provide a more accurate picture of
women's views on equality because they place this abstract principle in the
context of concrete issues, such as marriage, family, and work.
Two questions in particular reflect women's attitudes about equality. One
question asks women about the extent to which they agree or disagree with the
statement, "The husband should be the breadwinner, and the wife should stay at
home." Another question asks women which approach they favor in the early
training of children, "To teach a boy to behave like a boy and a girl to behave
like a girl," or "To bring up both boys and girls pretty much in the same
manner." The first question may be interpreted as a question about equality in
marriage as it asks whether or not men and women should have separate roles.
The second question reflects attitudes about equality in the upbringing of
children. On both questions, Japanese women appear to be split over the issue
of equality, with more than half agreeing on separate roles for men and women
in marriage, and almost half believing that girls and boys should not be raised
equally. But what is most interesting is how Japanese women compare with
women in other countries in their responses to these questions, as shown below.
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"The husband should be the breadwinner, and the wife should stay at home."
Completely or Rather Completely or Rather
Agree Disagree Don't Know
Japan 55.6 38.3 6.1
Korea 32.6 66.9 0.5
Philippines 66.5 33.4 0.1
United States 23.7 73.3 3.1
United Kingdom 20.3 78.8 0.9
France 22.4 76.0 1.6
Germany 24.8 70.9 4.3
Sweden 12.8 86.8 0.4
Jap
Ko:
Phi
Un
Un
Fra
Ge
Swi
"In the early training of children, which do you feel is the best approach?"
Teach a boy to behave Bring up both boys Can't
like a boy and a girl to and girls in pretty say No
behave like a girl much the same way which Answer
an 45.6 38.8 15.6 0.0
rea 55.2 42.2 1.6 0.8
lippines 36.4 63.3 0.2 0.1
ited States 28.2 66.4 3.6 1.7
ited Kingdom 15.8 79.0 4.0 1.1
nce 24.1 62.2 12.9 0.8
rmany 14.8 70.8 6.3 8.1
eden 6.3 89.2 2.8 1.7
Other survey questions also reveal attitudes that are relevant to how
women define their interests. For example, the following survey item shows the
extent to which marriage is viewed as contributing to women's happiness, and
therefore being in women's interest.
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"All things considered, women's happiness lies in marriage,
so it's better for women to marry"
Agree Disagree Don't Know
Japan 78.2 14.2 7.7
Korea 62.1 36.2 1.7
Philippines 74.4 25.3 0.3
United States 28.8 68.8 2.4
United Kingdom 37.0 60.5 2.4
France 51.8 46.4 1.7
Germany 40.9 52.6 6.4
Sweden 18.4 79.3 2.3
Furthermore, women's attitudes about work and family reflect priorities
and preferences relevant to gender equality. The following survey item reveals
beliefs about women's proper place in the workforce versus the home.
"Which of these statements comes closest to
the way you feel about women engaging in an occupation?"
continue return to
should work working work after
not work until after children
work until child- child- are Don't
at all marriage birth birth grown Other Know
Japan 2.8 10.8 11.1 26.3 45.4 1.3 2.3
Korea 2.3 4.4 7.4 40.4 43.3 0.3 1.9
Philippines 3.3 14.7 15.3 36.4 29.9 0.2 0.2
US 2.9 1.6 7.6 34.0 41.5 8.1 4.4
UK 0.6 1.8 6.4 31.9 51.0 3.9 4.4
France 0.8 1.3 6.6 38.1 50.4 0.9 1.8
Germany 1.7 4.6 13.2 34.2 40.9 2.0 3.4
Sweden 0.0 0.6 2.5 75.5 15.0 4.2 2.2
The responses of Japanese women to these survey questions seem to
reflect Japan's unusual position as the only non-western country among the
world's wealthiest nations. Japanese women's attitudes seem to fall somewhere
in between those of their developing Asian neighbors, who are closer in
proximity and culture, and those of their European counterparts, who share their
wealth and standard of living. Especially on the issue of marriage, Japanese
women's attitudes diverge sharply with their European counterparts, though
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they are somewhat closer to their Asian neighbors. A relatively high number of
Japanese women agree that men and women should have separate roles in
marriage. And, more than women in any other country, they believe their
happiness depends on marriage. Furthermore, more than ten percent of
Japanese women surveyed expressed the view that women should stop working
after marriage. This proportion is much higher than that of all other countries,
except the Philippines. While the effect of childbirth on women's equality is well
known, it is perhaps less clear why marriage alone would prohibit women from
continuing to work outside the home. In the Japanese case, the explanation
probably lies with the attitudes of Japanese men who do practically no
housework. A survey on time use and leisure activities shows that, on average,
Japanese working women spend nearly three hours a day on housework, child-
care, and shopping, while Japanese men, on average, spend only thirteen
minutes a day on these activities GIL 1994).
Moving Towards Equality
The public debates and opinion survey data show how many women in
Japan openly question whether or not equality with men is truly in their best
interests. But debates over equality versus protection or sameness versus
difference are found in feminist discourse in many countries. The point is not
that Japanese women are more or less ambivalent about equality than women in
other countries, or that this debate is unique to Japan. The point is that the value
of equality for women is openly debated and contested. But as the discussion
over equality continues, public opinion has shown a gradual shift, and legislation
has been strengthened in favor of gender equality.
49
While the opinion survey data viewed across countries show Japan's
relative skepticism over equality, similar data examined over time shows a
gradual yet consistent shift in the attitudes of Japanese women in favor of
equality. Over the past quarter century, the Prime Minister's Office has
periodically administered opinion surveys to thousands of women on a variety
of issues, covering work, family, civic engagement, public policy, and sex
discrimination. Two very similar questions, asked in slightly different ways,
appear in nearly all of these surveys, allowing for comparisons of women's
opinions over time.
Between 1976 and 2000, Japanese women have been asked in seven
separate national surveys whether they agree or disagree with the notion "men
should work, women should stay home." When this question was first asked of
women in 1976, 49 percent agreed, while 40 percent disagreed, with the
remaining responses unknown. But in subsequent years, the proportion of
women expressing agreement has steadily declined while the proportion of
women expressing disagreement has similarly increased. By 2000, only 21
percent of women surveyed agreed, and a full 53 percent disagreed, showing a
clear shift in opinion on this issue (Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1
Percentage of Responses to the Question, "Do you agree or
notion men should work, women should stay home?"
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Source: Prime Minister's Office. Fujin ni kansuru seron chosa (Public opinion
survey related to women). Josei ni kansuru seron chosa. Danjo kyodo sankaku ni
kansuru seron chosa. Various years.
The other way in which this question appears is slightly more specific and
allows for a more specific answer. In other years, women were asked for their
views on the statement, "The husband should work, while the wife protects the
home." Respondents were allowed to express a slightly wider range of opinions
than in the previously cited question, so the results are somewhat different. But
the overall trend over time is the same, as women's attitudes increasingly reflect
a rejection of traditional roles. Between 1981 and 1997, the proportion of women
who agree or tend to agree with this statement declined from 70 percent to 58
I I I I I I - i
percent. And the proportion of women who disagree or tend to disagree
increased from 23 percent to 38 percent (Figure 2.2)..
Figure 2.2
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The attitudinal shift among women has coincided with legislative changes
giving working women stronger guarantees of equality, though at the expense
of worker protections. The original version of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Law, passed in 1985, reflected a compromise between the right to
equality and demands for protection. Instead of an outright ban on sex
discrimination in employment, the law "obliged" employers to treat women and
I I
-,
men on an equal basis in recruitment, hiring, job assignment, and promotions.
Sex discrimination was only legally prohibited in training, benefits, dismissal,
and retirement. But in these areas of employment, the law simply affirmed
earlier court rulings. On the other hand, female worker protections, such as
restrictions on overtime, holiday work, and dangerous work, were retained for
the vast majority of working women, and maternity leave was extended.2
If the 1985 law represents a balance between equality and protection, the
1997 revisions heavily tilt the scale in favor of equality. Under the amended law,
employers are now prohibited from discriminating against women in the areas
of employment under which they were originally "obliged to endeavor" not to
discriminate. Thus, the prohibition provision now covers recruitment, hiring, job
assignment, and promotion. To strengthen enforcement, the Diet added a
provision that allows the Ministry of Labor to publicly identify companies that
refuse to comply with the law. Rather than requiring that both employers and
workers agree to arbitration, the government authority may intervene based on
one side's complaint. The new law also mentions sexual harassment for the first
time, and includes a general call to employers to adopt preventative measures.
In concurrent legislation, the Diet revised the Labor Standards Law to eliminate
female worker protections for all working women, not just those in high ranking
positions. The only remaining protection is an annual limit of 360 hours of
overtime, which now covers both men and women. For women with family
responsibilities, the old limit of 150 hours will apply for an interim period of
three years. All of these revisions went into effect as of April 1999.
Based on available evidence, the question of whether or not women in
Japan want equality with men is difficult to answer, as debates continue and
2 For more on Equal Employment Opportunity Law of 1985, see Lam 1992 and
Upham 1987.
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public opinion changes. But over the past quarter century, since the United
Nations declared 1975 as International Women's Year, the trend in Japan, both in
public opinion and legislation, has been towards the goal of gender equality. In
addition to public debates, opinion surveys, and legislative action, the activities of
women's organizations reveal the diverse goals of the women's movement in
Japan, and a strong support for gender equality.
Women's Organizations: A Feminist Movement?
Even more telling than what Japanese women think is what they do.
While opinion survey data may reveal women's passive attitudes about equality,
their efforts to organize and mobilize civic groups show their active participation
on issues that are most important to them. What are the issues that form the
basis of the women's movement in Japan? To what extent do women's groups
support the goal of equality? Is the women's movement necessarily a feminist
movement?
To answer these questions, I examined the activities of 889 women's
organizations, and coded the subject area for each group, according to thirteen
general categories, which are further broken down into 62 specific
subcategories.3 For groups engaged in activities in more than one issue area, I
recorded multiple issue areas. But for the sake of clarity, the following analysis is
based on the primary issue area of each group. The results show that the
3 The subject area code sheet used for this analysis is taken from a survey of
women's centers conducted by the National Women's Education Center (NWEC
1994). 1 chose to use this code sheet because the inclusion of so many
subcategories allows for a detailed examination of the activities of women's
groups. Using the same code sheet as the NWEC survey of women's centers
also allows me to compare the activities of women's groups in my database with
the activities that take place at women's centers. The results of this comparison
are reported in Chapter 3. For a list of all 62 subcategories, see appendix A.
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Japanese women's movement is active on a wide range of issues, but is largely
organized around women's issues and general social issues.
Of the thirteen general categories describing the issues taken up by
women's groups, "Women's Issues" and "Social Issues" overwhelming dominate,
with these two categories accounting for over half the women's organizations in
my sample. "Women's Issues," are the main concern of 31 percent, while "Social
Issues" are the focus of 21 percent of the groups. The next largest category is
"Labor" at 10 percent, followed by "Social Participation at 8 percent. "Health,"
"Home Education," and "Family," each represent 5 percent of women's
organizations. "Welfare," "Culture," "General Education," "Letters and Science,"
"Gay Lesbian," and "Other" each recorded less than 5 percent of women's
organizations active on these issues (Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3
Percentage Breakdown of Women's Groups by Primary Issue Area (N=889)
The two categories accounting for over half the women's groups in my
sample are made up of more specific subcategories, which provide sharper focus
on the issues of greatest concern to women in Japan. Out of my sample of 889
women's groups, 283, or roughly 32 percent, were organized around women's
issues. These 283 groups are further broken down into six subcategories. These
are "general women's issues," "women's studies," "women's education,"
"women's administration," "women's history," and "other women's issues"
(Figure 2.4). Over a third of the groups were concerned with general women's
issues. But even more groups fell under the catch-all "other." The large number
of groups assigned "other women's issues" indicates that my original code sheet
was inadequate at capturing the specific women's issues concerning many
womenT s organizations. A closer look at the 118 groups that fall under this
category shows a large number of groups lobbying for the legalized use of
separate surnames for married couples, and groups offering counseling, shelter,
and other services related to domestic violence.
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Percentage Breakdown of Women's Issues by Subcategory (N=283)
The general category "Social Issues," accounting for 21 percent of the
sample, consists of "general social issues," "international understanding and
exchange," "consumer advocacy," "environmental protection," "human rights,"
and "other social issues" (Figure 2.5). Nearly half of the 187 groups organized
around social issues are concerned with promoting international exchange.
Many of these groups are made up of women volunteers helping international
exchange students studying in Japan. Other groups promote friendship with
foreign residents or offer free Japanese language lessons. Some groups collect
cash or goods, such as used clothing and housewares, to send overseas.
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Percentage Breakdown of Social Issues by Subcategory (N=187)
After women's issues and social issues, the general category with the
largest number of groups is "Labor" with 10 percent, followed by "Social
Participation" with 8 percent. Of the 93 women's groups organized around labor
issues, about half deal with general issues concerning working women, while
the other half falls under "other labor issues." These other groups are mostly
made up of women's professional associations and groups supporting female
entrepreneurs, while some are organized around the issue of sexual harassment.
The general category "Social Participation" includes 70 women's groups, half of
which are concerned with political participation. Most of the remaining groups
in this general category are involved in general social participation and volunteer
activities.
The rest of the general categories, "Health," "Home Education," "Family,"
"Welfare," "Culture," "General Education," "Letters and Science," "Gay Lesbian"
and "Other" each represent 5 percent or less of the women's groups in my
sample. Although these general categories do not register a large percentage of
women's groups, two subcategories are notable for containing relatively large
numbers of groups. Under "Home Education," the subcategory "childrearing
and home education" includes 40 women's groups. And under "Health," the
subcategory "other health or medicine" represents 37 women's groups. These
are mostly support groups for women with various medical conditions or
substance abuse problems. And some groups are concerned with reproductive
rights.
Overall, this analysis of the issues concerning women's organizations in
Japan shows active participation in a wide range of issues that both affirm and
challenge women's traditional roles. Nevertheless, nearly a full third of the
groups in my sample are women's organizations with women's agendas.
Typically, the groups assigned to this category explicitly state gender equality a
goal of their organization. Given the vocal debates over equality and public
opinion supporting traditional gender roles, it would be reasonable to expect the
women's movement to be fairly split between groups organizing for women's
equality and groups formed around issues related to home and family, or
interests in traditional arts, such as flower arranging or tea ceremony. But home
and family issues and cultural activities make up only small slivers of the pie. By
far, the largest piece goes to women's issues, showing strong support for gender
equality within the women's movement in Japan.
Another significant finding is that an overwhelming majority of women's
groups in Japan are organized around issues in the public sphere, namely
women's issues, social issues, labor, and social participation. Far fewer women's
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groups are organized around private sphere concerns, such as family and home,
home education, or cultural activities. What this imbalance shows is that women
in Japan are going public with their private concerns and grievances. Rather
than turning inwards and forming support groups to cope with the status quo,
the vast majority of women's groups are going out into their communities to try
to affect social change. In this way, the women's movement in Japan is a
transformational social movement.
Katzenstein first identified the transformational character of feminist
movements regardless of national origin (1987). While recognizing wide
ideological and organizational variation within and across countries, she argues
that all feminist movements share a theoretical core, which is "...the unifying
ideological embrace of a political goal that seeks to change a world that relegates
women to a subordinated political, economic, and social status" (5). Feminist
movements are transformational in that they seek the total transformation of
society, encompassing all facets of daily life, including economics, family,
education, sexuality, and politics.
The transformative nature of feminism is also recognized in Khor's
assessment of the extent to which women's activism in Japan is feminist (1999).
Her definition of feminism includes "a commitment that is pro-woman, political,
and socially transformational" (641). After examining the activities of 590
women's organizations, Khor finds that one-half of the groups in her sample
meet her criteria as feminist organizations. Yet even as she performs this
analysis, Khor critiques the whole exercise of determining whether feminism
exists outside of western capitalist democracies. The more meaningful line of
inquiry for Khor is to identify and understand the characteristics of feminism
found in a particular cultural, historical, and national context. In the Japanese
case, she argues that feminism is characterized by a holistic cultural critique and
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woman-centeredness. Rather than treat gender inequality as a separate issue,
Japanese feminists often place women's issues in the context of a larger critique
of a capitalist system built up around the single minded pursuit of economic
growth, often at the expense of social welfare, environmental concerns, or
human rights. This critique of cultural values lends itself to a woman-centered
approach that asserts a unique woman's perspective, and seeks to have female
values recognized and legitimized as an alternative to the male-dominated status
quo.
Khor's data comes from one published directory of women's
organizations, Women 's Networking compiled by the Yokohama Women's
Forum. This source was not included in my database of 889 women's groups,
but it provides a useful basis of comparison for my analysis. Because different
subject categories were used, it is not possible to directly compare our results.
Nevertheless, my analysis of women's organizations generally confirms Khor's
conclusion that the women's movement in Japan can be characterized as
feminist, according to her broad definition. My findings also confirm Khor's
observation that women's activism in Japan tends to be woman-centered,
though I did not find many groups engaged in the holistic cultural critique that
Khor describes.
To determine the extent to which the women's movement in Japan is
feminist, Khor sets out a broad definition of feminism, which "consists in a
recognition of women as an oppressed group and of gende: inequality which is
produced by structural and ideological processes; an endeavor to improving
women's collective status, living conditions, opportunities, power, and self-
esteem; and /or a commitment that is pro-woman, political, and socially
transformational" (641). While half of the groups in Khor's sample meet this
criteria, about one-third of the groups in my sample reliably fit this definition, as
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they explicitly embrace gender equality as a goal and seek to improve the status
of women through collective action. An additional 40 percent of my sample
partially meet Khor's criteria by taking up a variety of social issues, supporting
women's employment, and encouraging civic participation. Although gender
equality may or may not be central to the cause of these groups, they have,
nonetheless, banded together as women to transform society in a particular area.
Taken together, this overwhelming majority of women's organizations seeking
social change in the public sphere makes clear that much of the women's
movement in Japan is indeed a socially transformative feminist movement.
Khor's observation of a woman-centered approach to activism also finds
support in my data on women's organizations. This notion that women possess
a unique perspective and play a special role in society is especially evident in the
areas of social issues and welfare. By far the social issue that engages the most
groups in my sample is international understanding and exchange. The large
number of women's groups involved in this area is not surprising, given the
increasing number of foreign students and workers in Japan, and the growing
awareness of international issues in the age of globalization. These issues are
also relatively safe and agreeable. Only a few groups in my sample deal with
controversial issues, such as the rights of abused Asian women who come to
Japan to work in hostess clubs, or to marry Japanese men in rural areas. Instead,
nearly all of these women's groups remain within the framework of women's
traditional roles, as nurturing, sympathetic, caregivers, promoting friendship and
understanding between peoples of different cultures. Similarly, on
environmental issues and consumer issues, women's groups tend to stress their
concerns for clean air or safe food as mothers protecting the health and safety of
their families. Although welfare comprised only 4 percent of the groups in my
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sample, most are involved in elderly and disabled care, again emphasizing the
role of women as care givers.
The prevalence of women's activism in areas consistent with culturally
prescribed roles may raise questions about the extent to which the women's
movement in Japan is truly feminist. But feminism encompasses a variety of
organizational forms, political strategies, and ideological perspectives even
within a single country. Given this diversity of feminisms, and the need to avoid
the imposition of a single ethnocentric standard, a broad definition of feminism is
appropriate for making this determination, particularly for non-western
countries. The one common denominator identified by Katzenstein and
acknowledged by Khor is the transformational character of feminist movements.
A woman-centered feminism seeks nothing less than the total transformation of
society, as it offers an alternative approach to social issues based on women's
values and perspectives. So while many women's organizations in Japan operate
within culturally prescribed roles, they are, nonetheless, part of a feminist
movement that is reshaping Japanese society to recognize and value the unique
contributions of women.
Structural Constraints on Women's Organizations
Given the poor standing of Japanese women on measures of gender
equality, it is rather surprising to find such an active and diverse feminist
movement in Japan. But the presence of feminist activism by itself does not
guarantee social change. All social movements, whether organized by women,
ethnic minorities, or social classes, must work within the context of national
political institutions that impact their effectiveness. For example, in some
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countries, democratic political institutions staunchly safeguard freedom of
expression and assembly, which encourages groups to form and express shared
grievances. While in other countries, the state limits dissent to keep social order,
so the activities of organized groups are sharply curtailed or rendered
ineffective. Therefore, regardless of the strength and size of the movement
itself, the political context in which it operates can largely determine its success or
failure. In the case of the women in Japan, a broad based movement consists of
many women's organizations working on a variety of issues, with the largest
segment committed to promoting gender equality. As the absence of a women's
movement or a lack of commitment to equality does not explain Japanese
women's relative lack of success at improving their international standing on
gender equality, an alternative explanation lies with the institutional context in
which the women's movement makes its demands for equality.
The Non-profit Sector in Japan
Women's organizations are just a small part of Japan's growing
movement of civic associations forming the Dai San Sekuita, or Third Sector,
operating alongside government and business. Much attention has been focused
on volunteer activity in Japan since the Kobe Earthquake in 1995, which killed
over five-thousand people and left hundreds of thousands homeless. During this
time of crisis, the central government was criticized as ineffective and slow to
respond. Meanwhile, an estimated one million volunteers spontaneously
mobilized to fill the void left by governmnent. Since then, the Ministry of
Education has created a national database of volunteer opportunities that can be
accessed through the internet. And, over the past decade, the Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications has facilitated individual charitable contributions
through two programs that allow depositors to donate designated portions of
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their postal savings accounts to international voluntary aid groups or domestic
disaster relief efforts. Most recently, in 1998, the Diet adopted legislation, known
as the NPO Law, which makes it easier for non-profit organizations to receive
legal recognition than under a cumbersome existing system dating back to 1896.
Yet, despite the recent surge of interest in volunteer activity and
government efforts to bolster civil society, Japan's third sector is still relatively
weak when compared to other industrialized democracies. Salamon and
Anheier (1996) compare nonprofit sector employment as the percentage of total
employment for eight countries, and find Japan's 2.5 percent below the eight
country average of 3.3 percent, and far below the United States' 6.9 percent
(Figure 2.6).
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Non-profit Sector Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment
Source: Salamon and Anheier 1996.
In terms of the number of officially registered voluntary or charitable
organizations, Japan differs from other wealthy countries by an order of
magnitude. The 26 thousand legally recognized public interest corporations in
Japan pale in comparison to the over one million nonprofit organizations that
receive tax-exempt status in the Untied States, or the hundreds of thousands of
registered associations found in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom
(Table 2.2).
Table 2.2
Number of Registered Nonprofit Organizations in Five Countries
Number of registered
Country Population nonprofit organizations
(millions) (thousands)
United States 275 1,130
France 59 500-700
Germany 82 180-250
United Kingdom 59 170
Japan 127 25
Source: UNDP 1995. Salamon and Anheier 1997.
Because the definition of non-profit organization differs across countries,
only a very rough comparison is possible. Nevertheless, the striking difference
between Japan and its western counterparts raises questions about the obstacles
to the development of Japan's nonprofit sector. Salamon and Anheier (1996)
offer one clue in their comparison of the sources of nonprofit revenue of eight
countries (Figure 2.7). Only one percent of nonprofit revenue in Japan comes
from private giving, amounting to the smallest proportion among the eight
countries compared. Unlike other industrialized countries, Japanese law does
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not allow for tax deductions on individual charitable contributions, except in
limited specified cases. Without such incentives, nonprofit organizations in Japan
are hampered in their fundraising efforts, and must rely on membership or
service fees and public funds to remain in operation.
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Figure 2.7
Private Giving as a Percentage of Nonprofit Funding by Country
Source: Salamon and Anheier 1996.
Because women's civic organizations must work within the context of the
rules and regulations that govern the nonprofit sector in Japan, it is important to
understand how these legal constraints impact the ability of women's groups to
mobilize an effective social movement. The exact proportion of the nonprofit
sector made up of women's groups is difficult to ascertain, but a survey of over
four thousand unregistered civic groups, conducted by the Economic Planning
Agency (1997), shows 1.6 percent of the groups surveyed report their primary
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activity as women's issues. Significantly, this figure goes up to 9.5 percent when
groups are allowed to list multiple activities, revealing the large number of
women's groups involved in social issues, such as promoting international
understanding, in addition to women's issues. But as part of Japan's growing
nonprofit sector, women's groups face a number of obstacles, many of which
can be traced back to a system of legal recognition for nonprofit public interest
corporations, set forth in 1896 through provisions in the Meiji Era Civil Code. In
addition to lacking incentives for independent fundraising, this system
maximizes bureaucratic discretion over the nonprofit sector, and makes it
extremely difficult for civic organizations to gain legal corporate status along
with its benefits.
Regulations on Public Interest Corporations (Koeki Hojin)
Under Japanese law, individual citizens are born with certain basic rights,
such as the right to own property or enter into contracts. But when citizens band
together to form a group, the group does not automatically have the legal rights
of individuals. Instead, the group must meet certain legal requirements and
apply to the government for official recognition as a "hojin," which literally
translates to legal person. Once approved as a legal person, the group acquires
individuals rights, which allow the group to purchase property, rent office space,
open bank accounts, or employ workers under the group name. Without legal
person status, activities such as these have to be performed under the name of a
responsible individual acting on behalf of the group.
There are many types of organizations with legal person status, and they
are governed by separate laws depending on their function. The most basic law
prescribing the process by which groups are granted legal recognition is the Civil
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Code of 1896. Article 34 addresses associations and foundations that serve the
public good without a profit motive. These are known as public interest
corporations (koeki hojin). Article 35 covers profit-making organizations,
including joint-stock companies and other private businesses. Other statutes
apply to a variety of nonprofit organizations that are separate from public
interest corporations under Article 34. These include social welfare providers,
private schools, religious associations, and hospitals. While a broad definition
applies to all of these nonprofit organizations, the term public interest
corporation (koeki hojin) generally refers to public interest associations (shadan
hojin) and public interest foundations (zaidan hojin), as governed by Article 34 of
the Civil Code. Public interest associations are membership organizations
formed to serve the public good, while public interest foundations are based on
endowed funds that are used for charitable purposes. In 2000, there were 12,872
public interest associations and 18,482 public interest foundations, for a total of
26,354 public interest corporations registered with the government (Prime
Minister's Office 2000).
The process of establishing a public interest corporation is cumbersome
and lengthy. Under the Civil Code, organizations must receive approval from
the "competent authorities" (smiui kancho), which, in practice, are national
government ministries or prefectural government offices. The appropriate
competent authority is determined by the goals and activities of the
organization, so that a group that administers scholarships would seek approval
from the Ministry of Education, or a group that provides social services to the
elderly would apply to the Ministry of Welfare. However, it is not always clear
which government office is the appropriate competent authority, and in cases
where the activities of an organization are related to more than one Ministry,
jurisdiction may be held jointly.
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To form a public interest association, an organization must have
members, a director or leader, and articles of association governing the group.
For a public interest foundation, a group must have the necessary funds or
assets, a director or leader, and articles of association. Although there is no set
requirement for the funds necessary to establish a public interest corporation, a
group must generally have 300 million yen (nearly 3 million dollars) to set up a
foundation, and 10 million yen (around 100 thousand dollars) in yearly
membership dues for an association (Kumashiro 1998). Also, the Civil Code
dictates the organizational structure of public interest corporations, requiring
that there be a Director (riji) who represents the organizations as its head, and a
Supervisor (kanji) that oversees the administrative work of the director and the
finances of the organization. All public interest associations must hold a yearly
general meeting of their membership for administrative planning. If a public
interest association wishes to change its articles of association, it must have its
members' approval by a three-quarters vote, as well as the permission of the
competent authority.
But even after meeting all of these requirements and submitting the
necessary paperwork to the proper authorities, the establishment of a public
interesi corporation is far from guaranteed, as there is wide bureaucratic
discretion in the approval process. Without clear or uniform criteria, the
competent government authorities decide whether or not the proposed
organization meets the requirement of serving the public interest. The final
decision cannot be challenged in court, and the interpretation of "public interest"
changes according to the times. For example, Japan has golf courses that are
designated public interest corporations because at one time they were
considered to serve the public interest, though not any longer. Bureaucratic
oversight continues after approval is granted, as public interest corporations
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must submit budget and activity reports to the competent authorities before and
after every fiscal year. The competent authorities have the power to revoke
legal status for noncompliance with regulations, though in most cases
government approval is semi-permanent.
With so much bureaucratic involvement, it is not surprising that there is a
widespread perception that public interest corporations are mostly extensions of
government agencies. The term "nonprofit sector" usually connotes citizen
activity that is independent of government or business. But in Japan, nonprofit
public interest corporations have the image of being quasi-governmental
organizations, and in many cases they are. Almost one-third of public interest
corporations are administrative proxies (gyosei daikokei), meaning their
establishment and management are paid for by the government, and oftentimes
they are headed by former government bureaucrats. These quasi-governmental
organizations provide an ideal landing spot for aiakudari, or descent from
heaven, in which high ranking bureaucrats take comfortable and lucrative
positions outside of government upon retirement. Among public interest
corporations under the jurisdiction of national government ministries or
agencies, 31 percent were headed by former government bureaucrats in 1998
(Yamauchi 1999). Another function of government sponsored public interest
corporations is that they allow ministries to get around government reform
guidelines that set ceilings on staff allotment within in each ministry. Nonprofit
organizations are created to perform government functions without appearing
to increase the size of government (Yamamoto 1998).
Bureaucratic involvement in the nonprofit sector extends even further
through a tax system that favors a relatively small number of organizations
designated by the government. As in other industrialized democracies,
registered nonprofit groups in Japan receive special tax consideration. Public
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interest corporations are only taxed on income derived from profitable activities,
such as selling goods or renting space, as defined by the tax code. On this
income, they are taxed at the rate of 22 percent, which is lower than the 30
percent income tax rate paid by for-profit organizations, such as private
companies. In special cases, public interest corporations receive additional
benefits through income tax deductions for individuals or corporations that
make charitable contributions to them.
Under the Japanese tax system, an individual donor is allowed income tax
deductions for charitable contributions to three types of institutions--national or
local governments, organizations chosen by the Ministry of Finance for
designated contributions (shitei kifiukin), or Special Public Interest Promoting
Corporations (tokutei koeki zoshin hojin).4 When a donation is made to one of
these three types of recipients, the individual donor may deduct the amount
contributed up to 25 percent of her yearly income, minus ten thousand yen.
Corporate donors may deduct the full amount given to national or local
governments and organizations approved by the Ministry of Finance for
designated contributions.
But in practice, these tax incentives for private donations are limited to a
relatively small number of nonprofit organizations. In 1996, only 704
organizations were approved by the Ministry of Finance for designated
contributions, mostly in the fields of social welfare and education. Similarly,
there were only 822 public interest corporations that qualified as Special Public
Interest Promoting Corporations (Yamauchi 1999). Therefore, out of a total of
- To increase support for nonprofit organizations, the government created a
fourth category, Recognized Special Public Interest Corporation (nintei tokutei
hieiri katsudo hojin), in October of 2001. While this measure widens eligibility for
tax benefits, nonprofit organizations seeking this special status must receive
approval from the head of the National Tax Administration Agency. Data on the
number of nonprofit organizations that qualify for tax benefits under this new
category are not yet available.
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26,089 public interest corporations, only 1,526, or less than 6 percent, were
designated by the government as qualified recipients of individual tax deductible
contributions. For the remaining 84 percent, there are no tax incentives for
individuals to make charitable contributions to them, though corporations
receive a relatively small tax break on donations to these groups.
Japan's complex system of granting legal recognition to public interest
corporations has led to a two-tiered nonprofit sector of registered and
unregistered organizations. While there are some 26 thousand registered
nonprofit public interest corporations, the Economic Planning Agency estimates
that there are over half a million nonprofit public interest organizations that are
not registered with the government and do not have legal person status
(Amenomori 1997). These unregistered groups may be free of government
scrutiny and intervention, but their independence comes at the expense of
income tax benefits and legal rights that facilitate the maintenance and
development of nonprofit organizations. An examination of my sample of 889
women's groups further shows how these two segments of the nonprofit sector
differ, and reveals significant legal and structural obstacles facing the women's
movement in Japan.
Women's Organizations as Public Interest Corporations
Within the women's movement, there is an observable difference
between unregistered, independent nonprofit women's groups and government
approved women's public interest corporations. The first obvious difference is
the number of organizations. In my sample of 889 women's groups, only 41
identify themselves as public interest corporations. Although fewer in number,
these organizations appear to be significantly richer in resources than their
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unregistered counterparts. While data on budgets and staff were not available
for my sample, the inequality in resources became apparent simply by viewing
the pamphlets, newsletters, flyers and other materials produced by public
interest corporations versus unregistered nonprofit groups. Literature collected
from the public interest corporations in my sample reflect a relatively high
degree of professionalism, typically including a glossy informational brochure,
listing an office location and full-time staff. In contrast, materials collected from
independent nonprofit women's groups are often hand written, and contact
information lists phone numbers of individual members as opposed to a
permanent office location.
The forty-one women's public interest corporations in my sample address
a variety of issue areas, but they share a fairly conservative approach to
improving the lives of women. These include well known international
organizations, such as the Girl Scouts of Japan, the Soroptimist Japan
Foundation, the Japanese Christian Temperance Union, and the Japan
Association of University Women. They also include the alumnae associations of
the two oldest women's universities in Japan, along with two consumer
advocacy organizations, and large professional associations for nurses,
midwives, secretaries, piano teachers and women in agriculture. Arts and
culture are represented by public interest corporations formed around
traditional Japanese handicrafts, folk art, flower arranging, and koto (a Japanese
string instrument). Only two foundations in my sample are devoted to
promoting women's employment, and one association is organized around
family planning. Motherhood and family life are supported by several
organizations, including the Mothers and Students' Association, the Japan Family
Welfare Association, the Better Homes Association, a home economics research
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institute, and two research groups developed to infant and childhood
development.
The largest subset of public interest corporations in my sample includes
regional women's organizations sponsored by local governments. Typically, a
prefectural or city government establishes a nonprofit foundation to manage a
public women's center. These centers sponsor lectures, workshops, and other
programs for women, and provide meeting space and other resources, such as
libraries, computers, and newsletters. The public interest foundations organized
around women's centers tend to be managed jointly by government and civilian
personnel. For example, the Kitakyushu Forum on Asian Women has a non-
governmental representative as its president, but a city official as its managing
director. Their board of trustees and advisors is made up of a mix of people
from government, business, academia, and the nonprofit sector. Similarly, the
Osaka City Women's Foundation is headed by the deputy mayor of Osaka City,
along with a vice-director general who is not a ct official.
These regional women's foundations demonstrate the distinction between
non-profit organizations (NPOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
in Japan, in contrast to the often interchangeable use of these terms in the United
Sates. As public interest corporations, regional women's foundations are, by
definition, not for profit. But they are closely tied to the government through
their establishment and management. The striking disparity in resources
between government sponsored public interest corporations and unregistered,
non-governmental, non-profit women's groups suggests a trade-off between
access and autonomy. While women's organizations affiliated with the
government have access to state resources and officials, their autonomy in
decision making and agenda setting may be compromised by their reliance on
government funding and staff. The imbalances created by Japan's two-tiered
75
nonprofit sector has led to recent legislative reform which offers an alternative
system of legal certification for non-profit groups.
The NPO Law of 1998
In order to encourage volunteerism and bolster civil society, Japanese
law-makers adopted the Law to Promote Non-profit Activities, better known as
the NPO Law, in 1998.5 The aim of the law is to make it easier for civic groups to
gain legal recognition than under the existing system governing public interest
corporations. To this end, the new law clarifies and streamlines the process by
which government authorities grant organized groups legal person status
(hojinkaku), giving groups the same basic rights as individuals, such as the right to
enter into contracts or own property.
Under the NPO law, civic groups with ten or more members are eligible
to apply for legal person status. Their activities must fall under twelve general
categories, including social welfare, environment, culture and arts, international
cooperation, and gender equality. There are some restrictions on religious and
political activities and violent groups are excluded from certification. Despite
opposition within the Diet, a provision was adopted to allow certified groups to
be made up entirely of non-Japanese citizens. Groups are not subject to any
minimum requirement on foundation assets or yearly membership dues. The
governor's office of the prefecture in which the group operates has jurisdiction
over the group. In cases where a group is active in more than one prefecture,
jurisdiction is with the Economic Planning Agency. Groups must provide yearly
reports to the government authorities with jurisdiction. If there are no reports
for three years, the group will lose certification.
5 For a detailed account of the passage of the NPO Law, see Pekkanen 2000.
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In contrast to the bureaucratic discretion that governs public interest
corporations, the rules and requirements for legal certification are clearly
specified in the NPO Law. In principle, legal status is granted to all groups that
meet the legal criteria and submit their application to the proper authorities. In
cases where certification is denied, a written explanation must be provided.
Unlike public interest corporations, groups that are denied legal status under the
NPO Law may contest the decision in court.
The new NPO Law goes a long way towards simplifying and clarifying
the process of legal certification for organized groups in Japan. Having legal
person status provides groups with individual rights, helping them conduct their
day to day business, such as setting up phone service, purchasing supplies, or
hiring staff. But, aside from these basic rights, there are few tangible benefits to
gaining legal status under the NPO Law. The most glaring weakness is that the
law fails to provide any significant tax advantage to newly registered nonprofit
groups. The issue of income tax deductions for charitable contributions was
hotly debated throughout the drafting and passage of the bill, and will
undoubtedly be the main issue of discussion for future legislation. But groups
that register for legal status under the NPO Law are not much better off in terms
of tax treatment than groups that do not register.
Also, while the NPO law is designed to keep bureaucratic intervention at a
minimum, groups seeking legal status must still submit to significant
government regulation and oversight. For example, the law dictates the
leadership structure of nonprofit groups, requiring three or more directors and
at least one supervisor. The law further stipulates that only one-third or fewer of
these officials can be paid because a fully paid leadership staff would detract from
the nonprofit nature of the group. There are also restrictions on the number of
people from the same family that can hold leadership positions. Certified groups
77
must conduct a general meeting of their membership at least once a year, and,
by law, the purpose of the meeting must be announced at least five days in
advance of the meeting. Decision-making must be equitable in principle, so that
members' votes cannot be based on their monetary contributions to the group.
While all of these regulations appear reasonable and well-intentioned, they
demonstrate the government's urge to micromanage the very organizations
that are supposed to function independent of government.
With so few tangible benefits at the cost of so much government
regulation, it is no wonder that the response of the nonprofit sector has been
lukewarm at best. According to a report by the Economic Planning Agency,
only 12 percent of the 4,152 unregistered civic associations surveyed felt the need
for legal person status (EPA 1997). But social change often takes place
incrementally in Japan. Since the Civil Code of 1896 first established public
interest corporations, it has taken over one hundred years before the adoption
of major new legislation for the nonprofit sector. So it remains to be seen how
the NPO Law will ultimately impact the nascent volunteer movement in Japan.
Obstacles Facing the Women's Movement in Japan
Like women in all countries, women in Japan face numerous obstacles to
organizing an effective social movement. Identifying and understanding the
main political obstacles to their struggle for equality is a key objective of this
dissertation. To this end, this chapter has explored three hypotheses that offer
political explanations for Japan's low international standing on gender equality.
The first hypothesis is that there is no women's movement in Japan. This
hypothesis is put to rest by the large number and wide variety of highly
organized women's groups active throughout the country. The second
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hypothesis is that there is a women's movement, but it rejects equality between
the sexes as a goal. While opinion surveys show some ambivalence over
equality, women's attitudes are gradually shifting in support of gender equality.
More importantly, a large segment of the women's movement explicitly
embraces equality as its goal. These groups, combined with the large number of
women's groups taking up a range of social issues, form the core of a diverse
women's movement with a transformative agenda. As so many of these
women's organizations seek nothing less than the total transformation of
Japanese society, the women's movement in Japan should be recognized as a
feminist movement.
With the existence of a broad-based, diverse, feminist movement
confirmed, the question then becomes what is holding this movement back?
The answer can be found in the legal and regulatory environment in which the
women's movement operates. For over one hundred years, the Civil Code of
1896 has been the basis of a vague and complex system of legal certification for
non-profit public interest corporations, leaving government officials with wide
bureaucratic discretion and control. The independence of the non-profit sector in
Japan is further limited by the lack of tax incentives for individual charitable
contributions to non-profit organizations. The high degree of government
involvement, combined with the difficulties of fundraising, has stunted the
development of an independent and professional non-profit sector in Japan.
Because the certification process is so cumbersome and requires a large amount
of resources, the vast majority of non-profit civic groups in Japan are not
registered with the government, and operate outside the system governing
public interest corporations. Wiot recognition as legal persons, these groups
face many difficulties in their day to day operations, as they lack basic individuals
rights, such as the right to own property or enter into contracts.
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Yet, despite these obstacles, the number of unregistered grassroots
organizations has increased dramatically in recent years, prompting new
legislation to create a clear and simple process by which non-profit groups can
obtain legal person status. Although the explicit goal of the legislation is to
strengthen an independent non-profit sector, the new system of legal
certification still calls for government regulation in areas as basic as leadership
structure, decision making rules, and yearly meetings. It is striking that even as
the government sets out to minimize state intervention in the non-profit sector,
it cannot resist imposing a certain amount of uniformity on the disparate and
diverse groups that are driving Japan's newly emerging civil society.
As the women's movement makes up a key part of the growing non-
profit sector, it is subject to this pattern of state regulation and intervention. Like
all non-profit organizations, women's groups are divided between registered
public interest corporations and unregistered non-profit organizations. Under
the hundred year old system of certification, government bureaucrats have
granted conservative, resource-rich organizations legal person standing, while
leaving most gras-roots women's groups to operate without the rights of legal
persons and without even the limited tax benefits given to registered public
interest corporations. In this way, the state controlled system of legal
certification and the lack of tax incentives to support non-profit fundraising have
created a regulatory environment that is hardly conducive to the development
of an independent and professionalized women's movement. Women's
organizations that have the resources to support full-time staff and permanent
office space tend to be connected to the government, while independent,
unregistered grass-roots women's groups tend to operate on a shoe-string
budget and rely entirely on volunteers. It is not yet clear how the new system of
legal certification will impact the women's movement, but without any
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significant tax benefits, the NPO law may not provide enough incentive for non-
profits groups to register with the government.
While government regulations on the non-profit sector have created
numerous obstacles to the women's movement, there is another side to state
intervention in civil society-one which seeks to support and aid women's
organizations. Both regulation and support achieve the same purpose of
allowing the state a degree of influence and control over the women's
movement. With one hand, the state constrains the ability of women's groups to
raise their own funds and set their own rules. But with the other hand, the state
provides them with resources and access through various policies, programs,
and projects. The most striking example of state intervention in support of the
women's movement is the vast network of public women's centers, which is
explored in the following chapter.
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Chapter Three
Women's Centers in Japan
Japan's National Women's Education Center (NWEC) spreads out across
nearly 35 acres in Saitama prefecture, just outside of Tokyo. Its facilities include a
conference center, administrative office building, library, cafeteria, swimming
pool, gymnasium, tennis courts, gift shop, and lodgings to accommodate over
three-hundred guests. The center is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Education, and almost all the full-time staff are civil servants. They conduct
research, publish studies, host conferences, and run on-line databases on
women's issues. Their facilities are used by women's groups and other civic
organizations year round for meetings, workshops, and other activities.
Although NWEC is the only national center, and by far the largest, it is one of
several hundred women's centers found throughout Japan.
From an American perspective, women's centers are an unusual
institution that have no obvious counterpart in the United States. Although they
may differ in size. location, budget, and administration, women's centers are
essentially a designated, physical space that serve as a base for women's social,
political, and cultural activities. In 2000, there were close to 800 women's centers
in Japan. Some are exclusively for the use of women, though most are open to
both women and men. A vast majority of these centers are supported financially
or administratively by municipal or prefectural governments. Only about ten
percent of women's centers are built and managed entirely by private groups
(National Council of Women's Centers 1998). Most are either built and managed
by the government, or built by the government and managed by private citizens
or legally recognized foundations (liojin). In addition to providing meeting space
for women's groups, almost all .enters sponsor their own programs, such as
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lectures, courses, exercise, research or counseling. They usually have a small
staff of government or civilian workers, and some centers have volunteers.
For a country considered a laggard among industrialized counties on the
promotion of women's rights, publicly supported women's centers present a
paradox. By all accounts, the Japanese government has been slow to adopt and
enforce aggressive policies on behalf of women. Yet, the government provides
tremendous resources and support for women's organizations in the form of
these women's centers. In this chapter, I will explore this paradox through an
examination of women's centers and their relationship to women's organizations
and the state. First, I will review the one hundred year history of women's
centers in Japan. I will then provide an explanation for the proliferation of public
women's centers based on international events and domestic institutional
constraints. Finally, I will examine the issue agenda of women's centers by
analyzing the content of their programs, and comparing them with the issue
agendas of women's organizations.
History of Women's Centers
The one hundred year history of Japan's women's centers reflects the
country's development through various stages of modernization, nationalism,
de-centralization, and public administration. Shikuma Atsuko, former Director
of the Japan Women's Social Education Association, divides the history of
women's centers into five distinct stages of development (Shikuma et al. 1 99(:
167). The first "creation" stage begins at the turn of the century and includes a
small number of women's centers built in the prewar years. The second stage,
covering World War II, sees the establishment of women's centers for
government controlled women's groups. The postwar years represent a third
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stage in which American Occupation policies of de-centralization encourage the
rise of regional women's centers. The UN declaration of 1975 as International
Women's Year marks the beginning of the fourth stage, characterized by the
proliferation of publicly built and managed women's centers. Finally, the fifth
stage, and current trend is towards large-scale, multi-purpose women's centers.
Earliest Women's Centers
The first women's centers in Japan were established in the early 1900s,
during a period of rapid industrialization and growing western influence. Given
this historical backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising that the earliest women's
centers were actually foreign imports, founded by international organizations
with funding from abroad.
The oldest women's center, built in 1900, belongs to the Japan Women's
Christian Temperance Union (JWCTU) (Nihon Kirisutokyo Fujin Kyofukai), a
branch of the American anti-alcohol and anti-prostitution organization that sent
missionaries around the world at the turn of the century.' The center, called
House of Love (Jiaikant), was built primarily as a shelter for former prostitutes.
According to regulations adopted in 1899, the purpose of the center was to direct
women in their transition from prostitution to "the right path." To this end,
women were given lessons on cooking, cleaning, sewing, knitting, and laundry,
as well as math, reading, and calligraphy. Whatever wages women earned, were
turned over to the center's staff to'keep until they were deemed reformed. To
use the center, women had to have two certified spoflsOrs (presumably WCTU
members), and go through a three-month trial period (Fujiui Sliupo 1899: 25).
While small donations were collected from within Japan for building the center,
STyrrell (1991) provides a history of WCTU's overseas missionary activities.
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the largest donation of $500 came from a foundation in the United States.
American involvement extended into management, as the center was headed by
an American, and run by Japanese staff (JWCTU 1986:149,250). In 1907, the
Japan WCTU opened the Osaka Women's Home (Osaka Fiujin Hou mu), as the first
branch of their organization to serve women in western Japan (255).
Fifteen years after the first Japan WCTU center was built, the Tokyo
Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) established its center under
similar circumstances of western influence and funding. The Tokyo YWCA
center evolved primarily from the need for female student housing in Tokyo. At
the time of the Tokyo YWCA's founding in 1905, women's education was on the
rise. Between 1900 and 1905, the number of girls' high schools nearly doubled
from 52 to 100, and the number of girls enrolled increased sharply from 12,000 to
31,900. By 1910, there were 193 girls' high schools with 56,200 students (Nihon
YXVCA 1987: 45). With nearly all of these schools concentrated in the Tokyo
area, a lack of accommodations became a significant barrier to education for girls
from the countryside.
The Tokyo YWCA sought to build student dormitories as a practical way
to increase access to education. An international fundraising campaign was led
by Caroline McDonald, a Canadian woman who was the first secretary general
of the Japan YWCA. In 1908, the Tokyo YWCA opened its first student boarding
house, followed by another built three years later. A large donation from
students of Vassar College provided funds for the Tokyo YWCA's main
women's center built in 1915 (46-47).
Unlike the student dormitories, this new building was a bona fide
women's center in that it not only housed female students, but also provided
meeting and office space for the Japan YWCA, as well as educational and
recreational programs for women. Teoinathe-str b iig burned
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down in the Great Kanto Earthquake and Fire in 1923. When it was re-opened in
1929, it was transformed into a six-story building with a basement, gymnasium,
swimming pool, meeting rooms, youth hostel, and cafeteria (Tokyo YWCA
1985: 7).
These first women's centers served as the base of activities for a new class
of urban, educated, Christian women, as industrialization saw the emergence of
the full-time housewife in Japan. But these women represented only a small
segment of the female population. And these centers could not have been
established without international funding and personnel. Because of their unique
circumstances, the first women's centers failed to start a national trend.
Even the burgeoning feminist movement of the Taisho period (1912-
1926), could not muster the resources necessary to build their ideal women's
center. In 1920, feminist luminaries Hiratsuka Raicho, Ichikawa Fusae, and Oku
Mumeo founded the New Woman's Association (NWA). While their main goal
was women's suffrage, their founding declaration includes plans to build a
women's center that would house offices, public meeting space, classrooms,
lodgings, a cafeteria, recreational facilities, and library (Shin Fujin Kyokai 1977:
161)2 Ultimately, this plan was not realized, as NWA disbanded just three years
after its founding, due to personality clashes among its leaders, and charges of
bourgeois elitism from a growing socialist women's movement (Tokuza 1999:
168-178).
Nevertheless, Oku Mumeo went on to establish women's centers, though
perhaps not as grand as than the one originally envisioned. Just months after
the dissolution of NWA, Oku founded the Working Women's Publishing House
2 Shikuma (1995: 29) points out that when the New Woman's Society was formed
in 1920, the Tokyo YWCA's center had been in operation for five years. She
speculates that the New Woman Society's desire for a women's center was
directly inspired by the Tokyo YWCA and Japan WCTU centers.
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(Shokugyo Fujinsha), that produced the monthly journal Women's Movement
(Fujin Undo). Through this organization led by Oku, the first women's centers
by and for Japanese women were established.
In 1930, Oku was presented with an opportunity to use a large two story
building in a downtown factory district of Tokyo.3 Oku and her publishing
house colleagues took this opportunity to create a women's settlement house,
which they called Fu jin Setsurumento, that served the needs of mostly poor,
working women and children. Within two years, the settlement had established
a day nursery, overnight lodgings, women's night school offering lessons on
housework and sewing, children's club, mothers' consumer organization, classes
on everything from feminism to knitting, counseling services for health,
employment, and family planning, and a monthly publication. The settlement
was supported by income from the publishing house along with personal
donations and volunteer efforts. Young women from the countryside would
come to live and work at the settlement for two or three months at a time. Well-
known scholars and artists, who were friends of Oku, came to give lectures
(Nakamura 1980:119-122).
While Oku and her colleagues in Tokyo focused their efforts on the
Women's Settlement, the Osaka branch of the Working Women's Publishing
House opened the first Working Women's House (Hataraku Fitjin no Fe) in 1933.
While this house served as a dormitory for young working women from the
countrysid, it also provided marriage, employment, and health advice,
sponsored various lectures, and promoted consumer activism. The Tokyo
branch soon followed suit by starting it~s own Working Women's House in 1935,
3A friend of Oku's offered to let her use the building when his organization's
plans for the building fell through. Oku describes the offer as "words that fell to
her from the heavens." (Oku 1988: 115).
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which was eventually followed by branches in Fukui, Nagoya, and Kyoto. (Oku
1988: 139-151).
Women's Centers during World War II
Although women's centers sought to create a safe haven for women, they
were not shielded from the wave of militarism sweeping the country. In 1941,
the Working Women's Publishing House ceased publication of its journal under
pressure from government censors. The government also forced an end to
family planning services at the Women's Settlement as part its policies ordering
women to "Give birth and multiply" ("Umeyo Fuyaseyo"). The settlement had
actually served the war effort by housing war widows and their children. But as
the war grew more intense, the center was evacuated, taken over by the Railway
Ministry, and eventually destroyed during the Tokyo air raids. Both the Tokyo
and Osaka Working Women's Houses were similarly destroyed during the war.
As Oku writes in her autobiography, "One by one, the buildings I struggled
alongside with for so long are extinguished and gone." (Oku 1988: 151-163).
Ironically, a major women's center that survived the war was actually a
product of the war. The Japan Women's Center (Nihion Joshi Kaikan) was built in
1937 for the Greater Japan Federated Women's Association (Dai Nihon Rengo
Fujinkai), an organization established by the Ministry of Education in 1930. The
purpose of the organization was to promote "household education" (katei
kyoiku), and "household living improvement" (kntei seikatsu kaizen). The
Ministry's official order states that, though both parents should be involved in
household education, women have a particularly large and weighty
responsibility. Therefore, raising the consciousness of women is the principal
aim (Monbudaijin 1996: 5). Through lectures, workshops, and educational films,
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the Federated Women's Association taught married women to conserve scarce
household goods, such as sugar and milk. Like all wartime organizations, the
association was vertically str-ctured, mobilizing women at the local, prefectural,
and national level. Within a year of its founding, there were close to thirty
prefectural branches throughout the county (Chino 1996a: 15).
In 1933, the association was joined by the Greater Japan Female Youth
Group (Dal Nihon foshi Seinendana) in a fundraising drive to build a women's
center. With donations collected combined with grants from the Imperial
Household, the Japan Women's Center was built in Tokyo in 1937. The center
housed the Household Science Research Center (Kateli Kagaku Kenkvujo), and
throughout the war years, served as a base of operations for promoting home
economics, conservation, and rationalization. While the Greater Japan Federated
Women's Association became consolidated under the Greater Japan Women's
Association (Dai Nihon Fujinkai) in 1943, the Japan Women's Center became part
of the Greater Japan Women's Social Education Association (Dai Nihon loshi Shakai
Kyoikukai). With the end of the war, the center was taken over by the Allied
Occupation in 1945, and was not returned to the Japan Women's Social Education
Association until 1966 (JAWE 1991).4
Postwar Women's Centers
The end of World War II marks the beginning of the rise of regional
women's centers in Japan. As Allied Occupation policies sought to break-up
centralized, integrated wartime women's associations, regional women's groups
- The Greater Japan Women's Social Education Association (Dai Ni/hon (os/u Sh:akai
Kqoikukai) changed its name to Japan Women's Social Education Association
(Ni/hon Jos/hi S/hakai Kqoikukai) in 1972. The organization translates its own name
into English as Japan Association for Women's Education (JAWE).
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(Chiiki Fujin Dantai) grew in strength and numbers. By the end of the Occupation
in 1952, a Ministry of Education survey counted 14,751 regional women's groups
with about six-and-a-half million members, or approximately 28.4 percent of the
female voting age population at that time. By 1960, the number of groups
reached 23,918 with nearly 7.8 million members (Zen Chifuren 1965: 20, 23-24).
These groups were made up primarily of housewives, organized around
consumer issues in response to severe shortages of food and other household
necessities following the war.
Initially, the Occupation's General Headquarters (GHQ), worked with
Social Education Sections of prefectural governments to support regional
womenIs groups. One newspaper, in 1950, called regional women's groups the
key to democratization of women's organizations (Zen Chifuren 1965: 23-24).
Occupation policies of decentralization and democratization took aim at
established patterns of centralized, hierarchical organizations based on regional
or residential affiliation. Particularly during the war, women's organizations in
Japan were formed in a pyramid structure with a national association at the top,
supported by regional or prefectural blocs, with city, town, or village groups
forming the base. Occupation forces attempted to break apart this structure by
urging women to loosen their provincial ties, and form groups or clubs across
villages and towns based on common goals and interests.
But despite Occupation efforts towards de-centralization, regional
women's groups within each prefecture began banding together, so that by
1952, prefectural federations of regional women's groups had been formed in 39
out of 47 prefectures (Zenchifuren 1965: 38). While Occupation authorities
allowed prefectural organizations, they drew the line at a national organization.
Many prefectural federations opposed this policy, and in 1952, just as the
American Occupation came to an end, regional women's groups formed the
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National Federation of Regional Women's Groups (Zenkokiu Clijiki Fujin Dantai
Kyogikai).i
Garon (1997) documents the close relationship between the state and
regional women's groups in the postwar period, particularly in government
campaigns to promote savings and decrease consumption (185-195). As further
evidence of the re-emergence of state involvement in women's organizations, a
yearly Ministry of Education survey documents government funding of regional
women's groups to administer specific programs. Throughout the 1960s,
regional women's groups received about a third of their total funding from the
government, primarily at the prefectural level (Table 3.1). In return for this
funding, regional women's groups carried out a variety of programs related to
women's education, including leadership and administrative training for
women's groups, consumer education, workshops on childrearing, and research
projects usually involving surveys of women (Ministry of Education 1960-71).
S [his decision was by no means unanimous, as many members believed it was
too soon after the wvar, and too close to the structure of wartime women's
associations. Initially, only 19 ot the 39 prefectural federations joined the
national organization, though eventually, they all joined (Zen Chifuren 1965: 37-
38, Shikuma et al. 199%: 80-82).
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Table 3.1
Regional Women's Groups: Percentage of Total Funding Received from
Government Sources
% funding from % funding from
Year National Government Prefectural Government
1960 1 31
1961 9.8 15.3
1962 5.5 25.4
1963 9 22.1
1964 4 30
1965 10.8 25
1966 7.6 24.6
1967 7.7 32
1968 6.5 25.7
1969 4.8 21.7
Source: Ministry of Education, Social Education Bureau. Various Years. Fujin
Kyoiku no Genjo (The Present State of Women's Education). This table represents
every year this data was published under this title.6
At the time, prefectural governments viewed regional women's groups as
representative of all women, and therefore justified the use of public funds to
support them. (Nakamura et al. 1995: 34-35, Shikuma et al. 1996: 82-84 ). In fact,
regional women's groups did represent a majority of women's organizations
throughout the 1960s (Table 3.2). But this still left many other women's groups
without the benefit of government funding. A Ministry of Education report
from 1961 reveals this funding imbalance (Table 3.3).7 While 86 percent of
regional women's groups received prefectural funding, less than 20 percent of
other groups received such funding. These non-regional women's groups are
further distinguished between those with and without central organizations. Of
6 einn in 1972, the Ministry of Education continued to publish an annual
report on women's education using a different format, under the new title Pujin
Kyoiki oyobi Kateikyoiku nii kant suru Shisaku 110 Genjo (The Present State of Policies
Related' to Women's Education and Home Education). The Ministry of Education
discontinued this annual report in 1992.)
7 While Ministry of Education annual reports tend to be uniform in the data
reported, this information on government funding to groups other than regional
women's groups does not appear in subsequent reports.
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the women's groups with central organizations, 23 percent received prefectural
funding, but this figure drops to 11 percent of those groups without a central
organization (Ministry of Education 1961: 53). Although data are only available
for 1961, it reveals a hierarchy of women's organizations in which prefectural
governments favored regional women's groups, followed by groups with
central organizations, and lastly independent women's groups with no central
organization. Oddly enough, this is just the type of group that American
Occupation authorities had hoped to cultivate in Japan.
Table 3.2
Percentage of Women's Organizations that are Regional Women's Groups
Total Number of 'j that are Regional
Year Women's Groups Women's Groups
1960 43,220 63.6
1961 34,095 66.5
1962 37,569 54.4
1963 34.177 58.4
1964 33.136 58.9
1965 31,290 62.3
1966 33,114 56.1
1967 32,143 56.4
1968 39,074 62.1
1969 35,446 52.6
Source: Ministry of Education, Social Education Bureau. Various Years. Fijin
Kyoiku no Genjo (The Present State of Women's Education). This table represents
every year this data was published under this title.
Table 3.3
Prefectural Funding of Groups by Type of Group
non-regional non-regional
Total Regional v /central wv / o central
organization organization
number of
grou ps 34.094 22,687 7,550 3,858
groups with
funding 21,646 19,467 1,743 436
percentage 63 86 23 11
Source: Ministry of Education, Social Education Bureau. 1961.
93
The relationship between regional women's groups and the state was
further cemented at the prefectural level through prefectural women's centers.
As a sign of the growing prominence of regional women's groups, prefectural
governments helped them build women's centers, often at the same site of
prefectural government offices. Generally, a prefectural federation of regional
women's groups would raise funds to build a center, then the prefecture would
provide additional aid, often in the form of land.
When the national federation was founded in 1952, only six of the thirty-
nine prefectural federations were based in women's centers (Zen Chifuren 1965:
38-40). By 1964, a survey by the National Federation of Regional Women's
Groups showed 33 prefectural women's centers affiliated with regional women's
groups. Of the 25 centers responding to the survey, 23 reported that the director
of the center was also the president or former president of the prefectural
federation of regional women's groups. In over half the centers, all leadership
positions were held by leaders of regional women's groups (Zenchifuren 1964).
Meanwhile, the National Federation of Regional Women's Groups began
to make plans to build its own women's center, beginning around 1967. Utilizing
its extensive regional networks, the National Federation succeeded in its
fundraising campaign, which enabled the establishment of the National
Women's Center (Zenikoku Fujit Kaikan) in 1971. This center housed the office of
their Tokyo regional affiliate, and provided lodgings for members from the
countryside who had contributed much to the fundraising effort. As the
consumer movement in Japan was in full swing, many voiced the need for a
product testing room. But the national government had already stepped in to fill
this need through the establishment of National Living Centers which were fully
equipped with such facilities. [his typc'of government involvement left the
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National Women's Center searching for a niche. Ironically, they found it
through a government program. The center soon came to administer a
telephone consumer information service for the Ministry of Agriculture
(Shikuma et al. 1996: 88-89).
Another important national women's center from this period is the
Housewives Center (Siu fit Kaikan), founded in 1956. Although Oku Mumeo's
women's settlement and working women's houses were destroyed by the war,
she continued her efforts to organize women. In 1948, she started the
Housewives' Association (Shufuren), which grew to become the most powerful
consumer group in Japan. Much like the National Federation of Regional
Women's Groups, the Housewives' Association mobilized around issues of daily
life, such as rice and miso distribution, electricity costs, and the quality of
matches. As the movement grew, the organization borrowed various meeting
spaces in churches, business offices, and school classrooms. But with meeting
locations constantly changing, many found it difficult to participate. Out of this
experience, women began to envision their ideal space, where they could meet
regularly, buy food for their families, seek counseling, and stay overnight when
visiting from the countryside (Nakamura et al. 1995: 32-34).
A year after the Housewives' Association was founded, Oku announced
plans to build a center to serve as their base of operations. It took seven years to
raise the necessary funds, as Oku traveled all over Japan collecting individual
donations of 20 yen. When the Housewives' Association Center (Shufu Kaikan)
opened in 1956, it housed a product testing room, a consumer complaint
window, and a family planning center. In keeping with their emphasis on the
concerns of daily living, they offered courses on cooking and house cleaning, in
addition to consumer education seminars. Like regional women's centers, they
95
also rented out space for weddings as a source of income (Shikuma et al. 1996:
86-88).
In the fall of 1956, the Housewives' Association Center hosted the first
national conference of women's centers. About thirty people attended,
representing women's centers at the prefectural, city, and town levels, from all
over Japan. Most represented centers that had already been established, while
others sought advice about building new centers (Shfn Tayori 1956: 4). This first
meeting became the start of the annual National Conference of Women's
Centers (Zenkoku Fujin Kaikan Kyogikai), and a national organization. The
National Council of Women's Centers is currently based at the Housewives'
Association Center.
Finally, in this period, a well known national women's center which
deserves mention is the Women's Suffrage Center (Fusen Kaikan). This center
was built in 1946 under the leadership of pioneer suffragist Ichikawa Fusae. It
served as a base for the New Japan League of Women (S/un Nihon Fujin Domei),
an organization founded by Ichikawa in 1945, which later became the League of
Women Voters of Japan (Nihon Fujin Yukensha Domei). Funding for the original
building came from individual contributions, but when the center was rebuilt in
1962, Ichikawa reluctantly sought funding from business interests to supplement
other fundraising efforts. Nevertheless, the Women's Suffrage Center prides
itself on its general policy of not accepting funds from government or business
(Shikuma, et al. 1997:77-78). The center continues its voter education activities
and currently serves as headquarters for the International Women's Year Liaison
Group (Kokusai Kujinne Ren rakukai), a coalition of over fifty national women's
organizations formed around the United Nations Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
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Overall, these early postwar years are characterized by a gradual
reemergence of state involvement in women's centers. During this period,
women's centers were primarily established through the efforts of women
themselves, through painstaking fundraising campaigns in which they sold items
such as towels, thread, or notebooks. Most of the revenue to support the centers
came from renting out office space, providing overnight accommodations, and
holding weddings. And centers were staffed by private citizens as opposed to
government bureaucrats.
Nevertheless, the line between private and public becomes blurred,
particularly at the prefectural level where the government provided resources
and recognition to regional women's groups. Although centers belonging to
regional women's groups were technically considered private institutions, they
were identified simply as prefectural women's centers, as opposed to centers
belonging to any particular organization. For example, a center in Shiga
prefecture is called Shiga Prefecture Women's Center, even though it was
entirely staffed by members of the Shiga Prefecture Federation of Regional
Women's Groups. Because the women's centers of these postwar years carried
the prefectural name, and were often built on prefecture owned land at the site
of government offices, at the very least, they have the appearance of public
institutions, despite their dcsignation as privately established and privately
managed centers.
This confusion reflects a prevailing tension of this period between
American Occupation policies io sever ties between women and the state, and
the long tradition of state intervention in the women's movement. WVhile
initially, grassroots regional women's groups seemed consistent with the goals
of decentraliiation and democratization, it was not long before they formed
centralized organizations resembling pre-war and warti me patterns. Similarly,
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with women's centers, the drive to build a space especially for women came
from grassroots fundraising efforts. But when these efforts fell short, it was only
natural for the government to step in. This tendency towards state involvement
in women's organizations was only temporarily halted by American Occupation
policies. And as the occupation ended and faded further into the past, women
and the state were eventually reunited through hundreds of women's centers
built by the state beginning in the 1970s.
Public Women's Centers
The United Nation's designation of 1975 as International Women's Year,
and the UN Decade for Women that followed ushered in a period of tremendous
growth in the number of women's centers built in Japan and the role they play in
the women's movement. A national survey of women's centers shows only 81
centers established before 1975, about one-third of which are private. By far, the
largest number of women's centers were established in the ten years marking
the UN Decade for women, with 184 women's centers reporting their year of
establishment between 1975 and 1985. Close to 95 percent of the centers
founded during these years were established by the government. This trend
continued in the 1990s so that about 80 percent of women's centers in Japan were
established by the government. There are currently close to 800 public and
private women's centers throughout Japan (National Council of Women's
Centers 1998).
Although in the vast majority of cases, funding and administration of
women's centers comes from prefectural and local government bodies, the
impetus for state involvement in women's centers originates in the national
bureaucracy. By all accounts, the movement towards public women's centers
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began with the Ministry of Education's establishment of the National Women's
Education Center (NWEC) in 1977. The Ministry first began to recognize the
value of women's centers to women's education in the early 1960s when a
section on prefectural women's centers became a part of their annual survey of
women's education (Shikuma 1990: 65). In 1971, the Ministry initiated a study on
the establishment of a national women's center, and formed a sixteen member
committee of Ministry of Education representatives, heads of prefectural
women's centers and education boards, professors, and heads of other social
education institutions. The committee met ten times between 1971 and 1973, and
submitted a report complete with diagrams and dimensions (Fujin Kyoiku
Kaikan Chosa 1972). In 1974, the Ministry of Education began appropriating
funds to build a national women's center, which eventually cost approximately
six-and-a-half billion yen (or sixty million dollars at the current exchange rate of
105 yen to the dollar).8 A ground-breaking ceremony was held in 1975 to
coincide with the UN declared International Women's Year. The National
Women's Education Center was officially opened in 1977.
The start of the UN Decade for Women and the establishment of the first
national women's center marks the beginning of the Ministry of Education's full-
scale involvement in building, managing, and overseeing women's centers
throughout Japan. As part of its Outline for the Distribution of Funds for the
Maintenance of Public Social Education Institutions issued in 1976, the Ministry
stipulated that funding be provided to prefectural and local governments for the
building and maintenance of women's centers in the 47 prefectures and cities
with populations above 300,000. The outline further specifies how large centers
should be in square meters, and the kind of facilities they should include, such as
8 hi figure includes all funds appropriated for building NWEC between fiscal
years 1971 and 1978, including funds for preparatory research (Ministry of
Education 1992: 106-107).
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conference rooms and information resource rooms.9 Funding for public
women's centers begin to appear in annual national budget figurcs for women's
education starting in fiscal year 1978 (Ministry of Education 1992: 104-109).
Meanwhile, other Ministries became involved in women's centers. While
working women's centers had been around since the 1950s, the Ministry of
Labor began to actively promote their establishment through prefectural and
local governments in 1974. In principle, all cities with populations over 50,000
should have working women's centers to address problems of working women
in the workplace and in the home, and to provide a place for recreation and
learning. The Ministry of Agriculture also followed suit. Between 1977 and 1985,
the Ministry promoted the establishment of rural women's centers to provide a
place for information exchange and learning for women in rural areas. These
centers are primarily managed by local governments and Japan Agricultural
Cooperatives (Nogyo Kodo Kimiai)
As the net result of these efforts by the Ministries of Education, Labor, and
Agriculture Japan currently has 239 women's education centers, 228 working
women's centers, and 305 rural women's centers, most of which were
established by the government. According to the National Council of Women's
Centers, Japan and Korea are the only countries in the world in which women's
centers are primarily funded by the government (National Council of Women's
Centers 1998: 12).
9For an abridged version of this Ministry of Education Policy Outline, see
Shikuma 1990: 86-87).
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Women's Centers in the 1990s
Although there is much diversity among the nearly 800 women's centers
in Japan, it is possible to get a general picture of these centers through data
provided by the National Council of Women's Centers (1998, 1999) and the
National Women's Education Center's (NWEC 1994a).' 0 The National Council of
Women's Centers defines women's centers broadly as centers that promote the
advancement of women, and serve as a base for the activities of women's
groups. Generally, these include women's education centers, working women's
centers, and rural women's centers. The large-scale surveys conducted by these
two organizations report the following characteristics of women's centers in
contemporary Japan.
The geographical distribution of women's centers in Japan is fairly even
according to regional population (Table 3.4). About half the centers are stand
alone buildings, while the other half are housed alongside other facilities, such as
general education centers, welfare centers, and public halls. A majority of
women's centers have facilities for research, conferences, library resources,
advice, childcare, and cooking. Nearly all the centers have paid staff, with an
average of six to seven workers. The average annual budget for a women's
center is a little over 50 million yen, or close to 500 thousand dollars at the
current exchange rate. But there are notable differences between the three types
of centers, with women's education centers having an average annual budget
close to five times higher than that of working women's centers, which in turn is
") These two surveys represent the most comprehensive data currently available
on women's centers in Japan. The 1994 NWEC publication reports the survey
responses of women's centers, but does not provide any data analysis.
Therefore, the findings reported from this survey come from my own analysis
of the data. The 1998 report by the National Conference of Women's Centers
contains survey responses of individual centers, and data analysis which I cite
directly from this publication, unless otherwise indicated.
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nearly ten times higher than the average annual budget for rural women's
centers (Table 3.5).
Table 3.4
Regional Distribution of Women's Centers (N=448)
Population(%)
4.5
7.8
31.7
17.1
17.9
6.1
3.3
10.6
Hokkaido
Tohoku
Kanto
Chubu
Kinki
Chugoku
Shikoku
Kyushu
Okinawa
Centers (%)
5.6
10.3
20.1
21.4
12.1
7.1
4.9
18.5
N/A
Sources: National Council of Women's Centers. 1998. Josei Kaniren Shisetsi iii kan
sur Sogo Chosa (Comprehensive survey of facilities for women). Yano Tsuneta
Kinenkai (Tsuneta Yano Memorial Foundation). 2000. Nihion Kokusei Zule (The
state of Japan pictorial data book). Tokyo: Kokuseisha.
Table 3.5
Women's Centers' Average Annual Budget (in 10,000 yen)
Type of
Center
Avg. Annual
Budget
All
(N=448)
5,080.8
Women's
Education
(N=178)
10,602.1
Working
Women
(N=196)
2,159.7
Rural
Women
(N=74)
230.6
Source: National Council of Women's Centers 1998.
The main function of women's centers is serve as a base for women's civic
and social participation. While centers provide space for women's groups to use
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Region
1.0
for their own purposes, almost all women's centers offer their own programs,
mostly in the form of classes or lectures (Table 3.6). Centers are also engaged in
information gathering and dissemination, advising, support for citizen activities
and exchange, and survey and research.
Table 3.6
Percentage of Women's Centers Engaged in Activities (N=448)
study/ info. civic group survey/ none of
learning gathering advising support research the above
87.7 55.8 53.8 51.3 16.5 6.9
Source: National Council of Women's Centers 1998.
Women's centers are classified as public, private, or mixed according to
their establishment and management. (Table 3.7). "Publicly Established and
Publicly Managed" (Kosetsu, Koei) means that the center is established and
managed by the government at the national, prefectural, or city level by an
executive office, board of education, or other public body. "Publicly Established
and Privately Managed" (Kosetsu, Minei), means that the center was established
by the government as described above, but is managed by a legally recognized
foundation (zaida hojin, shadan hojin), or other private group. Finally, "Privately
Established and Privately Managed" means that the center is established and
managed by a legal foundation or other private group.
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Table 3.7
Women's Centers by Type and Public/Private Establishment and Management
(N=423)
Classification Women's Working Rural Total
Education Women Women
Public establish
Public manage 86 160 46 292
Public establish
Private manage 56 24 14 94
Private establish
Private manage 32 1 4 37
Source: National Council of Women's Centers 1998.
According to these classifications, a vast majority of women's centers are
public institutions in that they are both established and managed by the
government. The level of government responsible for establishing women's
centers is most commonly the municipality, followed by the prefecture, and, in
only a few cases, the national government (Table 3.8). Management of women's
centers most often falls within the executive office of the prefectural governor or
city mayor, followed by the head of the board of education at the prefectural or
local level, and legally recognized foundations (Table 3.9).
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Table 3.8 Establishing Entity of Women's Centers (N=623)
Establishing Entity
Country
Prefecture
Appointed City*
Municipality
Union
Foundation
Individual
Other
Number
79
23
391
7
110
1
Percentage
0.5
12.7
3.7
62.8
1.1
17.7
0.2
1.4
Source: National Women's Education Centre. 1994. Josei kanren shisetsu no genjo
(The current state of facilities for women). Data analysis is my own.
*Appointed City refers to specially designated cities with populations over
500,000 that are allowed to take on functions usually performed by the
prefectural government.
Table 3.9 Managing Entity of Women's Centers (N=623)
Managing Entity
Ministry of Education
Board of Education
Executive Office
Union
Foundation
Number
2
137
270
13
135
Individual
Other 65
Percentage
0.3
22.0
43.3
2.1
21.7
0.2
10.4
Source: NWEC 1994a. Data analysis is my own.
The average number of people that use each women's center per year is
39,206. But usage differs significantly among the three types of centers (Table
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3.10). Not surprisingly, the vast majority of users are women at 82 percent.
Two-thirds of women's centers place conditions on the use of their facilities.
While conditions vary widely, the most common are the prohibition on activities
that are for profit, political, or religious, though it is unclear how these conditions
are defined and enforced.
Table 3.10
Average Number of Users per Year at Each Center by Type of Women's Center
(N=448)
Women's Working Rural
All Education Women Women
39,206 o8,868 26,622 2,839
Source: National Council of Women's Centers 1998.
Current Trends and Issues
The final stage in the history of women's centers in Japan is marked by
the trend towards large-scale women's centers, and debates over public versus
private management. Japan's most modem, high-profile women's centers are
exemplified by such leading centers as the Yokohama Women's Forum, Tokyo
Women's Plaza, Osaka Dawn Center, and Move-Kitakyushu Women's Center.
These centers stand out among Japan's women's centers in that they have
considerably more physical space, facilities, staff, activities, and users than other
women's centers.
While all of these centers were established by the government, they are
managed through legally recognized foundations, signifying a trend towards
public establishment and private management. But, in reality, the distinction
between public and private is not as clear as the term kosetsu minei suggests. A
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key issue in this arrangement is staffing. In publicly established, publicly
managed women's centers, regular full-time staff are typically civil servants, who
are sometimes supplemented by specialists outside the civil service, or part-time
workers. But the core of the staff are government workers subject to the civil
service employment system. In the case of publicly established, privately
managed women's centers, the prefecture or city government that established
the center will usually assign civil servant employees as workers on-loan (shikko
shoku in) to the women's center. The number of civil servants working in
privately managed women's centers varies from center to center. But overall,
about two-thirds of publicly established, privately managed women's education
centers surveyed report having at least one worker on-loan from the
government, with 13.5 percent reporting between ten and nineteen such
workers on staff (National Council of Women's Centers 1998: 58).
There are pros and cons to having women's centers staffed by civil
servants. From the government's perspective, the purpose of sending public
employees to privately managed women's centers is to loan out the
government's expertise in management and administration of public institutions.
There is also the issue of accountability. As taxpayer money is used to build
women's centers, the government must be sure that they are being run
efficiently. But, while civil servants may have general administrative skills, they
do not necessarily possess specific knowledge about or even interest in women's
issues.
In a typical case, for example, in which a city establishes a women's center,
the city will assign staff to that center from their pool of civil servants who may
be assigned to any number of the city's public institutions, including libraries,
museums, and town halls. Civil servants usually spend up to three years at one
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workplace before being transferred to the next, moving their way up through
seniority over their lifetime of government employment.
The close connection between women's centers and the civil service
probably explains the rather surprising finding that half of the 623 women's
centers surveyed in 1994 were headed by men (NWEC 1994a). A more recent
survey of women's centers shows little change, with slightly more men than
women heading women's centers. This survey also shows that women's
education centers are much more likely to be headed by women than working
women's centers or rural women's centers, suggesting that women within the
education civil service have greater opportunities than their counterparts in labor
or agriculture (Table 3.11). The men who head women's centers tend to be
relatively high-ranking civil servants who have worked long enough to earn the
position of head of a public institution, whether it be a library, museum or
women's center. Although efforts are made to assign women to these posts, the
emphasis is on general managerial and administrative skills that can be applied
equally effectively in running public facilities, regardless of their purpose or
populations they serve.
Table 3.11
Heads of Women's Centers by Gender and Type of Center (N=443)
Women Men Unclear Unreported*
Total 161 172 12 98
Women's
Education Ctr 96 45 4 33
Working
Women's Ctr 63 112 7 11
Rural
Women's Ctr 2 15 1 54
Source: National Council of Women's Centers 1998. Data analysis is my own.
*Unreported includes centers that do not have a director or center head.
108
Leaders within the women's movement express concern over the need to
develop specialists in the area of women's studies (Shikuma et al. 1999) They
point out that the usual three year assignment to a women's center does not
allow enough time for civil servants to gain expertise on women's issues. On the
other hand, the system brings in people who may otherwise never set foot in a
women's center. The hope is that through their work experience at a women's
center, civil servants will develop an awareness of gender issues that they will
take to their next public post. Whatever the pros or cons, it is unlikely that
women's centers will see the administrative efficiency of Japan's civil service
replaced by the passionate commitment of feminist activists, so long as women's
centers remain primarily institutions of the state.
Why Women's Centers?
In order to understand the proliferation and institutionalization of public
women's centers in Japan, it is necessary to examine the international context
and domestic institutions that shaped their development in the 1970s. The
establishment and maintenance of women's centers is an important part of
Japan's policy response to the United Nations designation of 1975 as
International Women's Year, followed by the UN Decade for Women. While
Japan could have responded to international pressure through any number of
policy alternatives, the decision to build centers for women has a historical
precedent in youth centers and other institutions that are part of a long tradition
of social education (shakai kyoiku) in Japan.
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The International Context
In December of 1972, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted a resolution proclaiming 1975 as International Women's Year. At the
first International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City in 1975, the
adoption of a World Plan of Action set forth guidelines for governments of
individual countries to develop their own National Plan of Action and National
Machinery to implement legislation to end discrimination against women. The
UN General Assembly endorsed the World Plan of Action, and further declared
the United Nations Decade for Women from 1976 to 1985. At the second World
Conference in Copenhagen in 1980, 75 countries signed the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), including
Japan.
This period coincides with Japan's self-conscious efforts to raise its
international stature after two decades of remarkable economic growth. Amidst
stereotypes of Geisha and Madame Butterfly, along with dismal statistics on the
status of women, it became increasingly important for Japan to demonstrate a
commitment to women's equality in order to improve its image abroad. As a
participant of the International Women's Year Conference and signatory of
CEDAW, Japan was obliged to develop goals and strategies towards ending sex
discrimination, and to submit periodic progress reports for international scrutiny
and appraisal.
In response to these requirements, Japan created the Headquarters for the
Planning and Promotion of Women's Issues (Fitjin Mondai Kikaku Siuishiii HIonbu)
within the Prime Minister's Office to head its "national machinery" for the
implementation of Japan's National Plan of Action (Kokunai Kodo Keikakn). The
original plan identifies five issue areas, and outlines basic strategies to improve
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the status of women in each area. These include law and legislation, women's
participation in society, maternal health and protection, welfare of the elderly,
and international cooperation. The outline for promoting women's participation
in society contains a section indicating that women's centers would be an integral
part of Japan's national strategy to support women's continuing education (Fujin
Honbu 1977:5).
With Japan's official entry into the international arena of women's rights,
the Ministry of Education made efforts to ensure that construction would begin
on the National Women's Education Center in time to commemorate
Internation-al Women's Year (Ohno et al. 1998:175). Also, the center's opening in
1977 happily coincided with the adoption of Japan's National Plan of Action. The
establishment of the national women's center was followed by the proliferation
of women's centers nationwide, some of which were part of a Plan of Action for
Women adopted at the prefectural or municipal level. The large, impressive,
national women's center, along with hundreds of regional and local centers,
served as visible evidence to the world that the Japanese government was
devoting attention and resources to women's issues.
The Domestic Institutional Context
While international influence explains the timing of government actions
on behalf of women, the choice of strategy to build women's centers was shaped
by domestic institutional factors. Japan's system of social education provided a
pre-existing conceptual and administrative framework that could simply be
extended to women. The model and justification for building the National
Women Education Center was the National Youth Center, built in 1959, and
followed by the founding of hundreds of regional and local youth centers.
II
Certainly, from an international perspective, Japan's policy response of building
women's centers is unusual, if not unique. But within Japan, women's centers
are just one of many different types of centers established by the government in
response to new social issues and demands.
In terms of Japanese education policy, social education basically covers
learning that takes place outside of formal schooling. The Fundamental Law of
Education, adopted in 1947, defines social education as "education that takes
place in the home, workplace, or other areas in society." Two years later, The
Law of Social Education, spelled out the responsibilities of national and local
governments in the area of social education, and charged local boards of
education with the establishment of public citizens' halls, libraries, and museums.
As part of a series of social education laws that followed, the Law for the
Promotion of Youth Classes was adopted in 1953. This law gave government
support to youth classes already in operation, mostly in rural areas, to provide
educational opportunities to teenagers who were not pursuing secondary or
higher education. These alternative schools for youth had been established in
1926, and became compulsory in 1939, as part of government efforts to organize
and control its youth during the war. At the end of the war, they were shut
down by the Occupation forces. But with the end of the occupation in 1952, the
Japanese government was ready to revive its role in the social education of its
youth.
In 1959, the Ministry of Education established the first national youth
center (Kokuritsu Culno Senen 10 le), followed by a dozen more national centers,
and hundreds of prefectural and local public youth centers. By 1993, there were
410 public youth centers throughout Japan (Somucho 1994: 23). The official
purpose of youth centers is described by four basic goals. 1) To cultivate the
spirit of discipline, cooperation, friendship and service, 2) To develop self-
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sufficiency, a sense of responsibility, and ability, 3) To increase mutual solidarity,
love for one's homeland and fatherland, and to foster the spirit of international
understanding, and 4) To design the advancement of education, purification of
sentiment, and reinforcement of physical strength (11). Instilling these values in
the nation's young people is part of the Ministry of Education's overall mission
of social education. And youth centers are an essential tool for carrying out
these goals.
Within this context, it is not surprising that the Japanese government
responded to pressure on women's rights by establishing centers for women.
By the early 1970s there were already around a hundred women's centers, many
of which were founded and run by private groups. But the nationwide network
of public youth centers provided a precedent and model for the government to
get actively involved in promoting women's centers as part of its social
education function.
Improving the status of women became framed as a social education issue
when the Social Education Bureau of the Ministry of Education coordinated the
establishment of the National Women's Education Center. Women's education
centers were then added to the list of social education facilities under the Ministry
of Education, which currently includes public citizens' halls, libraries, museums,
youth and children's centers, as well as women's centers (Table 3.12). Because
there was already an administrative infrastructure built up around social
education, the establishment of women's centers was a logical national strategy
for Japanese policy makers as they faced international and domestic pressure to
take action on behalf of women.
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Table 3.12
Ministry of Education Social Education Facilities
Type of Facility
Public Citizen's Hall
Library
Museum
Youth Center
Children's Nature Center
Women's Center
Culture Hall
Source: Ministry of Education 1996.
Number of Facilities
17,819
2,396
985
409
304
225
1,549
This strategy of building centers in response to political issues is not
unique to the Ministry of Education. As previously mentioned, the Ministry of
Labor sponsors working women's centers, while the Ministry of Agriculture
oversees rural women's centers. Nor are women and youth the only
populations that public centers serve. The Ministry of Labor also administers
close to one thousand athletic facilities, specifically to serve workers of small-to-
medium sized enterprises and rural manufacturing industries. The Ministry of
Agriculture oversees a variety of centers designed to serve the needs of
agricultural workers, youth, and women living in rural areas. Other Ministries
also have their own network of facilities, such as the Ministry of Health and
Welfare's mother and child health centers, or the Ministry of International and
Trade and Industry's consumer centers. Even the Defense Agency has centers to
improve living standards for local residents in areas where Defense Agency's
facilities are located (Table 3.13).
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Table 3.13
Examples of Government Supported Centers and Facilities
Ministry or Agency
Welfare
Agriculture
Fisheries Agency
Forestry Agency
International Trade
and Industry (MITI)
Economic Planning
Agency
Transportation
Home Affairs
National Land Agency
Type of Facility/Center
Public Health
Senior Welfare
Senior Relaxation
Children's Center
Mother Child Health
Dowa Welfare*
Farm Environment
Rural Youth
Structural Improvement
Agricultural Meeting
Fishing Village
Forestry Meeting
Communities Near
Power Stations
Consumer Awareness
Citizen's Living
Youth Hostels
Youth Travel Village
Tourist Recreation
Garden City Centers in
Planned Communities
Community
Development
Senior Community
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Number
851
1,826
3,605
3,739
654
1,167
457
168
2,703
1,351
248
414
620
217
N/A
465
80
30
45
134
145
Defense Agency
Community 184
Island Development 81
Community 259
Senior Welfare 40
Special Meeting Places 21
Learning Centers 567
Health Consultation 32
Source: Miura et. al 1992. Data on number of facilities are mostly from the mid
to late 1980s.
*Dowa refers to a class of people designated as outcasts during the Edo period
(1600-1867), who still experience discrimination in Japan today.
The Japanese government is often criticized for not doing enough to
support its emerging civil society, specifically for not providing non-
governmental organizations with tax-exempt status as in the United States. But
the vast network of public centers serving diverse populations provides valuable
resources for Japan's civil society in the form of physical meeting and activity
space, and in many cases staff assistance and educational programs. Bolstering
civil society through public centers represents a policy strategy that is
particularly suited to Japan's stroog state, because it allows the government
more access and control than simply giving organized groups a special tax status.
Unlike tax breaks, which would allow groups to do as they please with their
additional resources, public centers give state authorities a degree of agenda-
setting power by staffing centers with government workers, and offering their
own educational programs to targeted constituencies. In this way, public centers
represent a portal for state intervention in civil society.
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Issue Agendas at Women's Centers
An important purpose of women's centers is to serve as a vehicle for
women's groups to further their own interests and activities. But as state
institutions, public women's centers are hardly neutral, empty, vessels filled up
by the organized interests of society. Most have their own staff, and run their
own programs, which reflect conscious choices about which issues to address
and which to ignore. And examination of the contents of programs at women's
centers reveals their issue agenda. Since women's centers primarily exist to
serve women's groups, the issues they address should correspond to issues
taken up by the women's movement. But an analysis of the issue content of
women's organizations in Japan shows a disconnect between the issue agenda at
women's centers and the issue agenda of women's groups. This difference
raises the question of who sets the agenda at women's centers, which is explored
through an examination of program administration, staff, and government
relations at women's centers.
Program Content Analysis
The 1994 NWEC survey of 623 women's centers sheds light on the issue
content of activities that take place at women's centers. These activities include
on-going or short courses, one-time lecture meetings, exhibitions or displays,
and research studies. Over three-quarters of the centers surveyed report
offering courses, and nearly as many offer one-time lecture meetings. A little
less than half of women's centers house exhibitions or displays, and almost one-
fifth of the centers carry out research studies.
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For each of these four types of activities, the survey asked centers to
report on issue content, according to a code sheet that lists sixty-one different
subjects ranging from women's studies, to environmental issues, to natural
science (See appendix for the complete code sheet). These sixty-one subjects are
grouped into eleven general subject categories. For example, the general
category "Women's Issues" includes the subjects "General Women's Issues,"
"Women's Studies/ Liberation Ideology," "Women's Education," "Women's
Administration," "Women's History," and "Other Women's Issues." Also, the
general category "Family and Home" includes the subjects "Living Standards,"
"Food, Clothing, and Shelter," "Leisure," and "Other Family and Home."
Because most centers offer a number of different programs over the course of a
year, they were asked to report up to five subjects covered within each type of
activity.
Using these survey data, I analyzed the issue content of courses, lectures,
exhibitions, and research at women's centers. I counted all of the subjects
reported within each type of activity to determine which issues were most
frequently addressed through women's centers' programs (Table 3.14 ). For
courses offered at women's centers, "Family and Home" subjects are addressed
most often, followed by "Arts and Culture," then "Women's Issues." "Family
and Home" subjects are also the most common topic of one-time lecture
meetings, followed by "Women's Issues, and "Social Issues." Exhibitions
overwhelmingly revolve around "Arts and Culture," with some attention given
to "Family and Home" and "Social Participation." In the area of research, the
most frequent topic is "Women's Issues," followed by "Family and Home."
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Table 3.14 Issue Content of Programs at Women's Centers"(%) (%) (%) (%)
Issue Category Courses Lectures Exhibitions Research
(N=1,882) (N=1,298) (N=657) (N=117)
Women's Issues 13.8 16.6 5.3 29.9
Home Education 6.9 7.5 0.6 9.4
Education 2.8 2.6 2.7 8.5
Family/Home 19.1 22.0 11.0 20.5
Soc. Participation 8.3 8.5 7.3 9.4
Social Issues 4.9 9.5 6.1 6.0
Welfare 5.3 5.9 1.8 3.4
Health/Medicine 11.7 8.5 2.7 1.7
Labor 7.0 5.9 1.2 1.7
Arts & Culture 15.5 7.6 54.2 0.9
Letters & Science 4.4 5.2 6.1 5.1
Other 0.4 0.2 0.9 3.4
Source: NWEC 1994a. Data analysis is my own.
A more recent survey by the National Council of Women's Centers
confirms the emphasis on issues related to family and home, as well as arts and
culture at women's centers. In their 1998 survey of 448 women's centers, 393
centers report offering learning and study programs. They also report the issue
content of these programs according to a code sheet that lists eighteen different
subject areas. While this code sheet is not the same one used in the NWEC
survey, both code sheets cover the same general subject areas. Another
difference is the way in which the data is reported. The National Council survey
" N represents the total number of subjects reported by 623 women's centers for
each type of activity. Each Center was asked to report up to five different
subjects covered in their programs over the course of the previous year.
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reports the percentage of centers that offer one or more study programs for
each subject category. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the women's center itself.
In my analysis of issue content, I counted all the subjects reported by each
women's centers to account for the fact that most centers offer a number of
programs addressing different issues.
Despite these differences in data collection and reporting, the 1998
National Council survey is useful for providing up-to-date information on the
issue content of study programs at women's centers. Their data supports my
finding that programs at women's centers most frequently address issues related
to home and family, and arts and culture, such as tea ceremony and flower
arranging (Table 3.15). Over 70 percent of women's centers that offer study
programs address "Household Living," followed by 67 percent that support
"Hobbies," 59 percent that cover "Family Issues," and 49 percent that offer
study programs on "Women's Issues," which is the same proportion of centers
that have programs on "Sports."
Table 3.15
Percentage of Women's Centers that Offer Study Programs on Various Subjects
(N=393)
Subject Centers
(Description) (O)
Household Living 71.8
(Cooking, Sewing, Daily Living)
Hobbies 67.2
(Music, Art, Calligraphy, Crafts, Flower Arranging, Tea Ceremony)
Family Issues 58.8
(Child Rearing, Elderly Care, Home Education)
Women's Issues 48.9
(Women's History, Studies, Gender Roles, Life Stages)
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Sports 48.6
(Sports, Recreation)
Skills Development 46.6
(Word Processing, Personal Computers)
Health 44.8
(Mental Health, Women's Bodies, Reproductive Health/Rights)
Employment Support 43.5
(Career Advancement, Re-employment, Business Start-up)
Male Enlightenment 39.7
(Teaching Men to Be Self-Sufficient in the Home, Men's Studies)
Social and Welfare Issues 39.4
(Human Rights, Environment, Consumer Issues)
Self Development 35.4
(Support for Self Transformation, Independence)
Civic Group Support 26.5
(Organizing and Managing Groups, Fundraising)
Women's Film Screening 20.4
(Film, Video, Concerts Related to Women's Issues)
International Programs 19.8
(Women and Development, Foreign Women in Japan)
Participation in Decision Making 17.6
(Participation in Politics, Workplace, Community)
Leadership Development 16.3
(For administrators and women's groups)
Self Expression 15.8
(Video Making, Newsletter Publishing, Performance Arts)
Other 9.4
Unclear, No Response 1.3
Source: National Council of Women's Centers 1998.
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Women's Centers versus Women's Groups
As the primary purpose of women's centers is to serve as a base of
activities for women's groups, it is reasonable to expect women's centers'
programs to address issues that are most important to women's groups. But
this is not the case. In addition to analyzing the issue content of programs at
women's centers reported in the NWEC survey, I analyzed the issue content of
889 women's organizations, using the same code sheet to allow for
comparison."' The comparison shows clear differences between the issues
addressed at women's centers and issues supported by women's organizations
(Table 3.16). Not surprisingly, the largest proportion of women's groups are
organized around women's issues. Nearly one-third address subjects that fall
within the general category "Women's Issues," (which includes women's studies,
women's education, women's administration, women's history, and other
women's issues). An additional 20 percent of women's groups are organized
around social issues. The general category of "Social Issues" includes the sub-
categories "international understanding," "consumer advocacy,"
"environmental protection," "human rights," and "other social issues."
Altogether over half of the women's groups in my sample were organized
around women's issues or social issues. Only 5 percent addressed family and
home issues, compared with 20 percent of women's centers' courses and 23
percent of lectures on family and home. While it would be unrealistic to expect
that programs at women's centers to perfectly mirror the interests of women's
12 This sample of Japanese women's organizations was constructed from the
collection of pamphlets, newsletters, and other materials gathered from
women's groups nationwide and maintained at the information center of the
National Women's Education Center. The pamphlet collection was
supplemented by three published directories of women's organizations. See
Chapter 2 for a complete explanation of how this data was collected and
analyzed.
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groups, the distinct differences reflected in this comparison are rather surprising,
given that women's centers are established primarily to serve women's groups.
Table 3.16
Distribution of Issues of Women's Centers' Programs Compared with Women's
Groups
(%) (%) (%)
Issue Category WC Courses WC Lectures Women's Groups
(N=1,882) (N=1,298) (N=889)
Women's Issues 13.8 16.6 31.8
Home Education 6.9 7.5 4.8
Education 2.8 2.6 2.6
Family/ Home 19.1 22.0 5.1
Soc. Participation 8.3 8.5 7.9
Social Issues 4.9 9.5 21.0
Welfare 5.3 5.9 3.8
Health/Medicine 11.7 8.5 5.1
Labor 7.0 5.9 10.5
Arts & Culture 15.5 7.6 3.6
Letters & Science 4.4 5.2 0.7
Other 0.4 0.2 3.1
Sources: NWEC 1994. Data analysis is my own. Data on women's groups come
from my own survey of women's groups. See Chapter 2 for a complete
explanation of how the data was collected and analyzed.
Agenda Setting
This surprising finding raises the question of how programs at women's
centers are developed and administered. In other words, who sets the agenda at
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women's centers? A 1999 National Council of Women's Centers survey sheds
light on this question. This survey follows up on the 1998 survey of 448
women's centers, and focuses specifically on study and learning programs. Only
women's education centers are surveyed for a sample size of 166 centers, which
does not include working women's centers or rural women's centers. This
limitation biases the sample somewhat, as women's education centers tend to
focus more on women's issues and less on family and home issues than other
types of centers.' 3 Nevertheless, within these parameters, the survey contains
useful information on program administration, staff, and government
involvement, providing insight into how the issue agenda is set at women's
centers.
Nearly two-thirds of the centers surveyed report cooperation with
outside organizations in the planning and administration of their study
programs. Outside organizations include civic groups, businesses, and public
bodies, such as local government offices for women's policy or boards of
education (Table 3.17). Cooperation takes many forms, but the most popular
methods are advertising and recruiting participants, followed by planning, and
borrowing meeting space (Table 3.18). These responses show that most
women's education centers seek outside input and help for its programs. But
that still leaves over one-third of women's centers in which all planning and
management of programs is done internally. Who is in charge of determining
the content of these programs?
13 When the sample is broken down by type of center, the percentage of
women's education centers that offers study programs in women's issues is 78.5,
compared with 33.5 for working women's centers, and 9.1 for rural women's
centers. Also, on the topic of household living, only 40.5 percent of women's
education centers offer such programs, compared with 94.8 percent of working
women's centers, and 84.1 percent of rural women's centers (National Council of
Women's Centers 1998: 87).
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Table 3.17
Examples of Outside Organizations that Cooperate with Women's Centers in
Planning or Administering Study Programs
Government
Local government
women's policy office
Public and private
schools
Boards of education
National Women's
Education Center
Business
NfTT
Suntory
Fujitsu
Law Offices
Civic Groups
Divorce and domestic
violence self-help
Women's groups
Volunteer groups
Various NGOs
Source: National Council of Women's Centers 1999.
Table 3.18
Forms of Cooperation between Outside Organizations and Women's
Planning or Administering Study Programs (N=192)
Form of Cooperation
Assistance with Advertising and Recruiting Participants
Planning and Design
Providing Meeting Space
Sending an Instructor
Complete Cooperation in All Aspects of the Program
Providing Financial Resources
Providing Equipment
Providing Technical Expertise
Other
Source: National Council of Women's Centers 1999.
Centers in
Percent
46.9
44.3
42.3
32.8
25.5
24.0
19.8
10.9
9.4
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The survey also provides some basic information on staff people in charge
of programs at women's centers. Most are women, making up about a 65
percent, with men holding about 28 percent of these posts, and the rest
undetermined. By age, almost one-third are in their 40s, indicating that it is a
relatively high position. But the most interesting finding is that 57 percent of
program directors report 3 years or less experience in their post. This lack of
experience is more prevalent at public women's centers, that are staffed by civil
servants, than at private women's centers. At private centers only 25 percent of
program directors reported 3 years or less experience, compared with 60 percent
for publicly established, privately run centers, and 68 percent for publicly
established and publicly run centers. This finding suggests that the people
charged with running programs at public women's centers do not have many
years to develop expertise before being transferred to another post within the
civil service. It is likely that the short-term nature of program staff makes it
difficult for women's centers to keep up with changing interests and demands of
women's organizations. Therefore, an institutionalized lack of expertise may
help explain the disconnect between the content of women's centers' programs
and the issues embraced by women's groups.
Finally, to what extent are government offices involved in programs at
women's centers? The survey asked specifically about the role of local
government offices charged with women's policy in the planning and
administration of study programs at women's education centers. Most centers
reported some form of involvement by women's policy offices, with less than
one-third reporting "no particular role sharing," or "mostly no relationship."
While very few centers administer programs directly proposed and planned by
women's policy offices, many centers administer programs jointly, or have
regular meetings with women's policy offices regarding programs (Table 3.19).
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These findings reveal yet another layer of government involvement in women's
centers. In addition to building centers, and staffing them with civil servants,
government officials are involved in developing programs at women's centers
through women's policy offices. In this way, the Japanese government is able
exercise agenda-setting power at women's centers, not only through civil
servants acting as program staff, but also through direct input from women's
policy offices of local governments.
Table 3.19
Relationship Between Women's Centers and Local Government Women's Policy
Offices (N=166, multiple responses)
Description of Relationship Percent
Have Regular Meetings 30.1
Have Programs Jointly Planned and Administered 28.3
No Particular Role Sharing 17.5
Mostly No Relationship 12.0
Mainly Administer Programs of the Women's Policy Office 6.6
Other 23.5
Unclear or No Response 10.2
Source: National Council of Women's Centers 1999.
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Conclusion
There is no doubt that women's centers provide valuable resources and
services to the women's movement in Japan. In a country in which the
equivalent of half the population of the United States lives on land the size of
Montana, the physical space set aside for women is itself a precious commodity.
Staff provide knowledge and expertise, if not on women's issues, then on
administrative and management skills learned through the civil service. Most
importantly, women's centers facilitate civic participation by offering an easily
accessible point of entry for women to get involved in women's issues and
activities, simply by stopping by their local women's center.
But these benefits come at a cost. As state institutions, public women's
centers are not neutral ground. They have their own interests and agendas that
tend to differ from the issue agendas of women's organizations. By accepting
the resources offered at women's centers and participating in the programs they
sponsor, women's groups run the risk of compromising their autonomy and
control over the definition of their interests. Certainly family and home issues
and arts and culture are important to Japanese women. But, as my survey of
women's groups shows, they are most interested in women's issues and social
issues, which are not proportionately reflected in women's centers' programs.
The National Council of Women's Centers acknowledges the issue of
autonomy raised by publicly funded women's centers. But they support a
public-private partnership, noting the belief that women's rights are human
rights so public funds should be used to promote the advancement of women.
Most significantly, they point out that without the tax relief given to non-profit
organizations in western countries, non-profit groups in Japan have to rely on
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whatever public support they can get (National Council of Women's Centers
1998:12).
In this way, public centers and non-profit regulations represent two-sides
of the same coin. While the non-profit sector in Japan does not enjoy the same
tax privileges of its western counterparts, it benefits from an array of public
centers serving various groups throughout society. Offering meeting space,
programs, and staff assistance to local groups gives the state much more
influence over the civil society than simply offering them tax breaks. This
approach gives the state access to all corners of civil society, in every city, town,
or village in which a public center is located.
This combination of non-profit regulations and public center resources has
created a close relationship between women's organizations and the state. With
few alternatives, women's groups have come to rely on government resources,
and in turn, the government is able to gain a foothold in the women's
movement from where it can promote its interests and agenda. The partnership
that has developed between women and state is more than a natural or cultural
affinity. It is based on clear incentives and concrete institutions that encourage
cooperation, rather than confrontation.
Finally, in addressing the larger question of why gender inequality in
Japan remains so pronounced, this examination of women's centers shows how
state intervention in civil society keeps the women's movement in check.
Regulations that hamper financial independence, and resources offered at public
women's centers bind women's organizations closely to the state. While this
closeness may spare Japan the conflict and convulsions of feminist activists
taking to the streets, it can also temper and mute legitimate demands, thereby
slowing progress towards gender equality. In addition to regulations and
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resources, the relationship between women and the state is further cemented by
policies and policy making, to which the next chapter turns.
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Chapter Four
Women's Policy and Policy Making
A wide and diverse array of women's organizations with access to
hundreds of public women's centers forms a vibrant women's movement in
Japan. But, while the existence of a women's movement may be a necessary
condition for progress towards gender equality, it is by no means sufficient.
Without a forum in which to be heard, the voice of the women's movement falls
on deaf ears, no matter how loud or unified. Therefore, in order to understand
the politics of gender inequality, it is necessary, not only to assess the strength
and resources of women's organizations, but also to examine the policy making
institutions that take in or shut out their political demands.
Japan scholars have long noted the central role of the unelected, insulated
bureaucracy in the policy making process (Johnson 1982, Pempel 1982, Upham
1987, Krauss 1989). More recent studies vigorously attack the thesis of
bureaucratic dominance, emphasizing the power of politicians (Ramsayer and
Rosenbluth 1993, McCubbins and Noble 1995). This long standing debate raises
questions about how women's policy is made in Japan, particularly about the
openness and accountability of the process.
This chapter examines the institutions of women's policy making in Japan.
First, I address the question of women's access to policy making by describing
Japan's elaborate women's policy infrastructure within the national bureaucracy
as well as at the prefectural and local levels. I then explore how these policy
making institutions affect women's interest group politics by favoring certain
types of organizations over others. Finally, the question of women's access to
policy making is turned around to show how policy makers gain access to
women's organizations through a variety of public funding programs.
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Institutions of Women's Policy Making
Historical Background
The end of World War II marks the beginning of a new era for women's
rights in Japan. Following Japan's surrender, the American Occupation oversaw
the implementation of far-reaching reforms, including women's suffrage and the
adoption of a new Constitution guaranteeing equality of the sexes. As part of an
overall effort to educate women about their new democratic rights and
responsibilities, occupation officials chose the newly formed Ministry of Labor to
be charged with improving the status of women. Historically, women's issues
had been firmly established under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.
But the wartime activities of this ministry in organizing and mobilizing women
on behalf of the war effort left it tainted in the eyes of occupation reformers. The
newly created Ministry of Labor had no such history, so it became a key
institution for women's policy, with "the promotion of the status of women"
explicitly written into its founding law (Shikuma et al. 1996: 77-78).
The Bureau for Women and Youth was set up within the ministry and
soon became the focal point for the formulation and implementation of women's
labor policy. Eventually, Women and Youth branch offices of the Ministry of
Labor were established in all forty-seven prefectures. The Bureau for Women
and Youth later became the Women's Bureau, and continued to be a key
institution of women's labor policy throughout the postwar period. Since the
reorganization of Japan's central government in 2001, the Ministry of Labor and
the Ministry of Health and Welfare have been combined. Within the new
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, the Women's Bureau no longer exists.
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Under the new government structure, women's labor policy is overseen by the
Equal Employment, Children and Families Bureau. In addition to women's
labor, this bureau deals with harmonizing work and family, part-time and home
employment, family welfare, childrearing, day care, and maternal and child
health issues.
While the American Occupation favored the Ministry of Labor for
implementing women's policy, the historically close ties between women and the
Ministry of Education proved too strong to sever. This relationship has
remained strong throughout the postwar period, supported by the programs
and policies of the Social Education Bureau within the Ministry of Education. The
1947 Basic Law on Education not only spells out principles for governing formal
education in the schools, but also states that national and local governments
should be active in the area of informal education, including education in the
home and workplace. These areas of learning are defined as "social education,"
which is distinct from school education, and overseen by the Social Education
Bureau. In 1961, a Women's Education Division was established within this
bureau.
Because women as mothers are seen as the primary, if not sole, providers
of children's education outside the classroom and in the home, the Social
Education Bureau has been actively involved in promoting women's education,
particularly concerning family and household issues. One of the first projects
following the war was to commission "motherhood classes" to be administered
at the local level. These classes existed before the war and offered lessons in
childrearing, housework, and hobbies such as flower arranging. In 1946, 1,060
classes were held for 233,968 participants (Ministry of Education 1965). But in
that same year, under American Occupation pressure, these classes were opened
up to all parents, not just mothers, and the following year, the program was
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expanded to cover the cultural education of all adults and renamed "social
education classes."
At the same time, educational programs targeted specifically towards
women continued, particularly at the prefectural level. After 1947, women's
education classes became their own separate program, and prefectural budgets
for women's social education increased. In 1956, 230 women's education classes
became part of the Ministry of Education's regular budget and were
administered at the prefectural level on an experimental basis. The number of
classes commissioned by the Ministry increased dramatically over the years, so
that by 1963 they totaled 1,581 (Ministry of Education 1965).
The Ministry of Education was also active in organizing national
conferences around women's education. In 1951, it sponsored the first national
conference for prefectural women's education administrators, which continued
on a yearly basis. Beginning in 1953, the ministry sponsored four regional
conferences to be held yearly to discuss women's social education. For the first
ten years, these conferences focused mainly on developing procedures and
building institutions to systematically provide social education to women. But
the topic of discussion eventually shifted towards the substance and content of
classes.
Out of these discussions, the Ministry of Education developed a uniform
curriculum for women's social education. Basically, classes were designed to
address four main facets of women's lives. Civic education was provided to
encourage women to become good citizens within their local communities, their
country, and the world. Classes on children's education were given to support
women in their role as mothers. Instruction in household management and
home economics aided women in their duties as housewives. And, finally,
classes on working life were offered to working women.
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Leaders of women's organizations had always participated in these
conferences sponsored by the Ministry of Education. But beginning in 1960, the
ministry established a separate conference especially for representatives of
women's groups. The purpose of this meeting was for women's groups at the
prefectural level to discuss their activities, procedures, and management.
As Japan's postwar economic recovery entered a period of high-speed
growth in the late 1950s and 60s, budgets for women's social education
programs increased dramatically. A year after the end of World War II, the
Ministry of Education allocated less than 100 thousand yen for women's
education conferences, research, and motherhood classes. Ten years later, the
budget had grown to close to 5 million yen. By 1965, over 100 million yen were
being spent on women's education, with 63 percent going to women's social
education classes, 19 percent to promoting women's education, 10 percent to
women's groups, 6 percent to research on women's education, and 2 percent for
other activities. This sum is in addition to the nearly 100 million yen budgeted
for women's programs on childrearing and education in the home (Ministry of
Education 1965).
The involvement of the Social Education Bureau in women's education
policy reflects the Japanese government's active role in informal education in the
home, in addition to formal education in the schools. This approach views
women as the teachers of social education in their role as mothers. The
commitment to social education and central role of women in this endeavor help
explain the close connection between the Ministry of Education and women,
despite the early reservations of American Occupation authorities. The Social
Education Bureau has since been renamed the Lifelong Learning Bureau, but it
continues to serve as a key institution of women's policy through its Gender
Equality Division.
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In addition to the Ministries of Labor and Education, the Ministry of
Agriculture has an office dedicated to women's policy issues. The Women and
Life Division was established in 1990, within the Bureau of Farming, Sericulture,
and Horticulture of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. As an
increasing number of Japanese women leave the countryside for the city, this
division was created to improve the quality of life for women in rural, mountain,
and fishing villages. Its programs are designed to address problems of health,
household economy, farm management, and to promote the role of women in
decision making, for example, as members or officials of agricultural
cooperatives. Since the government reorganization of 2001, rural women's
issues have been taken over by the Ministry of Agriculture's Bureau of
Management, Division for Women Employed in Agriculture, in the Section to
Promote Policies Aimed at Women and the Elderly.
Although its short history and limited mandate make it less pivotal to
women's policy making than its counterparts in the Ministries of Labor or
Education, the Ministry of Agriculture's women's policy division deserves
mention because, out of the twelve ministries that currently make up Japan's
national government, there are just three that have offices specifically designated
to address women's issues. Historically, the Women's Bureau of the Ministry of
Labor, the Women's Education Division in the Social Education Bureau of the
Ministry of Education, and, to a lesser extent, the Women and Life Division of the
Ministry of Agriculture have all been important sites for developing and
implementing women's policy. But beginning in the mid-1970s, the Japanese
government has undertaken an effort to centralize women's policy making
within the Prime Minister's Office.
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Current Structure
Since the United Nation's Declaration of 1975 as International Women's
Year, the Japanese government has created a number of new institutions to
address women's policy issues. These institutions were formed in response to
guidelines issued at World Conferences on Women urging governments of
participating countries to establish a "national machinery," defined as "a single
body or complex organized system of bodies, often under different authorities,
but recognized by the government as the institution dealing with the promotion
of the status of women" (Council on Gender Equality 1996). This national
machinery, developed over the past 25 years, represents a shift away from a
ministry by ministry approach towards a centralized infrastructure for
addressing women's policy issues. While individual ministries, such as the
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, remain
active on women's issues, the center of women's policy making has been
officially placed under the Prime Minister within the Cabinet Office (Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1
National Machinery for the Promotion of Gender Equality
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Soon after the First World Conference of the International Women's Year
held in Mexico City in 1975, Japan established, within the Prime Minister's Office,
the Headquarters for the Planning and Promoting of Policies Relating to
Women, with the Prime Minister acting as President, the Chief Cabinet Secretary
as Vice-President, and Vice-Ministers of ten ministries and agencies serving as
members. The government also appointed the Advisory Council on Women's
Affairs made up of 33 representatives from the public to serve as advisors to the
Headquarters. The administrative work of the Headquarters was to be carried
out by the newly created Office for Women's Affairs.
Since their establishment, these institutions, making up Japan's national
machinery for the advancement of women have been gradually elevated within
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the structure of government. In 1986, the membership of the Headquarters was
expanded to include the Vice-Ministers of all 22 ministries and agencies. In 1994,
the Headquarters officially became part of the Cabinet. But rather than have a
separate ministry for women's affairs, all cabinet ministers serve as members of
the Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality, with the Prime Minister
acting as President, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary serving as Vice President as
well as Minister of Gender Equality. Each ministry and agency designates an
administrative body within their organization to be charged with gender
equality issues. For example, the Ministry of Education's Division of Gender
Equality Learning serves this purpose. A less obvious example is the Defense
Agency's designation of its Second Personnel Division to address gender equality
issues, and to assist the agency's representative to the Cabinet Headquarters for
the Promotion of Gender Equality.
The Japanese government has also made significant changes to the
institutions that support the efforts of the Cabinet Headquarters. As part of the
1994 reforms, the Advisory Council on Women's Affairs was restructured and
renamed the Advisory Council for Gender Equality. In its current form, the
Council for Gender Equality is made up of a maximum of 25 members, with at
least 40 percent of each sex represented. They are appointed by the Prime
Minister for a two year term, and are charged with advising the Prime Minister
and Cabinet on policies to promote gender equality. Members include
government ministry and agency officials as well as representatives from the
public, such as academics and leaders of women's groups. Additionally, in 1994,
the Office of Women's Affairs became the Office of Gender Equality. This office
has since been elevated to a full-fledged Cabinet Bureau. The Bureau of Gender
Equality is charged with the day to day administrative work of the Cabinet
Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality. It is staffed by full-time
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civil servants, and organized by specific duties, which include research and data
collection, coordinating regional government activities, international exchange,
consulting with politicians and political parties, working with women's
organizations, and disseminating information by publishing a newsletter Egalite
and maintaining a website.
Finally, to further encourage public participation in women's policy
making, the Liaison Conference for the Promotion of Gender Equality (or Egalite
Network) was established in 1996. This branch of the national machinery is
made up of 80 representatives of women's groups, business leaders, media
personalities, and educators to widen public access and input to government
action on women's issues. Although largely symbolic, this institutional link
between policy makers and non-governmental organizations represents an
unusual level of openness and cooperation for traditionally insulated Japanese
bureaucrats.
National Plan of Action
In addition to the establishment of a national machinery for the
advancement of women, the World Conferences on Women have urged
participating countries to develop their own "National Plan of Action" as a
blueprint for national strategies to achieve a gender equal society. Following the
First World Conference in 1975, the Japanese government adopted a National
Plan of Action in 1977. Formulating this plan was the first major task of the
newly formed Headquarters for the Planning and Promoting of Policies Relating
to Women under the Prime Minister's Office. The plan lays out basic principles
and goals for guiding women's policy development over the next ten years. It
calls for raising the status of women under the legal system, promoting women's
140
equal participation in all fields, respecting mothers and protecting their health,
ensuring stability and security in old age, and advancing international
cooperation.
In the years that followed, the National Plan of Action underwent a series
of revisions to comply with guidelines issued at subsequent World Conferences
on Women. In 1985, the World Conference to Review and Appraise the
Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women was held in Nairobi,
Kenya. In addition to reviewing progress made over the previous decade,
participants of this conference adopted the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies
for the Advancement of Women to serve as guidelines for the implementation of
concrete measures by national governments. As the ten-year term of Japan's
original National Plan of Action expired in 1987, the Headquarters for Women's
Policies authored the "New National Plan of Action Towards the Year 2000," in
accordance with the Nairobi directives. This new plan was again revised in 1991,
as the United Nations Economic and Social Council issued recommendations
after its review of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies.
At the Fourth World Conference on Women held in 1995 in Beijing,
China, a Platform for Action was adopted to identify critical areas of concern to
women, and to call upon national governments to develop a plan for addressing
these issues by the end of 1996. In December of 1996, Japan fulfilled its
obligation by issuing a new version of its National Plan of Action entitled "Plan
for Gender Equality Year 2000." This plan is largely based on the
recommendations of the Council on Gender Equality, contained in the report
Vision of Gender Equality--Creating New Values for the 21st Century, and submitted
to the Prime Minister in July of 1996.
The resulting National Plan of Action is divided into three parts. Part One
lays out the basic philosophy behind the plan, and defines a gender equal society
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as "a society in which both women and men are guaranteed equal opportunity to
participate voluntarily in activities in all fields, and receive equal political,
economic, social, and cultural benefits, while taking equal responsibility" (Office
of Gender Equality 1996). Part Two outlines the basic direction and concrete
measures of the plan. The issues addressed are women's participation in
government, gender consciousness raising, women's employment, outreach to
rural women, reconciling work and family life, care for senior citizens, violence
against women, women and the media, health and reproductive rights, women's
education, and women's contribution to global society. Part Three describes
measures for the implementation of the plan, which include regular monitoring
of progress, information collection and dissemination, and strengthening the
national machinery for the advancement of women. In accordance with the
Beijing Platform for Action, this plan was to be implemented by the year 2000.
Japan's National Plan of Action has come a long way since its original
inception in 1977. From five basic issue areas, the plan has grown considerably
in subsequent versions, with the most recent plan addressing eleven issue areas
for women. Also, changes in the language of the plan over a twenty year period
reveal a shift in focus from "equality between men and women" (danjo byodo) to
"men and women's joint participation" (danjo kyodo sankaku). Japanese
government documents published in English translate both terms as "gender
equality," but the subtle difference between the two terms may reflect an
ambivalence towards literal equality between the sexes that is prevalent in
Japan's discourse on gender relations.'
The development of Japan's plan of action has been spurred by guidelines
adopted at UN sponsored World Conferences on Women, showing Japan to be
I For more on this discourse, see Chapter Two's section on public debates over
equality.
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remarkably responsive to international pressure on women's issues. Although
the plan contains mostly general principles rather than specific measures, it
provides a blueprint for action and standards by which to measure Japan's
progress towards gender equality. Most recently, the National Plan of Action
proved to be important in laying the groundwork for landmark legislation.
Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society
Shortly after the legislature passed a law to officially establish the Council
on Gender Equality in 1997, the Prime Minister asked the advisory council to
recommend measures to promote the realization of a gender equal society as
part of an overall inquiry into formulating legislation. A year later, the Council
came out with its report, which was followed by two months of public comment.
From mid-June until the end of July of 1998, the advisory council held public
hearings in six cities across Japan, and solicited a total of 3,611 written comments.
Based on this feedback, the council issued its final report in November. The
following February, a bill was brought before the Diet, and was quickly adopted.
In June of 1999, the Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society went into effect.
A Basic Law is distinguished from other types of legislation in that it
provides a general, comprehensive, framework for future laws to be enacted to
address specific issues. For example, Japan's Basic Law on Education of 1947
contains an Article stating that educational activities in the home, workplace, and
other areas outside of formal schooling should be encouraged by national and
local governments by providing public facilities, such as libraries, museums, and
public halls. Based on this general principle, specific laws were subsequently
adopted, including the Social Education Law in 1949, the Public Library Law in
1950, and the Museum Law in 1951. In this way, one general article of a basic law
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spawned a series of laws, each addressing concrete issues while adhering to the
spirit of the original basic law.
The Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society is similarly general in its
provisions, with the expectation that specific measures will be adopted in the
future. Following its preamble, the law is divided into three sections. The first
twelve articles include the purpose, definitions, and general provisions
advocating respect for human rights, attention to gender socialization, equality
in public and private sector decision making, consideration for family life, and
international cooperation. These articles also state that the promotion of a
gender equal society should be pursued by the state, local government,
individual citizens, and legislative measures. And the government must submit
an annual progress report to the Diet. The second section of the Basic Law
provides guidelines for actions to be taken towards the formation of a gender
equality society. Articles 13 through 20 include a mandate for the Prime
Minister, Cabinet, and Council for Gender Equality to develop a Basic Plan for
Gender Equality, which should contain comprehensive, long-term policy
recommendations. This section of the law also directs prefectural and municipal
governments to formulate their own plans for gender equality. There are also
provisions to initiate a public awareness campaign, develop a system for
processing complaints of gender bias, conduct relevant research, and promote
international exchange. The final section, Articles 21 through 26, address the
Council for Gender Equality. These Articles stipulate the duties, organization,
and the terms of service for council members in their role as advisors to the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet on gender issues. Overall, the Basic Law for a
Gender Equal Society is not very long or detailed, but it represents a foundation
on which to build specific, concrete policy measures to address gender inequality
in Japan.
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Basic Plan for Gender Equality
As mandated by the Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society, the Cabinet
approved the government's Basic Plan for Gender Equality in December of 2000.
The Basic Plan is the latest version of Japan's National Plan of Action, so it builds
upon the previous Plan for Gender Equality 2000. The structure of the two plans
are identical. First, the plan lays out its basic philosophy. Second, it outlines
policy objectives for eleven women's issue areas. Finally, the plan describes
measures for implementation, which include strengthening existing institutions
of women's policy making, collecting and disseminating data and information,
and supporting the efforts of regional and local governments as well as non-
governmental organizations.
The eleven issues areas addressed by the Basic Plan are identical to those
stated in the Plan for Gender Equality 2000. These are women's participation in
government, gender consciousness raising, women's employment, outreach to
rural women, reconciling work and family life, care for senior citizens, violence
against women, women and the media, health and reproductive rights, women's
education, and women's contribution to global society. For each of these issue
areas, the Basic Plan charts out a basic policy direction for the decade ending in
2010, then outlines concrete policy measures to be implemented by 2005. For
example, one of the long-term goals of the Basic Plan is to increase women's
participation in policy making. The basic policy direction for the next ten years
includes efforts to increase the number of women on government advisory
councils which are instrumental to the formulation of policy in Japan. A concrete
measure proposed for the next five years is to set a goal of 30 percent women on
each advisory council, and to monitor, analyze, and make public progress
towards this goal. In this way, the Basic Plan represents a step forward since the
145
passage of the Basic Law in that it begins to set out a course of action for
achieving the goals spelled out by the Basic Law. Nevertheless, the policy
measures contained in the Basic Plan are only recommendations, which must be
followed-up by actual legislation to have any meaningful impact.
Since the enactment of the Basic Law in 1999, the one area in which the
Basic Law and the Basic Plan have led to the adoption of new legislation is
domestic violence. One of the eleven issue areas addressed by the Basic Plan is
violence against women. The Plan stresses the importance of raising public
awareness of the issue, and thoroughly recognizing violence against women as a
crime punishable by law. It also calls for creating an environment in which
victims of violence can find support and counseling.
This general policy direction contained in the Basic Plan coincided with
efforts already underway by the Council on Gender Equality. In 1997, the Prime
Minister charged the council with making basic policy recommendations for
addressing violence against women. In response, the council held hearings with
experts and relevant ministries and agencies, and conducted a nationwide survey
of 3,405 adults, 1,773 of whom were women. This survey found that 4.6 percent
of women suffer from life-threatening violence at the hands of their husbands or
partners (Council on Gender Equality 2000). The council's report was issued in
July of 2000, and within one year, the Diet had adopted the Law on the
Prevention of Spousal Violence and Protection of Victims. The law empowers
district courts to issue restraining orders on spouses or partners shown to be
physically violent. A maximum one year prison sentence or a fine of up to one
million yen may be imposed for failure to comply. The law also calls for
prefectural governments to support shelters for victims of domestic violence.
The provisions for domestic violence shelters go into effect in April of 2002, with
all other parts of the law going into effect in October of 2001.
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Japan's recently adopted law against domestic violence demonstrates how
the largely symbolic Basic Law and Basic Plan for gender equality has the
potential to bring about substantive legislation. The Basic Law provides the
official mandate for legislative action on women's issues. The Basic Plan sets the
agenda for women's policy by identifying the main issues to be addressed, and
charting out the basic policy direction for these issues. The Law on the
Prevention of Spousal Violence and Protection of Victims is the first of many
laws that must be passed in order to flesh out the skeletal framework provided
by the Basic Law and Basic Plan.
Given the general consensus around the prevention of violence against
women, the passage of the domestic violence law proceded relatively quickly in
an otherwise slow and incremental process. It remains to be seen how effective
Japan's approach to women's policy making will be when the issues become
more contentious and controversial. For example, the Council on Gender
Equality is re-visiting the issue of separate surnames for married couples, which
in the past has failed to be legalized. But with the development of a national
machinery for women's policy making, there is, at least, an institutional
infrastructure for addressing women's policy concerns. This infrastructure at the
national policy making level extends down to the prefectural and local levels as
well.
Prefectural and Local Institutions
Throughout the development of Japan's national machinery for women's
policy, prefectural and local governments have established their own institutions
which mirror those of the central government. These institutions include
prefectural and local government offices charged with coordinating women's
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policy, advisory councils made up of members of the public, and plans of action
to be implemented at the prefectural and local levels. The Basic Law of 1999 and
the Basic Plan of 2000 call on local governments to adopt policies that correspond
to national measures for gender equality. Because the central government
mandates local efforts, they tend to be uniform across prefectures and cities, and
closely resemble programs and policies adopted at the national level.
Since 1988, all 47 prefectures and 12 designated cities have established
government offices charged with planning and coordinating women's policy.
These offices exist at varying levels of importance within the hierarchy of
Japanese bureaucracy. According to this well-established system, bureaus
(kyoku) are the largest sub-division of government ministries or agencies,
followed by divisions (bu), which are again divided into sections (a), which may
be further specialized by offices (shitsu). For example, at the national level, the
body charged with the day to day administrative work of the Prime Minister's
Headquarters for Gender Equality started out as the Office for Women's Affairs,
but was eventually elevated to the Bureau of Gender Equality, indicating an
increase in staff, resources, and stature.
Similarly, at the prefectural level, the administrative offices charged with
women's policy fit into this bureaucratic structure, though at various levels
across prefectures. For example, the prefecture of Tochigi has a Women and
Youth section within their Living Environment Division. But neighboring
Gunma Prefecture has a Women's Policy Office within the Prefectural Citizens'
Living Section of the Living Environment Division. Of the 59 prefectures and
designated cities, 24 have offices for women's administration, 34 have sections, 1
has a full division, but none has a whole bureau dedicated to women's policy
issues (Prime Minister's Office 2000b).
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The budgets of these women's administration offices vary. In 1997,
Tokyo had the largest annual budget of over 1.5 billion yen (roughly $13 million
at 120 yen to the dollar). Akita prefecture spent the least, with a budget slightly
over 20 million yen (about $170 thousand). The average annual budget across
the 47 prefectures was about 227 million yen (around $2 million) (Prime
Minister's Office 1997).
In addition to administrative units charged with women's policy, all
prefectures and designated cities have administrative liaison councils based on
the central government model. At the national level, the Headquarters for the
Promotion of Gender Equality is headed by the Prime Minister and made up of
all Cabinet Ministers in order to coordinate the efforts of various ministries on
behalf of women's policy issues. Similarly, at the prefectural level, the
administrative liaison councils tend to be headed by the governor or vice-
governor and made up of representatives from various administrative divisions
within the prefectural government. These councils meet once or twice a year to
discuss and coordinate women's policy initiatives.
Two other national institutions for women's policy have been adopted at
the prefectural and city level. All prefectural governments and designated cities
have developed their own Plan of Action for promoting gender equality. One of
the key issues at this level of government is increasing the number of women on
prefectural government advisory councils and within the civil service.
Prefectural and city governments have also established their own outside
advisory councils modeled after the national Council on Gender Equality. Like
their national counterpart, these councils tend to be made up of professors,
journalists, and representatives of civic groups, with both women and men
serving as members.
149
Within each prefecture, there have also been efforts to develop women's
policy measures at the city, ward, town, and village level. But these efforts have
been far less successful than at the prefectural level. As of 1997, less than 12
percent of cities, wards, towns, and villages had adopted a local Plan of Action
for gender equality, as urged by the central government. Notable exceptions are
Tokyo and Osaka with 70 to 80 percent of their localities having plans, and
Saitama and Kanagawa at over 50 percent. Nevertheless, Japan's overall
women's policy infrastructure is impressive for its breadth, spanning across all
Cabinet Ministries of the central government, and for its depth, reaching down
to sub-national levels of government to the prefectures, designated cities, and, to
a lesser extent, the cities, wards, towns, and villages. At the national level, the
Headquarters on the Promotion of Gender Equality, headed by the Prime
Minister and made up of all Cabinet members, ensures that policy makers at the
highest level of government are at least symbolically involved in efforts to
promote the status of women. Rather than establish a separate Ministry for
Women's Affairs, as some countries have done, Japan's approach has been to
have all existing ministries and agencies designate an administrative unit to be
charged with women's policy issues for that ministry or agency. While
individual cabinet ministers may lack expertise on women's issues, the Council
for Gender Equality, made up of scholars, business people, and civic leaders,
serves as an advisory body to the headquarters. This advisory council, in turn,
receives input from the general public through the Liaison Conference for the
Promotion of Gender Equality (Egalite Network) representing 80 national
organizations. All of these efforts are supported and coordinated by the Cabinet
Ministry's Bureau of Gender Equality which is the administrative unit that
provides the staff and resources for carrying out the day to day operations of the
Headquarters and the Council. Finally, the Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society,
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along with the Basic Plan for Gender Equality establish the general principles and
guidelines for the developing women's policy on a wide range of issues. All of
these national institutions of women's policy making have been adopted at the
prefectural and designated city levels, and are just starting to reach local
governments.
Over the past 25 years, Japan has developed this very elaborate
infrastructure for addressing women's policy issues. Spurred by commitments
made at International Women's Conferences, the Japanese government has
established a national machinery of government institutions, along with a
national plan of action. With this system in place, there is no question that
women's issues have made it onto the political agenda in Japan. According to
Ohno Teruko, Director General of the National Women's Education Center, with
the cabinet level Bureau for Gender Equality in place, the exchange of
information and the amount of policy input and feedback may be highest for
women, compared with other civic groups (Ohno 2001).
The extraordinary set of political institutions specifically dedicated to
promoting women's policy makes the lack of progress on gender equality even
more puzzling in the Japanese case. With national and sub-national government
institutions in place, guided by legislation and official plans of action, it would
seem that women's organizations would be poised to generate sweeping policy
change. But, while all of these institutions of women's policy making provide
multiple points of access, the question remains: access for whom?
Uneven Access to Policy Making
The establishment of numerous ristitutions for women's policy shows
that the Japanese government has gone to great lengths to allow for political
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input from women's organizations. Nevertheless, these institutions are, by no
means, neutral black boxes that take in women's' input and turn out women's
policy. In practice, the particular way in which political institutions are structured
creates inherent biases that make them more or less accessible to different types
of organizations. In the Japanese case, the centralized, hierarchical structure of
women's policy making fits together with a highly centralized federation of
national women's organizations that has gained a privileged position among
women's interest groups by virtue of its representational coverage and political
connections.
International Women's Year Liaison Group
The same international events that prodded the Japanese government to
adopt institutions of women's policy making also mobilized women's groups to
adopt new organizational forms. To commemorate the United Nations'
declaration of International Women's Year, a national women's conference was
held in Japan in November of 1975. Forty-one national women's organizations
participated in this conference and formed an alliance called the Liaison Group
for the Implementation of Resolutions from the International Women's Year
Conference of Japan, or International Women's Year Liaison Group (IWYLG). In
accordance with the main themes of International Women's Year, the IWYLG's
stated goals are equality, development, and peace.
Throughout the UN Decade for Women, the IWYLG organized natonai
women's conferences in Japan to coincide with World Conferences for Women.
Forty-eight national women's organizations participated in the 1980 Japan
Conference, and 51 groups met at the' 1985 conference. Currently, the IWYG is
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made up of 49 national women's organizations, which continue to convene a
nation-wide women's conference every five years.
The organizations that make up the IWYLG are prominent, long-standing,
mainstream women's groups, including the Housewives Association, Mothers
Congress, Japan Women's Temperance Union, Girl Scouts of Japan, plus
numerous professional and labor associations. The IWYLG reports the
combined membership of all of its participating organizations as 23 million,
which is roughly equivalent to one-third the female population in Japan.
However, it does not account for overlapping memberships of individual
women belonging to multiple associations.
The most important activity of the IWYLG is to submit proposals to the
government in response to women's policy issues. Typically, when a relevant
issue arises, the IWYLG first holds a study group, then meets with government
officials to receive information and a formal explanation of the policy proposal.
The IWYLG then submits a brief, formal document to the relevant ministry or
advisory council stating their policy position and demands.
Since its founding in 1975, the IWYLG have been active on a number of
important policy issues, including changes to Japan's nationality law, so that
Japanese nationality is not determined only by the father's bloodline but also the
mother, and naturalization requirements for foreigners married to Japanese are
the same for women and men. The liaison group was also involved in the
passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law. On the education front, the
group lobbied to change the requirement that only girls take home economics in
school, so that both boys and girls now take these courses.
Over the years, what began as a loose federation of women's groups has
become increasingly structured and organized. The IWYLG has alternating
leadership and yearly membership dues. Member groups must be national
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organizations, with a responsible representative. They must have rules, and
regulations, and be approved for membership by unanimous consent of
participating groups. The liaison group is based at the Ichikawa Fusae Memorial
Association's Women's Suffrage Center, where it maintains an office and part-
time paid staff. Although the IWYLG operates by unanimous consent in
principle, not all member groups are always in agreement. Groups that
disagree with the liaison group may have their names removed from any formal
documents stating the policy position of the IWYLG. Also, as the number of
relevant women's policy issues have increased, separate conferences have been
organized in addition to the national conference held every five years. Funding
for the national conference comes from participating organizations, the sale of
publications, and donations which are mostly from individuals.
Preferential Access
A huge membership base with national representation, along with
politically well-placed leadership, has given the IWYLG a privileged position in
the policy making process. By claiming a representational monopoly over
women's political interests, the IWYLG has gained government recognition as
the voice of the women's movement. In return, the government need only hear
from a single, centralized organization, thus making the process of incorporating
women's input into public policy much more manageable than dealing with a
cacophony of demands from numerous women's groups.
This mutually beneficial relationship between the IWYLG and the
government resembles political arrangements between the state and peak
associations representing labor and capital, which spawned a whole literature on
"corporatism" in the 1970s. Although this model of interest intermediation is
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primarily associated with class organizations in northern and western Europe,
the concepts have been applied widely to non-economic interest groups
(Schmitter 1979, Offe 1981) and non-European settings (Pempel and Tsunekawa
1979).
Essentially, corporatism describes a political system in which the state
grants a single, dominant, interest association special status and access to decision
making in exchange for compliance, restraint, and support for government
policies. According to this literature, such arrangements evolved as
governments became more active and interest groups multiplied, leading to
system overload and problems of "ungovernability." In theory, corporatism
offers a way for governments to manage their overloaded agendas by dealing
with a large but single organization that can claim to represent an entire interest
category, such as labor, consumers, or women. Policy discussions between state
officials and representatives of peak associations often take place behind closed
doors, thus bypassing the usual cumbersome process of adopting legislation
through parliament. In return for this privileged access to policy making, the
leadership of key interest associations are supposed to ensure that their
members support government policies, or at the very least, keep political protest
within designated, legal channels and out of the streets.
While corporatist theory has long fallen out of fashion, some of its
concepts and critiques are useful for understanding the relationship between the
IWYLG and the government in Japan. Like the peak associations of labor and
capital described in the corporatist literature, the IWYLG enjoys wide coverage
as a federation of national women's organizations, as well as high density,
purporting to represent a large portion of the female population of Japan. While
not created by the state, the liaison group was organized under the leadership of
pioneer suffragist and Diet member Ichikawa Fusae, whose position in
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government gave the association instant credibility and political access. With
such a large membership base and close political connections, the IWYLG has
been able to gain a practical representational monopoly over women's interests
in the national policy making process.
The special status of this women's peak association has been established
through regular channels of communication with government officials on policy
issues affecting women. Typically, when a relevant policy issue arises, ministry
officials meet with representatives from the IWYLG to exchange information and
receive input on policy proposals. Meetings are also held at government offices
for the benefit of IWYLG members to hear the policy positions of each of the
major political parties. The political clout of the liaison group is also
demonstrated by the presence of high ranking government officials at its
national conferences, including the Prime Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary.
The connection between the IWYLG and the government has been
further institutionalized through the creation of the Liaison Conference for the
Promotion of Gender Equality, or Egalite Network. This arm of the
government's national machinery for women's policy making was created in
1996 to ensure public input on policy matters. The Egalite Network is comprised
of eighty prominent citizens, including professors, journalists, lawyers, and
representatives of business and civic groups. Not surprisingly, there is a high
degree of overlapping membership between the government's Egalite Network
and the IWYLG. Out of the 28 women's groups represented on the Egalite
Network, 23 are members of the IWYLG.
The privileged political position of the International Women's Year Liaison
Group reveals an inherent bias within Japan's institutions of women's policy
making. Rather than offer an open market place in which all women's interest
groups can make their demands and compete for influence, the Japanese system
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favors the consolidation of many women's interests into a single peak
association. Like the government's women's policy making apparatus, the
IWYLG has a centralized, hierarchical structure and a focus on national policy
issues. As they developed in tandem over the past 25 years, the liaison group
and the government's national machinery have established multiple channels of
communication with each other, thereby creating a cooperative and efficient
system of incorporating women's input into public policy.
While this system has achieved a level of "governability" over potentially
contentious relations between the state and women, critiques of European
corporatism have raised important questions about such arrangements. For
example, how inclusive are these peak associations, and which interests do they
represent? In the case of Japan's International Women's Year Liaison Group,
only large, long-standing, national organizations are represented. Small,
grassroots, local women's groups are not included in this peak association. Also,
because Japan's institutions of women's policy making are so heavily centralized
at the national level, there are few points of access for local women's groups.
As for the interests represented by the IWYLG, the member organizations
are all mainstream, national associations that seek to improve the status of
women through established political channels and incremental change. The
decidedly conservative tone of the liaison group was originally set by founder
Ichikawa Fusae when she called for the exclusion of women's organizations
which focus solely on women's liberation or sex discrimination. She expressed
concern that there would be a gap between these feminist organizations and
other member organizations with a more general focus, such a consumer
groups, that view women's issues as just one part of its activities (Shikuma, et al.
1997: 86). Ichikawa's preference for subsuming women's issues under other
causes is reflected in the large number of IWYLG member organizations that
157
represent women as consumers, voters, Christians, workers, or farmers, as
opposed to feminists.
Given the centralized, hierarchical structure of Japan's institutions of
women's policy making, the formation of a peak association provides an efficient
way for women to gain access to the policy making process. By combining the
memberships of numerous national organizations, and claiming to speak for
millions of women, the IWYLG is guaranteed a spot at the bargaining table with
policy makers. Nevertheless, the granting of a representational monopoly to a
single organization, no matter how large, inevitably means that some groups are
left out. In the Japanese case, it is the grassroots, local women's groups that lack
political access. Also, in its effort to gain ever wider coverage and represent even
more women, the IWYLG's interests become increasingly diffuse, and its
demands watered down. The resulting lowest common denominator tends to
be general and symbolic as opposed to specific and substantive. While Japan's
elaborate national machinery for women's policy offers institutionalized points
of access to women's organizations, this access is uneven, favoring large,
national associations with general or moderate political goals.
Two-way Access Through Women's Policy
Although Japanese laws regulating interest group activity have been
shown to hamper the ability of grassroots organizations to raise funds and
professionalize their activities, other government policies have directly aided
women's groups, albeit at the price of autonomy. In addition to providing
physical space and resources through public women's centers, the Japanese
government has long supported select women's groups through various
funding programs administered by the Ministry of Education. These programs
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are consistent with a pattern of state involvement in the women's movement.
that offers access, aid, and resources to women's groups, but, at the same time,
discourages their independent development.
Women's Groups and Social Education
Following the end of World War II, Japan adopted its Basic Law on
Education, which contains the basis for government support of social education
programs. Article 7 of the Basic Law states that educational activities in the
home, workplace, and other places in society should be encouraged by national
and local government. The law makes clear that the government is responsible
not only for providing classroom instruction for its citizens, but also for
encouraging on-going education outside the classroom, through the provision of
community centers, youth and adult education courses, libraries, museums and
other educational facilities.
In 1949, the Social Education Law was adopted to define the social
education responsibilities of national and local government bodies, based on the
principles set out by the Basic Law on Education. Chapter 3 of the Social
Education Law addresses the government's relationship with non-governmental
organizations whose main purpose is to carry out programs related to social
education. Originally, Article 13 prohibited government subsidies to these types
of voluntary associations, in accordance with American Occupation efforts to cut
ties between the state and civic groups that were mobilized so effectively during
the war. But most social education organizations found it difficult to survive
without government sponsorship, and continued to seek assistance and
cooperation from local government authorities. In 1959, seven years after the
end of the American Occupation, the Social Education Law was amended to
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allow government subsidies to social education organizations (Shimbori and
Kishimoto 1975).
Women's groups were included under the law's broad definition of social
education organizations. Therefore, many women's groups benefited from the
amended Social Education Law, especially regional women's groups which were
the dominant form of women's organization in the immediate postwar period.
Beginning in 1960, a year after the law was amended, Ministry of Education
budget records show how the government provided funding to select women's
organizations to carry out social education programs on subjects ranging from
personal hygiene to public morality. These subsidies created a strong financial
incentive for women's groups to administer programs consistent with the
government's social education agenda, and, in effect, to serve as government
sub-contractors. In this way, public funding of women's organizations
represents an important avenue of access and influence between the
government and the women's movement.
Regional Women's Groups
By far, the leading beneficiary of government aid to women's groups has
been regional women's associations. Throughout the 1960s, the Ministry of
Education gave these groups over 90 million yen in aid to carry out various
social education programs (Table 4.1). The groups receiving this aid were almost
entirely regional women's associations at the prefectural level. Typically, each
prefecture's regional women's group would receive funds for one major project
or program a year. Beginning in 1966, two or three national organizations also
received funding each year.
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Table 4.1
Yearly Budget for Government Subsidized Programs for Women's Social
Education, 1960-1969
Year Budget Number of groups
(unit=1,000 yen) receiving aid
1960 N/A 38
1961 8,000 48
1962 8.960 45
1963 10,260 46
1964 11,650 46
1965 10,086 45
1966 9,780 48
1967 12,600 49
1968 11,800 48
1969 10,329 44
Source: Ministry of Education. 1960-1969. Fujin kyoiku no genjo (The present state
of women 's education). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Social Education.
The substance of these subsidized programs reveals the government's
goals for the social education of women during this period (Figure 4.2).
Strengthening the management and leadership skills of women was an
important priority for the government, as leaders of women's groups would be
needed to help educate and mobilize women at the grassroots level for various
state sponsored campaigns. In terms of substantive issues, household
management, including consumer education, and child and youth education
were the most prevalent topics addressed by government funded programs. On
such issues vital to the state's social education mission, the government was able
to reach women in all corners of the country by utilizing the networks and
resources of regional women's groups.
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Figure 4.2
Substance of Government Subsidized Women's Programs, 1960-1969
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Source: Ministry of Education. 1960-1969. Fujin kyoiku no genjo (The present state of
women's education). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Social Education.
The largest number of funded programs were designed to teach
leadership and management skills for organizing and maintaining women's
associations. For example, in 1966, Tochigi Prefecture's Regional Women's
Association requested funding for the second of five planned annual leadership
training workshops for Tochigi women leaders based at women's centers. The
proposed workshop would have roughly 150 participants, including 100 for
general leadership education and 58 for specialized technical training. The
subjects covered would include "leadership and the character of women's
groups," "learning activities and social activities," "education and the home,"
"household planning and consumer economics," and "specialized technical
training for social education--a course on projection technology." The total cost of
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this workshop was estimated at 475,850 yen, 200,000 of which was paid for by
the Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education 1966).
The government also subsidized numerous research projects carried out
by regional women's groups. Almost all of these projects involved some type of
survey research, usually asking women about household management, child
rearing, or community participation. A typical example is Saga Prefecture's
regional women's association 1965 survey of three thousand mothers of junior
high school students asking them about the education they provide for their
children at home. The research category also includes a small number of
subsidies granted to regional women's groups to put out publications.
Educational programs dealing with household management also received
a substantial amount of the government aid. These programs approached basic
concerns such as food, clothing, and shelter from a seemingly scientific
perspective, exhorting housewives to economize and rationalize their household
activities. Some regional women's groups held "kitchen conferences," to teach
women how to improve their diet and prepare nutritional meals for their
families. Many programs emphasized consumer education, teaching women
about food and product safety, as well as how to manage the household budget.
One example is the 1961 "Ishikawa prefecture realization of daily life
improvement exhibition and presentation." Through "daily living classrooms" in
three locations, over a nine day period, this program reached over three
thousand women, with the goal of "promoting a new life movement, based on
new knowledge and technical research on the household management of
clothing, food, and shelter" (Ministry of Education 1961).
A related and almost equally popular subject for government subsidized
programs was child and youth home education. While some of these programs
provided for informal discussion and counseling on childrearing, most involved
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research based workshops and study groups on effective home education
methods. For example, in 1965, Yamagata prefecture's regional women's group
received government aid to hold their "Home Education Study Activities and
Research Conference" in twenty-two locations with over four thousand
participants. Based on survey data collected on the actual condition of infants in
Yamagata, each local conference was to "...investigate how to capture and put
into practice the special character of early childhood education" (Ministry of
Education 1965).
Other less frequently funded programs involved women's learning,
conferences, and community activities. Women's learning programs were
usually prefecture-wide study sessions or reading groups on a variety of topics,
such as literature, history, and art. Women's conferences were mostly to bring
together regional women's groups within a single prefecture to discuss a
number of general women's issues. Community activity programs encouraged
women to become active on behalf of such causes as traffic safety, neighborhood
beautification, and pollution control. Also, many of these programs mobilized
women to participate in public morality campaigns. For example, the Hiroshima
prefecture regional women's association held the "Women's General Meeting for
Uplifting Public Morality" in 1966. According to the stated purpose of the
program, "Sudden economic and social development accompanied by the
remarkable growth of material civilization has led to the neglect of public
morality and the spiritual side of life. This conference is convened in order to
heighten women's consciousness of public morality, and to deepen the
recognition of their practical role in raising children in the home and leading a
conscientious existence in society." In addition to this central general meeting,
there were regional workshops held in six different locations, the establishment
of a model district, and year-round activities, including a poster campaign. The
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total cost of this program was 838 thousand yen, of which 220 thousand was
provided by the Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education 1966). Such public
morality campaigns were most prominent in 1964 as a number of regional
women's associations linked efforts to uplift public morality with preparations
for the Tokyo Olympics (Ministry of Education 1964).
Finally, the smallest category of programs funded by the government is
labeled generally as "women's issues." These include educational programs on
women's suffrage and politics, human rights, and women's labor. While these
issues go to the very heart of women's movements today, they received
surprisingly little attention from regional women's groups and their government
subsidized programs in Japan throughout the 1960s.
Based on the overall content analysis of government funded programs
during this period, it appears that the highest priority was given to laying the
groundwork for women's organization. By subsidizing women's leadership and
management training programs and funding survey research on women, the
Ministry of Education supported the development of a fledgling women's
movement that could eventually be mobilized on behalf government campaigns.
Also, as Japan entered a period of high-speed economic growth accompanied by
urbanization, a growing middle-class, and the rise of the nuclear family, the
Japanese housewife was clearly the target of most of the government funded
programs throughout the 1960s. These programs emphasized a pseudo-
scientific approach to household management, nutrition, and child rearing.
Women's traditional roles were also affirmed by programs promoting
community participation, especially as the pillars of public morality in the wake
of Japan's growing materialism. At this stage, women's rights, politics, and labor
received scant attention from government subsidized programs, as the Ministry
of Education and regional women's groups worked closely together to promote
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a social education agenda that viewed women primarily as caretakers of the
home.
Regional women's groups continued to receive government funding
throughout the 1970s. Ministry of Education budget data from 1972 to 1982
show funding to women's organizations related to social education provided by
Prefectural and large city boards of education (Tables 4.2 and 4.3).
Table 4.2
Board of Education Aid to Regional Women's Associations by Type of Funding,
1972-1982
Year Aid Percentage Percentage Percentage
in 1,000 yen Grants Commission Joint Sponsor(% of total)
1972 59,215 (94) 67.7 27.4 5.9
1973 77,552 (92) 69.2 18.3 12.5
1974 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1975 83,226 (92) 73.1 21.3 5.6
1976 75,696 (93) 72.4 23.9 3.7
1977 81,081 (94) 77.7 19.1 3.2
1978 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1979 159,810 (94) 56.2 41.7 2.1
1980 158,908 (90) 54.2 43.7 2.1
1981 132,843 (86) 66.7 30 3.3
1982 138,351 (93) 65.5 32.3 2.2
Source: Ministry of Education. 1972-1982. Fujin kyoiku oyobi katei kyoikz iii kansuru
shisaku no genjo (The present state of policies relating to women 's education and home
education). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Social Education.
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Table 4.3
Board of Education Aid to Other (Non-regional) Women's Organizations by
Type of Funding, 1972-1982
Year Aid Percentage Percentage Percentage
in 1,000 yen Grants Commission Joint Sponsor
(% of total)
1972 3,748 (6) 80.4 17.6 2
1973 7,119 (8) 81.6 12.3 6.1
1974 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1975 7,412 (8) 86.1 10.8 3.1
1976 5,515 (7) 80.6 18.9 0.5
1977 5,419 (6) 87.6 11.8 0.6
1978 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1979 9,405 (6) 50 44.8 5.7
1980 17,161 (10) 76.7 19.7 3.6
1981 21,017 (14) 92.9 6.3 0.8
1982 10,706 (7) 89 10.1 0.6
Source: Ministry of Education. 1972-1982. Fujin kyoiku oyobi katei kyoiku iii kansuru
shisaku no genjo (The present state of policies relating to women 's education and home
education). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Social Education.
While the data available do not contain information about the substance
of programs which were funded, they do reveal two notable trends in
government funding to women's organizations. First, the vast majority of funds
went to regional women's associations, which typically received over 90 percent
of the total aid available from prefectural and city Boards of Education. Second,
the amount of aid is broken down into three distinct forms of funding. The way
in which aid was given varies by the amount of government involvement in the
process. A majority of government funding was in the form of outright grants
which women's groups used for administrative costs and programs or projects
of their own design. A second form of funding that became increasingly
common over the years was commissioned programs, in which women's
organizations administered programs paid for by the government. The least
common form of funding was jointly sponsored programs in which the
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government and women's groups administered programs together.
Throughout the 1970s, regional women's associations differed from other
women's groups, not only in the amount of government funding they received,
but also in the type of funding. Commissioned programs and joint sponsorship
were more common in the case of regional women's groups than other groups,
suggesting a higher degree of cooperation and a closer relationship with the
government.
National Women's Organizations
In addition to regional women's associations, the government has also
provided aid to national women's organizations. According to a Ministry of
Education report, "The Ministry of Education provides public funding, advice,
and guidance in response to requests, while respecting the independence of these
groups. The aid given supports part of the necessary expenses for programs
administered by organizations that have social and public meaning" (Ministry of
Education 1981: 30). Under this aid program, the Ministry of Education gave a
total of 421 million yen, or an average of 26 million yen a year to national
women's organizations between 1971 and 1987. As stipulated, the aid was used
to fund specific programs deemed to have social value, including leadership
training workshops, overseas study tours, national conferences, and survey
research projects.
What is most remarkable about this program is that the same
organizations received this limited funding year after year. In the thirteen years
for which the data are available, the same eight national women's organizations
were the beneficiaries of this program (Table 4.4). At the same time, the number
of women's groups belonging to national organizations swelled from less than
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five thousand in 1971 to almost thirty-five thousand in 1987. Yet despite the
growing number of national women's organizations, the same handful of
groups were chosen by the government to receive public funding.
Table 4.4
National Women's Organizations Receiving Government Aid, 1973-19862
National Organization Years funded
1. National Federation of Regional Women's Organizations 1973-1986
2. Japanese Association of University Women 1973-1986
3. International Women's Education Association 1973-1986
4. National Council of Women's Centers 1974-1986
5. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1977-1986
Japan Section
6. National Federation of Designated Cities' Women's 1977-1986
Organizations
7. Japan Association for Women's Education 1976-1977, 1981-1986
8. Shuyodan (youth and home education organization) 1984-1986
Source: Ministry of Education. 1974-1987. Fujin kyoiku oyobi katei kyoiku iii kansuru
shisaku no genjo (The present state of policies relating to womeni's education and home
education). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Social Education.
Women's Volunteer Activities
Giving money directly to women's groups is one way in which the
Japanese government has involved itself in the development of the women's
movement. Yet another, more subtle, method of influencing women's civic
participation is found in government efforts to promote women's volunteer
activities. Over the past thirty years and continuing today, the Ministry of
Education has promoted women's volunteerism by administering education and
outreach programs, and later funding programs proposed by non-governmental
2 Excluding 1975 as data were not available for that year.
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organizations to further women's social participation. While thousands of
women have been prompted to volunteer in their communities, these
government programs have by no means been neutral on women's role in civil
society. Rather than simply promote volunteerism on behalf of any individually
chosen cause, the government encourages women's participation in certain types
of activities. The direction in which women's civic participation has been guided
is evident in the content of educational programs sponsored by the government
from the mid-1970s through the 1980s, and volunteer efforts that received
government funding in the 1990s.
Beginning in 1971, the Ministry of Education commissioned the boards of
education in twelve large cities to conduct research towards developing policy
measures to promote women's volunteer activity. Over a three year period,
these cities conducted a number of surveys, studies, and analyses which became
the basis of the Ministry of Education's Women's Volunteer Activity Promotion
Program, which began in 1976. In its inaugural year, this program was
implemented in sixty cities, towns, and villages throughout Japan, with a total of
3,200 participants. At its peak in 1983, over ten thousand women in 225 localities
participated in this program (Table 4.5).
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Table 4.5
Women's Volunteer Activity Program, 1976-1990
Year Budget Number of Number of
(unit=1,000 yen) Localities Participants
1976 60,200 60 3,200
1977 67,200 119 5,800
1978 65,520 163 8,000
1979 65,520 188 8,500
1980 65,520 208 8,500
1981 65,520 221 9,200
1982 62,712 234 10,000
1983 59,904 225 10,600
1984 53,914 212 9,100
1985 48,485 219 8,800
1986 43,740 216 8,400
1987 39,240 216 8,000
1988 35,280 190 7,300
1989 33,086 166 7,200
1990 30,741 138 7,500
Source: Ministry of Education. 1972-1991. Fujin kyoiku oyobi katei kyoiku iii kansuru
shisaku no genjo (The present state of policies relating to women 's education and home
education). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Social Education.
The Women's Volunteer Activity Promotion Program was made up of
two components--course instruction and volunteer dispatch. First, women
enrolled in an instructional course that included a basic course and a specialized
course. The basic course covered "the meaning of volunteerism" and "ways in
which women should participate in society." The specialized course, provided
"technical knowledge necessary according to the substance of the volunteer
activity." On average, the entire course involved about thirty hours of
instruction. After successfully completing the course, women were sent to
various sites to offer their services. These sites included education and welfare
facilities, individual residences, non-profit organizations, libraries, and others.
On average, each program participant was dispatched to volunteer sites four to
five times (Ministry of Education 1972-1991).
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What is most remarkable about this program is that it did not simply
promote women's community service in and of itself. Rather it was fairly
specific about the areas in which women should volunteer. Both the course
instruction and volunteer dispatch components of the program were explicitly
designed to train and send women to serve children, youth, senior citizens,
disabled people, and cultural institutions (Table 4.6). The specialized course
instruction covered topics which prepared women to volunteer in these
designated areas. For example, women learned about early childhood
development, recreational activities for children and youth, caring for the elderly
and disabled, and cultural preservation. On average, each locality offered
volunteer dispatch programs in three to four of these five subject areas.
Between 1976 and 1989, dispatch programs were most common in the area of
the elderly, followed by cultural activities, children, youth, and the disabled
(Table 4.7).
Table 4.6
Content of Women's Volunteer Activities Promoted by the Government
Area of Activity Examples of Volunteer Activity
Children Providing daycare for young mothers attending classes,
Reading outloud to children,
Providing advice on childrearing,
Leading children's play,
Puppet theater,
Emergency safety measures.
Youth Leading children's groups,
Regional cooking instruction,
Leading recreational activities,
Directing reading activities,
Individual counseling,
Guiding latch-key children.
Elderly Home visits for nursing care or talking,
Companionship,
Facility visits for nursing care,
Leading recreational activities,
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Learning advice.
Disabled Home visits for nursing care,
Facility visits for nursing care,
Braille, sign language, and voice library,
Leading recreational activities.
Culture Preservation of cultural assets,
Regional forestation and beautification,
Library maintenance and reading activities,
Presenting audio and visual teaching materials,
Interaction with foreigners,
Transmission of native folk songs and artifacts,
Advice on women's courses.
Source: Ministry of Education. 1985. Fujiin kyoiku oyobi katei kyoiku iii kazsuru
shisaku 1n genjo (The present state of policies relating to women's education and home
education). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Social Education.
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Table 4.7
Number of Volunteer Dispatch Programs by Subject Area, 1976-1989
Year Children Youth Elderly Disabled Culture
1976 46 37 40 24 26
1977 70 62 76 43 62
1978 112 69 127 76 113
1979 105 98 184 72 129
1980 119 79 211 82 150
1981 135 95 202 88 137
1982 162 132 253 113 189
1983 153 106 227 88 137
1984 169 141 222 101 lo5
1985 134 101 204 90 129
1986 123 67 165 94 142
1987 111 39 177 72 157
1988 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1989 62 24 79 40 19
Total 1,501 1,050 2,167 983 1,601
Source: Ministry of Education. 1977-1990. Fujin kyoiku oyobi katei kyoiku ni kansuru
shisaku no genjo (The present state of policies relating to womeni's education and home
education). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Social Education.
Between 1976 and 1990, the Ministry of Education conducted three follow-
up surveys of participants who completed the Women's Volunteer Activity
Promotion Program. These studies found that about 65 to 70 percent of
participants continued their volunteer activities after completing the program.
The surveys also compared the types of volunteer activities program graduates
went on to pursue with the types of activities they had been offered through the
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program (Figure 4.3). The numbers are remarkably similar in all three years of
the study, indicating that the program succeeded not only in mobilizing women
to become volunteers in general, but also in directing women's civic participation
towards specific sectors of society.
Figure 4.3
Comparison of the Types of Volunteer Activities Offered in the Program with
Types of Volunteer Activities Pursued by Program Graduates (figures below
refer to % of total)
Children Youth Elderly Disabled Culture
1980
1981
1983
1984
18,6 1 12,3 1 32o9 1 12,8 1 23.4 I
19.7 12.2 30.8 14,7 22.6 h
20.2 14 30 11.6 24.2
13.5 20.3 32 12.1 22.1 n
1986 CU.Q ALI s7
1987 21.4 12.8 29.5 8.9 27.4
Source: Ministry of Education. 1988. Fujin kyoiku oyobi katei kyoiku ii kansuru
shisaku no genjo (The present state of policies relating to women's education and home
education). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Social Education.
Note: Data represent comparisons between the percentage of programs offered
for each subject area with the percentage of women who volunteered in the
same area the following year.
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Beginning in 1990, the Ministry of Education implemented its Special
Promotion Program to Support Women's Social Participation. According to the
Ministry's outline of the program, its purpose is to "...make use of women's
talents, and contribute to the advancement of women's education, by promoting
model instructional or practical programs, centered around women's
organizations, for various forms of social participation" (Ministry of Education
1999: 1). In practice, the program provides funding to women's organizations to
administer their own programs to promote women's social participation.
National and regional women's organizations may apply for this funding by
submitting a proposal to the Ministry of Education. A Ministry appointed
executive committee selects groups to receive funding, and provides guidance
and advice in the implementation of all programs. According to one prominent
member of the executive committee, the program represents the formation of a
partnership between government and non-government organizations (Ministry
of Education 1999: 5).
From 1990 to 1998, this program to support women's social participation
funded a total of 210 women's organizations nationwide at a cost of close to 552
million yen (or approximately $4.6 million at an exchange rate of 120 yen to the
dollar) (Table 4.8). The content of these programs varies, though a large
proportion involve chiiki zukuri, or regional development (Table 4.9). The top
two categories of funded programs are "regional development by the hands of
women" and "home and regional development." In this context, regional
development includes activities designed to improve or strengthen local
communities, such as organizing traditional festivals, erecting signs that point
out buildings of historical significance, or publishing and distributing hiking
maps of the area. The "home and regional development" category includes
activities that link community improvement with family needs, such as creating
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open play space for children. Taken together, these two categories represent
almost one-third of all the programs that received government funding through
the women's social participation program. Also notable are the number of
programs that fall under the categories "gender equality consciousness reform"
and "environmental issues." While a relatively large number of gender equality
programs received funding, over half of these are clustered over a two year
period from 1996 to 1997. In contrast, programs related to environmental issues
consistently received funding every year from 1990 to 1998. These trends
suggest that government support for programs that directly address gender
equality has not been as consistent as for other issues, and may be largely
dependent on current events or executive committee personnel from year to
year.
Table 4.8 Special Promotion Program to Support Women's Social Participation,
1990-1998
Year Budget (unit=10k yen) No. of Groups Funded
1990 5,000 22
1991 6,200 24
1992 6,200 22
1993 6,405 25
1994 6,405 24
1995 6,405 22
1996 6,405 29
1997 6,405 26
1998 5,749 16
Total 55,174 210
Source: Ministr y of Education. 1999. Kaze zwo okosu josei tachi: Josei 110 shakai sanka
s/hien tokubetsu suishin jigyo hokokusho, Heisei 2 nendo - H-eisei 10 nendo (Women
making wind: Report on the special promotion program to sup port women 's social
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participation, 1990 - 1998). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Lifelong
Learning, Division of Gender Equality.
Table 4.9
Content of Programs Funded under the Special Promotion Program to Support
Women's Social Participation, 1990-1998
Content Number of Programs
Regional Development by the Hands of Women 40
Home and Regional Development 29
Gender Equality Consciousness Reform 29
Environmental Issues 27
Women's Lifelong Learning 18
Internationalization 17
Facing the Aging Society 11
Consumer Education 10
Nurturing Personal Character 9
Improving the Status of Women 9
Information Age 4
Demonstrating Women's Scientific and Technical Talent 2
Women's Enterprise/ Non-profit Organizations 2
Developing Networks 2
Total 210
Source: Ministry of Education. 1999. Kaze wo okosu josei tachi: Josei no shakai sanka
shien tokubetsu suishiin jigyo hokokusho, Heisei 2 nendo - Heisei 10 nendo (Women
making wind: Report on the special promotion program to support women 's social
participation, 1990 - 1998). Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Bureau of Lifelong
Learning, Division of Gender Equality.
The programs described in this section demonstrate the variety of ways in
which the government is involved with the women's movement in Japan. Public
aid to women's organizations takes the form of direct grants, commissioned
programs, and jointly sponsored activities. The groups receiving aid may be
national, regional, or local, and the aid may be administered by national
executive committees, prefectural governments, or boards of education. The
government supports the women's movement directly by giving money to
women's organizations, and indirectly by sponsoring programs to promote
women's civic participation.
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While the different programs vary in their goals or administration, they
express a consistent view of the role of women in civil society. Content analyses
of various government funded programs for women show that women are
encouraged to fulfill their duties as wives and mothers through rational and
economical household management, and well-researched methods of
childrearing. Women's community activities are largely an extension of this
caretaker role, as women are directed towards helping children, youth, the
elderly, and disabled. Even into the 1990s, government funded programs
emphasize regional development "by the hands of women," suggesting that
women offer a special contribution to the community as women.
What is most remarkable about these government programs for women
is not so much the message they contain but the fact that they contain a message
at all. As a matter of public policy, civic participation may be encouraged in any
number of ways. But the Japanese pattern of state intervention in civil society is
especially bold in that the government not only asks women to become active in
their communities, but also tells them where and how to become active.
Access versus Autonomy
The Japanese government has made great strides to institutionalize
channels of access to women's policy making. Through an elaborate national
machinery headed by the Prime Minister and including all Cabinet members,
guided by the principles of a Basic Law on Gender Equality as well as a legally
required government Plan of Action, Japan's central government offers an
unprecedented level of public input to policy making at the highest level. This
access is surprising for two reasons. First, the Japanese policy making process is
often depicted as insulated from interest group pressure due to the large role
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played by an unelected bureaucracy. Second, Japan's low standing on measures
of gender equality suggests that women have been shut out of political processes
that would allow them to affect social change.
But the issue of access is not a simple yes or no question. While there are
political channels available for women's input on policy issues, access to these
channels is not equal for all women's groups. Furthermore, access is a two-way
street, allowing government to influence women, just as women influence
government.
The centralized, hierarchical structure of Japan's institutions of women's
policy making is mirrored by the centralized, hierarchical organization of
women's groups into a single peak association. With its huge membership and
national coverage, this women's organization has gained a practical
representational monopoly over women's interests. Because the peak
association is made up exclusively of national organizations, small, local,
grassroots women's groups are not represented. The broad based women's
organizations that are included tend to represent overlapping and sometimes
competing interests of women as consumers, farmers, or mothers, thus
tempering and diluting a feminist political agenda.
And just as some women's organizations have institutionalized avenues
through which to influence public policy, a number of public policies and
programs gives the government an institutionalized means of influencing
women's organizations. From the 1960s continuing to the present, the Ministry
of Education has provided funding to select women's organizations to promote
state social education interests. Because children's education in the home is a
large part of the Japanese definition of social education, great emphasis is placed
on women's role as mothers in many government funded programs. While
programs to encourage women's social participation could be designed in more
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content neutral ways, the Japanese government does not hesitate to direct
women's role in civil society.
In this way, women's policy and policy-making follow the same pattern
found in the government's management of women's organizations and
women's centers. Rather than adopt across-the-board tax incentives for non-
profit organizations, the Japanese government does little to aid independent
fund-raising efforts of civic associations. Instead, the government offers funding
to select groups that ser. e the state's social education agenda. Similarly, public
women's centers are not simply empty, neutral spaces offered freely to women's
organizations. They are staffed by civil servants who offer government
sponsored programs. As with women's organizations and women's centers, the
Japanese approach to women's policy maximizes state involvement and
discretion, and promotes a close and cooperative relationship between the
government and women's organizations. While select women's organizations
enjoy access to the highest levels of government, the government maintains
access to women's organizations, first, by limiting their ability to operate and
raise funds independently, then, by offering aid and resources to groups that
share the government's vision of women's place in Japanese society. In sum,
access is granted at the price of autonomy.
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Chapter Five
Conclusion
The contradictions between Japan's ancient traditions and modem society
are fittingly captured by its Imperial family which serves as a symbol of the
nation. This venerable institution is believed to date back more that 2,600 years
to the creation of the islands of Japan by the mythological Sun Goddess
Ameterasu. By this account, Japan's Chrysanthemum Throne is the oldest
continuous royal dynasty in the world.
Into this cloistered world of archaic religious ritual and obscure honorific
language entered a modern woman in 1993, when Crown Prince Naruhito
married Owada Masako, a multi-lingual, Harvard educated, Foreign Ministry
diplomat. Their marriage raised expectations that the new princess would take
an active role to promote worthy causes and serve as a visible role model.
Instead, Princess Masako seemed to vanish from public view, appearing only
occasionally at sporting events or local charities, always a few steps behind the
Crown Prince. Gradually, the focus of the media and the public shifted away
from how Princess Masako might revitalize the monarchy to when she would
produce its heir.
The women's movement in Japan is similarly plagued by unfulfilled
expectations. Despite many forces of change, old ways prevail to keep women
just a few steps behind men. And like the princess herself, the women's
movement is hardly seen or heard by the general public, either in Japan or
abroad. It is a decidedly quiet movement that pursues political goals largely
through cooperation and consultation, as opposed to conflict or confrontation.
While this observation is consistent with prevalent beliefs about the overriding
value of harmony in Japanese culture, there are legal and political institutions
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that promote cooperation and contain conflict between the Japanese
government and the women's movement. This dissertation identifies and
analyzes these institutions that create a system of incentives and disincentives, in
which the government hinders the development of an independent,
professionalized women's movement, while helping certain women's
organizations with political and material resources. In this way, conflict is
managed and cooperation is institutionalized through state intervention in the
women's movement.
Summary of Findings
This dissertation began with the puzzle of gender inequality in Japan.
Despite achieving the highest levels of economic and technological development,
Japan ranks significantly behind other industrialized countries on basic measures
of gender equality. As in other wealthy countries, women in Japan have steadily
increased their levels of education, workforce participation, and life expectancy,
while decreasing the number of children they have. While these demographic
trends are associated with growing equality between the sexes, Japanese women
remain at the bottom of the industrialized world as measured by wage
disparities, occupational segregation, higher educational attainment, and
electoral representation. Therefore, this dissertation asks why is gender
inequality in Japan so pervasive, despite economic, demographic, and
international trends towards growing equality between the sexes.
A review of the literature shows that cultural explanations and economic
explanations provide valuable pieces to the puzzle. But a political explanation is
missing from the literature on gender inequality in Japan. Erom a political
science perspective the question of gender inequality becomes a question of
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power. As Japan is a constitutional democracy, women as citizens have the right
to influence public policy and the distribution of non-market resources. But what
prevents women in Japan from effectively using the political process to achieve
gender equality? A series of hypotheses guides this inquiry.
Is There a Women's Movement in Japan?
The first hypothesis is that there is no women's movement in Japan.
While images of women staging rallies, marches, and bra burnings are familiar in
the west, many people find it difficult to picture Japanese women taking to the
streets in protest.' But popular perceptions aside, universal collective action
problems inherent in organizing broad based social movements, in addition
Japdn's specific history of diffusing and deflecting protest activity call into
question the existence ofa women's movement in Japan.
Nevertheless, this dissertation finds that a broad, diverse, and active
women's movement does indeed exist in Japan, despite such obstacles. A review
of published directories combined with an original survey of the National
Women's Education Center's pamphlet and newsletter collection yielded data on
close to nine hundred women's organizations, active in all regions of Japan.
These organizations range from small, grassroots women's groups, meeting at
individual residences and producing hand-written, photo-copied flyers to a
highly professionali zed federation of national women's organizations with a
combined membership of 26 million women. The large number of women's
groups and the level of organization they have achieved provide sufficient
evidence of a thriving women's movement in Japan.
SWhen I tell people my dissertation topic is the women's movement in Japan, a
typical response is "should be a short dissertation!"
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Do Japanese Women Want Equality?
Having established that a women's movement exists in Japan, a second
hypothesis questions the assumption that Japanese women have mobilized this
social movement for the purpose of attaining equality with men. Public debates
and popular opinion show widespread skepticism over whether or not it is truly
in the best interest of women, or Japanese society as a whole, for women and
men to fulfill equal or identical roles. As an alternative to the gender equality
model, prominent Japanese scholars and many opinion surveys express support
for the notion that women should be recognized for the special contribution they
make to society as women, particularly in their roles as care givers, nurturers,
wives and mothers.
Such debates over equality versus difference are by no means unique to
Japan. And while a healthy level of skepticism over equality exists in Japanese
public opinion, there is strong evidence of support for gender equality within the
women's movement. An analysis of the activities of 889 women's organizations
shows that a majority of these groups are organized around women's issues and
social issues. Women's issues include general efforts to promote gender
equality, as well as specific women's concerns, such as legalizing separate
surnames for married women or raising awareness about domestic violence.
The social issues women's groups are organized around include international
exchange, consumer advocacy, environmental protection, and human rights.
Only a small proportion of the groups in this sample are organized around issues
concerning women's traditional roles, such as family, home education, welfare,
or culture.
[he content ot women's organizational activities shows that the women's
movement in Japan is primarily made up ot groups that either explicitly embrace
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gender equality as their goal, or actively promote causes outside the traditional
women's sphere of home and family. This finding indicates that, at least within
the organized women's movement, there is wide pread support for furthering
equality between the sexes, as opposed to valuing women's differences from
men.
The diversity and complexity of the women's movement in Japan means
that there is no simple answer the question, do Japanese women want equality.
Overall, the evidence suggests that women do indeed want equality, but equality
on their own terms. Rather that simply being accepted into male-dominated
institutions, Japanese women seek to change these institutions themselves by
contributing their perspective and experience on an equal basis with men.
Do Women Have Political Access?
Even if a women's movement exists in Japan, and even if this movement
actively seeks equality, it is possible that women's political organizations have
little impact due to a closed political system that minimizes public access to the
policy making process. According to this hypothesis, unelected bureaucrats
within the vanous national ministries play a central role in formulating public
policy in Japan. Therefore, women lack clear points of access through which to
express their input on policy decisions. no matter how organized their
movement or how strong their demands.
The question of whether or not woeN n in Japan have political access is
answered with a qualified yes. While the government has set up an impressive
national machinery dedicated to women's policy making, in practice, these
institutions are not equally accessible to all women's groups. Instead, the
women's policy makmng process has developed into a system that resembles
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corporatist arrangements in which the state grants a representational monopoly
to a single peak association in exchange for cooperation and compliance with
government policies.
Over the past 25 years, women's political access in Japan has been
centralized and institutionalized, largely as a result of commitments made by the
government at international women's conferences since the United Nations
declaration of International Women's Year in 1975. At the national level, Japan
has established the Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality, with the
Prime Minister acting as president and all Cabinet Ministers serving as members.
Each national ministry and agency must have an administrative division that is
charged with gender equality issues. This requirement applies equally across the
national bureaucracy, including even Japan's Defense Agency. The
Headquarters is supported by the Bureau the Gender Equality, a cabinet level
office that is staffed by full-time civil servants and charged with the day to day
administrative and policy work of the Headquarters. This structure is further
buttressed by a government appointed advisory council of outside experts, as
well as a network of non-governmental organizations that provide input on
women's policy issues. These institutions of women's policy making have
gradually been adopted by prefectural and local governments which have
established their own administrative offices and advisory councils charged with
women's policy.
As the government built up its national machinery for women's policy,
mainstream, national women's organizations formed a peak association which
mirrors the government's centralized, hierarchical structure. This single
organization has gained a practical representational monopoly over women's
interests by virtue of its huge membership base and strategic political
connections. Over the years, the government has established regular channels of
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communication with this federation of women's organizations, thus developing
an efficient and manageable way to incorporate women's input to policy
making, Nevertheless, this system excludes the interests of local, grassroots
women's groups, as only national women's organizations are represented by the
peak association. Furthermore, there is a historical bias against the inclusion of
strictly feminist women's organizations, and a tendency to view women's
interests as a sub-set of consumer, religious, professional, or other interests. As a
result, any overtly feminist demands are muted as the peak association seeks the
lowest common denominator among its member organizations' multiple
competing interests. Although the Japanese government has gone to great
lengths to institutionalize women's access to policy making, this access is
controlled and limited to maximize cooperation and minimize conflict.
Does the Government Have Access to the Women's Movement?
While women's organizations have institutionalized channels of access to
the government, the government uses these same channels to access and
influence the women's movement. This two-way street has enabled a close and
cooperative relationship to develop between mainstream women's
organizations and the government. But the government's involvement and
influence has constrained the development of an independent women's
movement that would be more likely to challenge government authority on
gender issues than a women's movement that depends on government
recognition and resources.
A burgeoni ng literature of comparative research on associational
democracy, social capital, and civil society retlectagrwnscoryiteetn
civic associations and the understudied non-governmental, non-profit "third
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sector," which exists alongside the public government sector and the private
business sector. An analysis of Japan's system of regulating third sector activity
shows how government policies in this area have curtailed the development of
an independent, professionalized women's movement, while creating
dependence on government approval and support.
For over one hundred years, the non-profit sector in Japan was regulated
by the Meiji Era Civil Code dating back to 1896. Under this system, public
interest associations and foundations seek government recognition as legal
entities in order to gain basic rights necessary to conduct business, including the
right to own property or enter into contracts. Government recognition also
gives civic groups limited income tax relief, and, in special cases, tax deductions
for charitable contributions made to the group. In practice, government
bureaucrats have wide discretion over the approval process, and public interest
groups that receive legal status tend to have huge monetary resources or close
government ties.
My own sample of 889 women's organizations shows how this regulatory
system impacts the women's movement. First, only a small number of women's
groups are legally recognized by the government as public interest associations
or foundations. But those that have legal status tend to be large, resource-rich,
and professionalized, often having paid staff and permanent office space.
Second, womeln' groups officially recognized by the government tend to be
organized around conservative, general, or relatively non-controversial issues,
such as womn'a Vs education, the arts, and family life. Finally, many wonwn's
public interest corporations are regional women's organizations sponsored by
prefectural or local governments.
Overall, the effect of the Civil Code system has been to constrain the
development of an independent, professionalized women's movement in Japan.
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Although a broad-based women's movement has emerged, despite the vague
and complex laws governing civic associations, the movement is segmented
between a small number of well-endowed, well-connected women's
organizations with legal status and the vast majority of women's groups that
must operate without legal status, tax benefits, or government support. In this
way, the bureaucratic discretion involved in granting and denying legal status to
women's organizations has allowed government officials a hand at shaping the
women's movement for over one hundred years.
To address the basic problems of the Civil Code system, Japan recently
adopted the Law to Promote Nonprofit Activities, which clarifies and simplifies
the process by which civic groups obtain legal status. Under the new system,
groups gain approval for legal status fairly easily, but they must submit to
government regulation and oversight without receiving significant tax benefits.
Without such tangible benefits, the new law remains largely symbolic, leaving
the women's movement to operate within a regulatory environment that
promotes mutual access and influence between the government and women's
organizations, but hinders the development of an autonomous women's
movement in Japan.
State Intervention in the Women's Movement
The puzzling lack of progress towards gender equality in Japan cannot be
explained by the absence of a women's movement, or a lack of interest in
equality on the part of women, or the comnplete denial ot access to the policy
making process. Regulations on civil society are found to inhibit the
development of an effective women's movement. But understanding the impact
of these regulations is just the first step towards uncovering a whole
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institutionalized system that facilitates a cooperative and interdependent
relationship between the government and women's organizations.
First, regulations on non-profit organizations make it difficult for
women's groups to independently raise funds needed to establish their own
office space or professional personnel. Second, the government steps in to fill
the void by providing women's groups with physical space and staff assistance
through government sponsored women's centers. The government provides
additional resources to women's groups through a variety of direct and indirect
funding programs. Finally, select women's groups are given access to policy
making through a number of government institutions. In this way, the
government gains a foothold in the women's movement in exchange for
resources and access.
The lack of tax-exempt status for non-profit organizations is a key point
emphasized in the literature on civil society in Japan. Without such tax benefits
and incentives found in other industrialized democracies, civic associations in
Japan, including women's groups, are at a disadvantage in their ability to raise
funds needed to hire full-time staff, establish permanent office space, publish
quality newsletters, and generally maintain effective and professional
organizations. While this observation helps explain some of the weakness of the
women's movement in Japan, it only tells half the story. With one hand, the
government sets out regulations that limit the ability to women's groups to
independently raise funds and develop professional organizations. But, with the
other hand, the government offers women's groups access and resources that
help them maintain their organizations, while at the same time, allowing
govrnmntinput and acesto the women's movement. By tocusin nwa
the government fails to provide, the literature on civil society in Japan misses
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what the government does provide, and more importantly, how the provision
of resources allows the government to influence civil society.
The most impressive form of government support for women's
organizations is found in the hundreds of public women's centers found
throughout Japan. Through these centers, the government provides a physical
space set aside for women, where they can meet, take classes, access library
resources, participate in recreational activities, receive counseling and other
services. While nearly all women's centers are open to the public, they are not
simply neutral spaces for women's groups to fill with their own activities and
agendas. Instead, women's centers offer their own programs, reflecting their
own definition of women's interests.
An analysis of activities at over six hundred women's centers shows that
the courses and lectures they sponsor most frequently address family and home
issues, with women's issues and social issues receiving less attention. Also, many
activities at women's centers revolve around cultural activities, such as flower
arranging and tea ceremony. When the issue content of the activities sponsored
by women's centers is compared with the activities of the 889 women's groups in
my sample, a distinct disconnect becomes apparent, as women's organizations
are far more interested in women's issues and social issues than family and home
issues or arts and culture. Yet, government bureaucrats that staff most public
women's centers design programs for women that fail to reflect the interests of
the women's organizations they are supposed to serve. Instead, their programs
promote a separate agenda defined by government officials.
State intervention in the women's movement is also accomplished
through a variety of programs that provide government aid to select women's
organizations. Since the early 19%0s, the Ministry of Education has been funding
women's organizations as part of its social education mission. Not surprisingly,
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the groups and projects that receive government aid reflect a particular point of
view that is consistent with the government's social education agenda for
women.
Throughout the 1960s, regional women's associations received the bulk of
government aid to carry out specific social education projects. Content analysis
of the programs that received funding shows that, during this decade, the
government focused on developing a fledging postwar women's movement by
subsidizing women's leadership and management training programs, along with
survey research on women's daily living. At the same time, the government
funded many programs aimed at Japanese housewives to promote pseudo-
scientific methods of household management and childrearing. Also, in an era of
rapid economic growth, urbanization, and growing materialism, women were
encouraged to participate in the communities to uphold "public morality."
Comparatively, projects involving women's rights, political participation, or
workforce participation received very little public funding during this time.
Beginning the in the 1970s, the government implemented programs to
promote women's volunteer activities. Again, the same bold pattern of state
intervention in the women's movement emerges. Through these programs, the
government does not simply encourage volunteerism in general, but goes a step
further to encourage women's volunteerism in particular sectors of society. In
the 1970s and 80s, government funded programs directed women's volunteer
activities towards children, youth, the elderly, and disabled, to utilize women's
unique capacity for nurturing and care giving. Women were also assigned to
volunteer in the area of cultural preservation and promotion, which is also
consistent with traditional feminine roles. Throughout the 1 990s, government
funded programs to promote women's social participation have emphasized
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community development "by the hands of women," again relying on women's
unique ability to link community improvement with the needs of families.
The observation that the Japanese government makes assumptions about
unique female perspectives or women's special talents is less relevant than the
fact that these assumptions inform the content of government aid to women's
organizations at all. Rather than simply provide funding to worthy
organizations to use at their own discretion, the government funds specific
programs that promote particular goals for women. Similarly, the government
could fund education and outreach programs to promote women's volunteer
activities on behalf of individually chosen causes. But instead, the government
directs volunteer activities towards areas deemed most appropriate for women.
In this way, state intervention in the women's movement involves support in
exchange for influence.
This relationship has been built up over many years going back to the
World War II, in which women's organizations were so effectively enlisted and
organized by the government to cortribute to the war effort. Although
women's groups have gained considerable independence compared to the total
government control experienced during the war, the government's historic
tendency to actively intervene in the women's movement remains strong. What
the relationship between the government and the women's movement in Japan
demonstrates above all is the trade-off between access and autonomy. In
accepting access to resources and power, women's organizations open up two-
way channels of influence, which the Japanese government uses to promote its
own social and political agenda. This system of cooperation and collaboration
between women's organizations and the government may have spared Japan
the social strife of women taking to the streets in mass protest. But the
alternative has been slow, deliberative, and incremental change that has left
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Japanese women with the dubious distinction of being the least equal in the
industrialized world.
A Happy Ending
The future of the women's movement in Japan will be filled with many
new challenges as well as old obstacles, as the country continues to face
economic stagnation, an aging population, declining birthrates, increasing
unemployment and crime, and political corruption. But if there are parallels
between the story of Princess Masako and the women's movement in Japan,
there is reason to be hopeful. After eight years of marriage and a heartbreaking
miscarriage, Crown Princess Masako gave birth to a baby girl, Princess
Toshinomiya Aiko. The entire country rejoiced, despite current law which
stipulates that only male descendants of the Imperial family may occupy the
throne. The long awaited royal birth has sparked debate over Japan's
succession law, with public opinion polls showing overwhelming support for
allowing an Empress to grace the throne. Perhaps history will show that
Princess Masako's most subversive, feminist act was to give birth to a baby girl.
By embracing the most traditional of female roles, she may, in her own quiet
way, revolutionize the oldest continuous monarchy in the world, and bring
Japan a step closer to equality.
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Appendix A: Subject Code Sheet
This is a translation of the code sheet used to report the content of programs at
women's centers in the 1994 NWEC survey of 623 women's centers.
Respondents were asked to report up to five different subjects from this code
sheet that were addressed by various programs at their centers. I used this same
code sheet to determine the issue content of 889 women's organizations in Japan.
90101 general women's issues
90102 women's studies/women's liberation thought
90103 women's education
90104 women's administration
90105 women's history
90199 women's issues/ women's education other
90201 child and home education
90202 mind-body development
90299 home education other
90301 general education (excluding women's education and home education)
90302 school education
90303 social education
90304 lifelong education
90399 education other
90401 family/home
90402 living standards
90403 food / clothing / shelter
90404 leisure
90499 family/home living other
90501 general social participation /regional activities
90502 political participation
90503 volunteer activity
90504 women's association/ group activity
90505 PTA activity
90506 youth activities
90599 social participation other
90601 general social issues
90602 international understanding /international exchange
90603 consumer issues
90604 environmental issues
90605 human rights
90699 social issues other
90701 general welfare
90702 childcare
90703 elderly issues
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90704 disabled issues
90799 welfare other
90801 general health
90802 health and hygiene
90803 medical treatment
90804 sports / recreation
90899 health/medicine other
90901 labor
90902 self development
90903 qualifications/credential acquisition
90999 labor othr
91001 arts /painting /crafts
91002 flim / photography
91003 music
91004 drama
91005 general hobbies (flower arrangement, tea ceremony, etc.)
91099 culture other
91101 literature
91102 philosophy/thought/religion/ psychology
91103 history
91104 manners and customs/cultural assets
91105 politics/economics/law
91106 natural science/ technology
91107 information
91199 literature, society, natural science other
91299 other
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